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Abstract 
 
If 'nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of 
evolution' (Theodosius Dobzhansky, 1973)1, then, does nothing 
in technology make sense except in the light of evolution?  
 
This study will seek to construct an evolutionary account of technological development. To this 
end, it will consider and analyse a variety of theoretical proposals. In this thesis I will survey 
existing evolutionary accounts found in socio-cultural and engineering sciences, and will evaluate 
how these theories have been formulated. The study will look at evidence and theory, and it will 
consider the formalisation, visualisation and conceptualisation of ancestral-descent relationships in 
socio-technical systems.            
 
In recent years, this area of study has gained momentum among experts from different academic, 
scientific and theoretical backgrounds, particularly those working in the fields of theoretical and 
engineering science, technology, and in the development of social-technical systems. 21st century 
biologists, social scientists, philosophers, economists, and technologists have instigated lively and 
thought-provoking interdisciplinary discussions about the feasibility of quantifying and modelling 
macro and microevolution in technology. Neo-Darwinian theory and modern synthesis theory have 
prepared a framework for a more effective discussion than ever before. The question asked by many 
researchers in this area is how microevolution can bring about macro evolutionary events in socio-
technical systems. However, any evolutionary account of technology requires the application of 
conceptual tools and special theoretical foundations for study that do not necessarily match those 
traditionally used in the study of the organic world. Therefore, to address how microevolution can 
influence macroevolution in technological design, it is important to establish an evolutionary 
account of modular systems in technology in order to depict the patterns and processes that have 
evolved over time in the process of design. 
 
The main principles that govern Darwin’s evolutionary scheme according to natural selection 
suggest that every system in nature uses variation, reproduction and heritability in order to evolve. 
The simplicity of the general principles that govern the theory of evolution in biology has enabled it 
to be generalised as a theoretical framework in other academic and research fields. However, the 
                                                
1 Theodosius Dobzhansky (1973) Genetic Diversity and Human Equality Basic Books, New York 
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existence of directionality and intentionality in the production of artefacts makes it necessary to 
extend the definition of, and to re-examine, evolutionary mechanisms and classic notions of 
synthesis. For example, Simondon's theory of concretization considers the horizontal transmission 
of technicality in systems.2 Additionally, Baldwin and Clark argue that the theory of modularity is a 
powerful conceptual tool which can be used in different fields, and this theory sheds light on how 
extended evolutionary operators work in technological systems.3 
 
It is possible to find similarities between evolution in natural history and the developmental history 
of modern technology. Historical objects in the two fields are connected together through the idea 
of reproductive descent. This thesis will investigate how the unit of selection affects the process of 
evolution and the hierarchical classification of modular systems, and how evolutionary mechanisms 
bring about evolutionary change in design space through time. It will explore how different 
evolutionary operators interact to cause 'phenotypic' effects. The main challenge of the thesis will 
be to explain developmental patterns found in socio-technical systems, and in the biological 
selective regime, into an extended synthesis. To this end, a scientific investigation of shared 
research is required, and emphasis will be placed on how this unifying approach can delineate 
evolutionary mechanisms, functional theory and evolutionary methodology of design, evolutionary 
operators, and phenotypic-genotypic distinction in technology. 
 
It is apparent that evolutionary theory can be used for theoretical planning in the growth and 
development of technical-social systems. The basic principles of Darwin’s theory of evolution notes 
that each system (which can), under a selective regime, achieves properties including variation, 
reproduction and heritability, in order that the system can evolve. Academics who study the growth 
and development of technology in the context of an evolutionary-historical process often use the 
idea of genetic transfer for inspiration.  
 
                                                
2 Gilbert Simondon On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects Jérôme Millon (2005) 
3 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark Design Rules: Vol. 1 The Power of Modularity (2000) 
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Introduction 
 
Is an ‘evolutionary’ approach towards studying developmental patterns in the artificial world 
possible? Can it give us a new understanding of different fields of knowledge, and can we discuss 
artificial science alongside natural science? As part of its research process, this thesis aims to 
address questions such as these. Are biological models suitable for understanding socio-cultural 
evolution? While these models may have introduced some much-needed methodological rigour into 
the field of humanities research, and although they represent an important area of interdisciplinary 
research, they fail to capture some key aspects of cultural transmission. In particular, innovations 
that are combinatorial, or require some depth of learning for adoption, seem largely intransigent to 
biological models.  
 
This thesis will consider the development of a model, which can capture the dynamics of 
technological change, and one, which is inspired by the biological evolutionary approach. In 
biology, one of the key advantages of Darwin's theory of evolution is that 'macro-evolutionary' 
patterns and trends can be explained in terms of 'micro-evolutionary' processes, such as selection, 
drift, and mutation. The same advantages can be gained by viewing socio-techno change as a 
Darwinian evolutionary process. Here, 'macro-evolutionary' patterns and trends can be explained in 
terms of 'micro-evolutionary' processes, and sometimes the researcher can borrow concepts used in 
biology (e.g. artefactual selection or technical drift) in order to explore technical micro-evolutionary 
processes that have no parallel in genetic evolution (e.g. non-random 'guided variation'). Lewontin 
outlines the three main general principles of Darwin's theory as follows: 
 
1. Different populations have different morphologies, physiologies and behaviours (this is known as 
phenotypic variation). 
2. Different phenotypes show different survival and reproduction rates in different environments 
(this is usually referred to as physical capacities with differential fitness). 
3. There is solidarity between parents and offsprings in association with future generations, in that 
fitness is inheritable.4 
 
There is some dispute among academics about the validity of applying a ‘genetic evolution’ 
approach in other fields. Jablonka & Ziman note that the 'cultural evolution' model cannot be a 
                                                
4 R C Lewontin 'The Units of Selection' Annu Rev. Ecol. Syst. (1970) pp.1-18 
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direct imitation of the 'biological evolution' model.5 However, they also note that the basic 
framework of biological evolution theory can be preserved when thinking about technology, 
because one can find similarities between natural history and the developmental history of modern 
technology. It is possible to observe and examine the reproductive descent of both organisms and 
artefacts. However, it should be mentioned that, over time, different theories have developed in 
these two different scientific fields, and those that study the patterns of the gradual growth of a 
material culture have the potential to present different views of the selection process. 
 
The idea of Mendelian inheritance not only succeeds in filling a gap between variation, selection 
and transmission, but this work develops a framework that can be used to examine how 
evolutionary theories in other fields work. However, evolutionary theory, as applied in other fields, 
necessitates the formulation and use of adequate conceptual tools, and special theoretical 
foundations, which do not necessarily match those used to examine the organic world. In other 
cases, evolutionary theories used in other field facilitate their own version of selective process. 
 
Disputes about the nature of technology, the manner of industrial growth, and its development and 
its interaction with society continue to this day. Over time, more and more thinkers have considered 
the relationship between technology and society in various fields of science and philosophy. For 
example, Francis Bacon considered the effects of technology on society for the first time,6 and Karl 
Marx explored the idea that technological innovations might result in the progression of socialism 
and communism.7 In the 20th century, thinkers such as Simon (1969)8, Mokyr (1998, 2000)9, 
Basalla (1988)10 and Simondon (2005) further contributed to the subject of the growth and 
development of technology.11 I will refer to the work of these theorists throughout this research. 
 
Identifying a distinction between technologically made and naturally reproducing objects is the first 
step towards exploring how the development and growth of technology is both distinguishable from 
                                                
5 Jablonka and Ziman (2000) 'Biological Evolution: Processes and Phenomena' in Technological Innovation as 
an Evolutionary Process (Ed: Ziman J.) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge pp.13-27.  
6 Farrington, Benjamin Francis Bacon, The Philosophy of Industrial Science (1951) 
7 Karl Marx – Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. First published Tue 26 August 2003 substantive revision 
Mon 14 June 2010. Retrieved 4 March 2011 
8 Herbert A. Simon The Science of the Artificial (1969) MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1st Edition 
9 Joel Mokyr 'Science, Technology, and Knowledge: What Historians can learn from an evolutionary 
approach' in Neither Chance nor Necessity: Evolutionary Models and Economic History (1998) and 'Natural 
History and Economic History: Is Technological Change an Evolutionary Process?' Lecture (April 2000) 
10 Basalla The Evolution of Technology Cambridge University Press , 1988 
11 Gilbert Simondon (2005) 
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and related to the evolutionary biological process. Simon defines artificial objects based on their 
goals and functions, and he considers technological evolution as a directive-oriented process.12 
Intentionality in design by humans aims to protect technological innovation from the process of 
random mutations, but in theory of design, directionality and randomness is a complex subject. A 
weak account of directionality can be noted in the biological world (Darwinism), Lewens believes 
that genetic mutation embodies a form of design (directionality), because some mutations are more 
probable than others are, but this does not necessarily mean these mutations have better qualities.13 
In technology the human designer often deliberately and directly contributes towards design 
improvement. However, it could be argued that there is a convergence in the concepts of directness 
in design innovation and evolutionary genetics. When working within social-technical systems, the 
designer has to work with the raw materials, energy sources, and the environmental, political and 
commercial conditions available to him or her. Indeed, the selection process only really plays a role 
in the directiveness of a set of variants of existing differential fitness.   
 
The evolution procedure in technology as inspired by genetic transmission can reach some level of 
technicality transmission from the basic element level in the system to its phenotypic level. 
Technology grows by means of engineering procedures, which are related to the quality of technical 
objects and design methodologies. By applying the theory of self-organisation in biology, 
Simondon describes the final steps of producing technology and the process of the technical 
identification of a technical system as 'technical concretization'.14 Indeed, technical objects in their 
progressive stage move towards self-organization as an organism. It must be remembered that 
external observers such as operators in control rooms etc. that interact with the external world 
control technical systems. However, the idea of the concretization criterion considers systems as 
independent of such external observers. However, concretization may also refer to ‘functional 
concretization’, which relates to the creation of a multi-function component. Vincent Bontems 
suggests it is historical progress and ‘historicality’ that contributes to concretization, rather than 
aesthetic aspects, which are trans-historical.15 However, it is important to note that the external 
appearance of technology can sometimes play a role in classifying the technical maturity of a 
                                                
12 Herbert A. Simon (1969) 
13 Tim Lewens 'Innovation and Population' in Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds: Comparative 
Philosophical Perspectives Edited by Ulrich Krohs and Peter Kroes (2009) p.153 
14 Gilbert Simondon (2005) 
15 Vincent Bontems 'Gilbert Simondon’s Genetic ‘Mechanology’ and the Understanding of Laws of Technical 
Evolution' in Techne 13:1 (Winter 2009) 
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system. Indeed, external appearance can contribute towards establishing concretization-oriented 
factors. For example, in the aviation industry, hydrodynamics plays an important role, and the 
architecture and configuration of a system can affect the functioning of a system. In this thesis, I 
will consider a non-liner developmental pattern of technical change in terms of historical models 
initiated by evolutionary function theory. 
 
In Simondon’s view a linear and monotonous developmental programme in technology does not 
exist. Simondon evaluates the development of technology by looking at non-linear patterns. He 
suggests that elements develop individually, and that individual elements develop in sets until new 
elements result over time.16 For example, the steam engine was placed into a steam locomotive and 
then into a system of transportation, and then an entire system was established based on steam 
technology. Then, over time, the steam engine was replaced by an electric motor, and this led to a 
transportation system reliant on electric energy.17 
 
To understand Simondon's non-linear evolutionary theory, an accurate understanding of what he 
calls 'associated milieu' is of crucial importance. Associated milieu refers to when a technical object 
is not gradually matched to an 'associated milieu' in a systematic fashion, but when this matching 
takes place thoroughly and at once. When an artefact is immediately placed in certain operational 
and proficiency conditions, a system of natural elements is constructed surrounding the technical 
object, which are not completely artificial, and these play the role of intermediary between technical 
elements and natural elements. For example, hydraulic cooling systems in industry can play such a 
role. During a CDQ project when an engineer extinguishes coke by dry quenching, the red-hot coke 
reaches 1050oC and is placed in special modules. Then a neutral gas flow is blown under the 
modules to cool the coals. The neutral gas blown from the upper hatch of the container lowers the 
coal heat to the extent that it becomes suitable to be transferred to the furnace, and this makes the 
coal ready for implementation of the next thermal operation, which produces copper. In these 
conditions, the neutral gas and cooling system play the role of associated milieu for the CDQ 
project. In addition, a power generation system is placed laterally besides the CDQ unit in order to 
make use of the heat of exhausted neutral gas for electricity generation. A boiler, a steam turbine, 
and a condenser are embedded in this accessory unit in order to generate the power. Thus, the fluid 
                                                
16 In Simondon`s theory 'individuals' are equivalent to artefacts, and 'sets' are equivalent to systems. 
17 Marc J. de Vries 'Gilbert Simondon and the Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts' in Techne 12:1 (Winter 
2008). This research is part of the Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts study that was started in 2002 by Peter 
Kroes and his group at the Delf University. 
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carrying the boiler is the 'associated milieu' for the set of coal and neutral gas. Therefore, this 
environment is relative to the system in which it operates. 
 
Evolution in technology can be related to the system of Darwinian adaptation (meaning adaptation 
with its environment), since an artefact can be considered as an interface between an external 
environment (an environment in which the artefact operates) and an internal environment 
(ingredients and the internal structure of the artefact itself). Co-ordination between two internal and 
external environments may account for the sorting process of technical change. Lewens speaks 
about technology changing like a sorting process. For example, ions on a metal surface match with 
their environment after time, and artefacts match in with their cultural-economic environment.18  
 
As well as the physical structure and functional nature of the artefact, recognising the environment 
in which the artefact works becomes important, because function acts as an intermediary between 
the environment and internal structure. Thus, an artefact’s fitness can be considered as a kind of 
design 'sorting' element which is directed towards meeting the market's and the user’s needs. This 
idea mostly concerns the empirical question of what forces are involved in the selection process. 
Additionally, the biological world can be compared with the technological one when we consider 
such things as environmental issues, organism solutions and traits purposes. Academics and 
researchers have examined the application of directiveness and adaptiveness in the technical and 
organic worlds. According to Griffiths, two main general ideas about design engineering can be 
defined: 
 
1. Reverse Engineering - This deduces propounded problems by examining the environment and the 
limitations of solutions, which can be adapted to any problems, posed. 
 
2. Adaptive Thinking: This reverses the deduction direction. It makes use of recognising the 
adaptive issues of an organism in order to predict probable solutions.19  
 
In this regard, nature operates like a design procedure in the evolution processes, and we as humans 
interact with the design process and solve design problems when we examine internal structures, 
and engage with limitations and environmental constraints. 
 
                                                
18 Tim Lewens (2009) p.140 
19 Paul E. Griffiths 'Functional Analysis and Proper Functions' in Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 44 (1993) pp.409- 422 
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Since a specific structure demonstrates different adaptive characteristics in different environments, 
creative design needs to execute strategies that can place a related phenotype in the best 
environmental conditions, with the help of specific operators and genotype structures. These 
developmental strategies create the conditions for phenotype acquisition. However, 
developmentalist theorists argue against the process of adaptationalism, which confirms selection 
pressure on phenotypes. When using the 'artefact model' it can be assumed that different 
components, which construct a system, have a role to play in the overall capacity of the system. 
They co-operate in the system’s fitness, even if they do not have evolutionary and design history, 
and only by means of the role they play in the current system can they contribute to the system’s 
fitness. This approach, which looks at the presence of traits and a biological or artificial structure 
without paying attention to the historical past, is called a systematic analysis of function, and it can 
be compared with etiological explanations of function theory.20 
 
The presence of intentionality in engineering design, and the conscious selection mechanism (in 
accordance with market demands and functional requirements) grants directionality to engineering 
procedures in technology in terms of non-linear developmental patterns. To understand non-linear 
evolutionary theory, an accurate conception of the artificial environment, and the physical structure 
and functional nature of artefacts is crucial. Certain structures interacting in different milieu find 
different adaptive properties based on the actions of evolutionary operators. Although using 
evolutionary strategy is promising for shaping developmental patterns in technology, scientific 
progress and in economic theory, the distinctions between biological systems and technical-social 
systems highlights the importance of the preparation of a distinct conceptual framework for this 
kind of model. In this respect, the most important idea to consider is the presence of human desire 
and intention in the production of artefacts, and the idea that purposeful design is at the centre of 
such consciousness. Purposeful design is the intentional sensitivity of technological innovation 
toward human needs, social conditions and aesthetic aspects. The positive internal and external 
adaptation of a system may follow the optimality model. With this idea in mind, an 
engineering/design approach would try to find the adaptive factors,  
 
Traits are essential in the evolutionary process, and every population possesses traits in order to 
evolve. However, these traits are not necessarily made up entirely of biological entities. Silby 
                                                
20 Robert Cummins 'Philosophy of Science Association' in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Jun. 1977) 
pp.269-287 
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explains that individuals within a population have unique characteristics. He defines the 
characteristics of a human population as follows: 
 
− The capacity to compete for resources.  
− Uniqueness of character of the individual within the population. 
− The capacity for reproduction.  
− Production of offspring, which have some, inherited characteristics. 
− The production of offspring that are unique, and who possess characteristics that their 
parents lack which are created by particular evolutionary operators like mutation and re-
combination, etc.21 
 
It can be seen that an evolutionary account of the pattern of scientific progress22 and an 
epistemological one23 can be proposed. Games theory and economic theories can also be evaluated 
using such strategies. The structural similarities between evolutionary processes in biology and in 
technology remind us that technological innovations can be exposed to evolutionary variations, 
under the influence of operators. Although these evolutionary similarities are promising in order to 
shape an evolutionary strategy for technology, there are some ways in which biological systems 
differ from techno-social systems, and this is why it is so necessary to prepare a distinct conceptual 
framework from biology for such a model. 
 
One of the great differences between a biological and a techno-social system is the presence of 
human will and desire to shape artefacts. When purposeful designing is placed at the centre of 
consciousness, technological innovations are not blind to human needs, social conditions and 
aesthetic aspects. Although Weismanian 'character' is absent in variations presented for selection in 
technology, the presence of Lamarckian traits can be found in the field of technical knowledge, and 
acquired traits can affect engineering procedures. Of course, there are other differences that can be 
found and analysed as a basis for selection, and I will discuss these in Chapter One.
                                                
21 Brent Silby (2000) 
22 Stephen Toulmin, Ronald N.Giere, Michael Bradie, Wevner CalleBaut, Pik Pinxten, Louis Boon, Richard 
S.Wesfall & L.Janathan Cohen are just some of the scientists who explored this subject. 
23 Campbell-1974, Riedl-1984, & Lorenz-1967 explored this subject. 
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Chapter One of this thesis explores the basic conceptual and theoretical elements of the artificial 
and evolutionary worlds. In this kind of exploration, it is important to consider the role of the 'unit' 
of selection, and to examine the unit of selection in the context of its role as replicator. This 
approach helps to resolve ambiguity at the level of selection. In the past few decades, much debate 
has taken place among evolutionary biologists about the level and unit of selection. Selection is the 
result of replicator and interactor operation. An item is considered a replicator if it transfers its 
structure intact to the next generation following reproduction. The main principle of Darwin’s 
theory of evolution is the idea of natural selection and survival of the fittest, and this can be used to 
inform the contribution made by phenotypic effects in fitness. By considering these ideas, the 
evolutionary patterns of technological growth can be established. Using an historical-etiological 
approach it can be seen that adaptation occurs in the process of creating artefacts and systems that 
are used optimally in context (which have fitness). This adaptive process (in recursive practice) can 
be related to optimality in technical-social systems.  
 
Technique and technical knowledge, engineering procedures, design traditions, aesthetic aspects, 
and commercial and economic aspects can have an effect on what is understood as the unit of 
selection. In this approach, a mentifact is considered a unit of selection. This idea views the 
cohesive whole as including the artefact and all activities involved in its production, use, 
maintenance, and developmental patterns (like design methodology, engineering procedures, etc.) 
which act to achieve the stable reproduction of the technical systems. Chapter one assesses different 
units of selection, as they have been interpreted by different academics, and the different 
frameworks within which innovation and variations in technical-social systems occur.  
 
An understanding of how evolutionary theory works in technology is crucial in order to discover 
how these two worlds (artefactual and natural) interact with each other. Chapter Two looks at 
whether it is possible to distinguish artefactual kinds from natural kinds, and whether the artefactual 
world is determinable ontologically and epistemologically. A theory of the artefact should be able 
to establish coherence of physical-chemical and intentional aspects. However, examining artefactual 
kind is not merely an analysis of structural properties. Intentionality plays a central role in human 
artefactual design, construction and use.  
 
Chapter Three discusses why technical systems are considered the product of a design process. The 
product and process of design is linked together, and the methodology of design as it affects 
  16 
technical systems as a product of the design process is examined. An understanding of evolutionary 
mechanisms as they work in the design space is a pre-condition of an evolutionary theory of 
technology. Design methodology is involved with the improvement of the design process. John S. 
Gero talks about activities such as formulation, synthesis, analysis, evaluation, re-formulation and 
the production of a design description.1 These procedures look at how function, structure and 
behaviour are linked together in the design process. Based on the evolutionary methodology of 
design, new innovative elements (structural, behavioural and functional elements) enter into the 
design space in terms of a means-end system in different environments. By looking at adaption to 
milieu, this methodology may provide solutions to the different problems posed by different 
environments.  
  
Chapter Four looks at different fundamental theories about function, such as intentional function 
theory, system function or causal-role theory, and etiological-evolutionary theory. By presenting 
existing theories of function, it is possible to consider whether one single theory of function can be 
used to answer all questions about how function works. I will review existing theories and examine 
the advantages and disadvantages of these theories. The chapter considers the distinction between 
proper function, accidental function, and malfunction. Over the past decade, discussion about 
intentional, evolutionary-etiological, and systematic interpretations and approaches, or a 
combination of these approaches, has instigated debate and conflict among theorists. This thesis 
will consider these debates in detail. These debates have led some theorists, including Robert 
Cummins, to modify their previous theories (Cummins modified his theory in his 2002 essay 
entitled Neo-teleology). The subject of 'malfunctioning' is one of the most common causes of 
conflicting argument. Therefore, in order to overcome theoretical obstacles, conjunction and 
disjunction combination theories are frequently used by academics in order to try to present a 
comprehensive interpretation of function. Some of these theories look at functional analysis from 
the perspective of the use plan or the action-oriented activities involved in production, design and 
use. In this chapter, I will provide an historical-evolutionary account of function, and I will present 
a discussion about how the interpretation of function can be used in an evolutionary model of 
technology. 
 
Planning a dynamic evolutionary theory for technology means that a method is needed in order to 
                                                
1 John S. Gero 'Creativity, emergence and evolution in design' in Knowledge-Based Systems 9 (1996) pp.435-
448 
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link the past to the future events. It could be argued that, in technology, modularity plays the same 
role as heritability does in the world of nature. Evolutionary mechanisms that act on the unit of 
selection are a requirement for evolution. Baldwin and Clark2 look at the dynamic possibilities of 
modular operators in complex systems, such as splitting a design and its tasks into modules, 
substituting one module design for another, augmenting and adding a new module to the system, 
inverting to create new design rules, and porting a module to another system. The six operators act 
across modular architecture, and I will examine how two operators work within modules, 
replicating, combining and extending. Some modules bring about variation in the architecture of 
modular design, and others are sources of diversity and act as the search paths of modules. In 
addition, genetics-like operators act on modular structures to create differential fitness in terms of 
adaptive patterns which leads to optimality. 
 
                                                
2 Baldwin and Clark (2000) 
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Chapter One 
 
The Foundations and Conceptual Elements of Evolutionary Technology 
 
The basic principle of Darwin’s theory suggests that each system, under a selective regime and 
properties including variation, reproduction and heritability, is enable to evolve. The difference 
between biological systems and technical-social systems has led to the formulation of distinct 
conceptual frameworks. In order to establish an evolutionary account for technology, I will 
consider fundamental elements and a conceptual framework. In this regard, I will review theories 
that examine adaptive patterns and the Unit of Selection in technology. I will propose a two-sort 
theory for Unit of Selection for the artifact and all relevant activities that are required for stable 
replication. The presence of intentionality in engineering design and the conscious selection 
mechanism (working in accordance with needs and functional requirements) defines the distinct 
adaptive criteria in technical systems.  
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1.1   Adaptive Form and the Selection Process in Technology and Biology 
 
One of the most valuable ways of looking at evolutionary theory in biology is to consider the nature 
and variety of an environment’s selective pressures. Technological evolution is the process whereby 
technical systems adapt to the environment, and this process can take place with more speed than a 
genetic one. It is useful to specify which level, under what patterns, technology adapts to an 
environment, and to what extent the developmental programs included in the engineering design 
can influence the selection process.  
 
Edward Constant (2000) and researchers such as Akich and Latour (1992) and Law (1997) examine 
the distinction between material and social aspects of technological change, and they argue that 
technology is established by human and non-human factors as fixed networks. They suggest that 
fitness or adaptation without stable unity and coherence between these factors does not have any 
meaning.  
 
For biological systems, adaptation refers to a process whereby, in a historical-etiological word, an 
organism survives in response to environmental problems. When considering the nature of an 
adaptation process in technology, it is reasonable to question what limitations there are for adaptive 
forms, and which part of the technology structure is involved with this adaptation? The theory of 
Darwinian evolution, based on natural selection and survival of the fittest, points to the contribution 
of the phenotypic effects of an organism to its fitness, and this creates a relationship between 
adaptation and fitness. This is not a one-way or linear relationship, and the existence of optimum 
solutions against adaptive problems does not necessarily result in fitness. For technological 
systems, we can study evolutionary patterns, algorithms and strategies in order to show how a 
technical trait adapts within a social-artefactual environment. In other words, artefactual selection 
acts on the artefact based on optimal design, and, indeed, design is optimal concerning context of 
use. Optimality is the result of developmental programs, which are subject to internal restrictions 
(the internal environment), and selection pressures (the external environment).  
 
I will review three strategies in which adaptation is conceived for technological systems. John H. 
Holland shows how a system is exposed to adaptation (the fittest phenotype) by a mixture of 
operators that operate on the structure of various systems. He specifies how operators and structures 
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can be identified in different fields of study.3  
 
Fields Structure Operators 
Genetics Chromosomes Mutation and 
recombination etc. 
Economic planning Mixes of goals Production activity 
Control Policies Bayer’s rule and 
successive approximation 
etc. 
 
Physiological psychology Cell assemblies Synapse modification 
Game theory Strategies Rules for iterative 
approximation of optimal 
strategies 
 
Artificial intelligence Programs Learning rules 
 
Table 1: John H Holland- Comparative Operators 
 
An entity is shown to be optimal, and subsequently, adaptive when operators operate in each of the 
named systems, when obtainable structures are set, and when the limitations governing a 
developmental program are identified in an adequate time. The desired trait is selected based on the 
context in which it is located. The concepts of optimality and gradual growth are not the only two 
theories that can be used to explain the design process. In the car design and manufacture industry, 
over time better vehicles are produced that are faster and safer than previous models, and designers 
create and produce new models based on their knowledge and experience. Therefore, optimal 
design results in producing better vehicles. However, can we argue that innovations in the aviation 
industry have come about due to the design optimisation of cars, or that the innovation and design 
                                                
3 John H. Holland Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems University of Michigan Press (1975) 
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of spacecrafts has resulted from optimality in the design of aircrafts? Although, shared cross 
industry innovation does take place, can it be argued that innovations in one technological sphere 
always lead directly to innovations in other technological spheres? In nature the fittest species do 
not evolve directly as the effect of the gradual evolution of its predecessors; mutation and 
randomness play a part in the natural process of evaluation, and these concepts help us to analyse 
and understand nature. Therefore, it is possible that technological innovation incorporates mutation 
and randomness also. It is possible to consider that in technological design, new generations of 
artefacts incorporate traits that are the result of randomness, mutation and adaptation.  
 
David Perkins identifies the selective forces to create a history of optimal forms using three 
distinctive strategies, as follows: 
 
1. Adaptation by revision 
2. Adaptation by selection 
3. Adaptation by planning4 
 
Adaptation by revision is informed by Lamarckian theory whereby innovations and variations are 
exposed to a trial and error process, and are based on a recursive procedure (in technology fields) 
and epigenetic inheritance (in biological fields), and, then, as a result, more adaptive forms are 
created. Physiological adjustments are like a muscle strengthening, and a form of learning takes 
place through adaptation by reviewing what operates in the life cycles of individual organisms. One 
of the restrictions of this adaptive pattern is its need for intelligence. The process of evolution 
through adaptation by means of revision means that significant knowledge is needed of the fitness 
perspective. Of course, this intelligence and knowledge does not imply the need for consciousness, 
because the muscle strengthening process is a mechanism without consciousness. For example, 
although the body-shape of a fish in formation is adaptive to physiological hydrodynamic 
knowledge, it does not necessarily have awareness of hydrodynamic criteria. The second restriction 
is that even if this adaptive process is directed consciously, the desired knowledge may need 
revisions to meet special environmental and local needs, in a given time-space. The classic 
mechanic paradigm in relation to energy and mass remaining at high speeds occurs in science. 
However, in the history of technology changes in engineering procedures and techniques based on 
                                                
4 David Perkins (2000), Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary Process Edited by John Ziman p.379 
Cambridge University Press 
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environmental conditions (which can include engineering, social, and technical environments) occur 
frequently. This pattern can provide directness and efficiency for the adaptation process.  
 
Adaptation by selection follows a Darwinian pattern. In other words, variations and innovations are 
adapted to the environment by the selection process. Of course, the optimal model is bound to the 
developmental program of the related system, and it is bound to pressures and external adaptive 
problems that inform the need for selective historical modifications. Therefore, the main question 
here is, to what extent can a part of a system contribute to fitness. Adaptationists consider the 
process by which lineages change as a designing process. Therefore, we cannot consider only 
present contributions in the capacities of complicated systems, but also it is necessary to follow the 
historical facts about functional role in adaptation.5 
 
Biological organs and technical systems both promote their ability through the adaptive process. 
Adaptation can take place on two levels: behavioral and technique-genetic levels. Designers may 
acquire experience and technical knowledge by means of interaction with environmental conditions 
based on a trial and error process, as organic entities do unconsciously. Technical and organic 
entities may adapt their behaviour based on their internal expectations of environment to achieve 
goals. Innovations are produced in new design spaces in which designers explore new structures, 
behaviour or function in terms of their experience and knowledge. Production that does not meet 
market demands or that is not chosen by users will be set aside, as the process is in organisms. 
However, although we can find similarities in both fields, it is knowledge and the ability to transfer 
this knowledge to the next generation that defines consciousness in the technical field. Lewens’ 
Artefact Model explores these issues and looks at the similarities between organisms and artefacts. 
Lewens evaluates the biological world based on available solutions following the adaptive process, 
and he explains 'historical process’ that results in the emergence of artefacts and organisms.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 In Chapter Two, I will discuss the different interpretations of function, such as systematic function and 
historical-etiological function. 
6 Tim Lewens 'Innovation and Population' in Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds: Comparative 
Philosophical Perspectives edited by Ulrich Krohs and Peter Kroes (2009) 
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Artifact Model for Organisms 
 
Ancestral organism 
Constraints on variation                                                       Variation not available                          
 
 
 
Variation available for selection 
 
Selection pressure  S1          S2        S3          {S4, S5, S6, …., Sn} 
                                    
 
 
 
Variant emergent from selection 
S1 
 
 
Artefact Model for Artefacts 
 
Limitation on candidate                          Cultural resources 
                                                       
                  
 
 
Candidate problem solutions 
 
        Criteria for choice  S1          S2        S3 
    
       
 
 Finished artifact 
       S1 
 
Figure 1: Artefact Model for Organisms and Artefacts 
 
In the two patterns shown above, the similarities between adaptive forms in the biological and 
technological worlds are clearly seen. In both models, the selection process operates on the 
solutions’ set or candidates (which are bound by some limitations). Therefore, the organisms and 
artefacts models follow similar explanatory principles. Usually, designers produce and test all 
obtainable structures from specific operators. The selection process that is used for technical, 
aesthetic, commercial and legal production operates using 'candidates' with respect to resource 
limitations. Therefore, it seems that by promoting this theory of adaptation, Perkins avoids the 
traditional criticisms that are levelled at adaptation theory.7 Perkins considers an abstract-cognitive 
concept called a fitness landscape. Here the main idea is that in an abstract environment, adaptive 
                                                
7 David Perkins (2000) 
Solution not available for 
consideration 
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forms use cues to reach the summits of geometrical place. This reminds us of gold explorers, and 
the closeness reached to summits determines degree of fitness. This abstract geometrical space 
known as the 'Klondike' fitness landscape has four traits as detailed below: 
 
1. Wilderness Gaps: In the wilderness gap, there are only few solutions available for selection. The 
analogy in the organic world is that there are only a few fitness forms, and in the innovative world, 
only a few choices can be made and only a few solutions ever expand into a presence in the market. 
 
2. Plateau Gaps: This idea refers to more expansive areas where there are only a few guiding signs 
for solutions to be able to reach upper regions of fitness. Therefore, this flat area does not provide 
substantial direction in an investigation process. 
 
3. Canyon Traps: Exploration in this territory often takes place within a closed area. However, it is 
associated with low fitness results and suitable solutions are often created unexpectedly using 
different approaches. 
 
4. Oasis Traps: in this region, exploration is undertaken based on pseudo-solutions, and it is 
necessary to pass through this region in order to achieve a suitable solution. 
 
Therefore, although the space proposes investigation strategies in order to find suitable solutions, it 
seems that the model does not provide an answer to common criticisms about adaptation theory, 
which includes criticisms such as the issue of drift, developmental program limitations, and 
functional commonality. 
 
In the biological world, drift and selection are not forces that act on individual entities. Therefore, 
this issue cannot be analysed in the design of hand-made artefacts specifically. Evolutionary theory 
describes the interaction between various forces and phenomena, and, therefore, in order to describe 
changes in the gene frequencies of future generations, aspects such as drift (which has a statistical 
nature), selection, mutation, and simple mistakes, etc. should be considered. It is the nature of drift 
and selection that persuades Elliott Sober8 and Richard C. Lewontin9 to believe that it is not 
                                                
8 Elliott Sober 'Likelihood, Model Selection, and the Duhem-Quine Problem' in The Journal of Philosophy 
Vol. 101, No. 5 (May 2004) pp.221-241 
9 R. C. Lewontin (1970) pp.1-18 
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possible to predict the direction of a system, and its future, simultaneously.10 In their view, the 
causal processes involved in organism creation are different in that two phenotypic traits might be 
created with combination, and the selection of one may cause the reproduction of both. Therefore, 
although they are in one organism, their causal role is different in the selection process. 
 
Functional commonality acts as a warning for adaptationist, in that different ‘types’ may provide 
similar answers to adaptive problems and pressures, and one can demonstrate these warnings in 
technological development. In the field of biology, examples of solutions that do not have a 
common descent, and do not have the same origin embryologically, are called 'Analogy'. All similar 
traits that work under adaptive convergence are similar structurally, and those that are created from 
the same origin embryologically are known as 'homology. The standard sample of such adaptive 
convergence can be seen in the wings of insects and birds. Although, historically, insects used their 
wings as a way of adjusting body temperature, ultimately they found a flying function. In the field 
of artefact design, this issue is of importance for determining the functional nature of a system’s 
components, especially when we look at the reverse engineering approach from the viewpoint of 
modular systems. In archaeology, it is not possible to deduce the function of an ancient artefact only 
by relying on the structural information an artefact displays. In design tradition, usage context and 
social and economic limitations can impose their own selection criteria on an artefact’s evolutionary 
history. Lewontin's11 research focuses on the constructive and active interaction of organisms within 
their environment and how they can improve their habitat in order to promote adaptation, and, 
hence, fitness. 
 
Constructionist theory looks at conceptual and logical problems relating to adaptive thinking. In 
contrast to artefacts, organisms create their own niche, and indirectly affect selective forces. For 
example, we know that a beaver makes changes to his habitat by constructing a dam, and in doing 
this, the beaver creates its niche. Developmental theory is primarily interested in knowing what 
phenotypes are allowed to work in the developmental program (which is established based on the 
organism's internal qualities), while adaptation theorists are more interested in the manner of the 
phenotype changes in fitness. 
                                                
10 This theory looks at the statistical nature and non-determinism of macrophysics (kinetic theory of gases) 
rather than referring to the basic particle physics (photoelectric effects). There is significant dispute among 
contemporary academics about the theoretical-philosophical results of relativity and basic particle physics in 
this regard. 
11 R. C. Lewontin (1970) pp. 1-18 
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In the production of technical artefacts, co-adaptation can be related to market demand, the user’s 
needs and intentions, and the sources available for the designer to work with. In genetics, 
environmental niche prepares various opportunities for an adaptive design, and the system selects 
the obtainable structures. Geoffrey Miller specifies the two types of selection process in what he 
refers to as Darwinian engineering.12 These are as follows: 
 
1. The engineers use their common sense and knowledge in order to classify alternative designs 
based on possibility. These designs can be created by algorithm or computer simulation. Therefore, 
the computer can learn the path of human responses for evaluation, and imitate the neural network 
involved in humanistic evaluation. The evaluation function can be a combination of common sense 
and engineering principles. 
 
2. An alternative evolutionary method is evaluation in terms of consumers and users. In modern 
business, manufacturers can affect consumer taste through interaction, and the user can co-operate 
in the design and production stages. 
 
Evolutionary algorithms using interaction-al evaluation (the interaction between user and designer) 
is a strategy that integrates design, construction, marketing, and sales in a unique system. Therefore, 
the richness and variety of material culture will increase by introducing the end-user as one of the 
factors of evolutionary-interaction-al selection. However the user’s judgement may import aesthetic 
aspects into the design process, whilst in genetics, the mathematical language in respect of the 
fitness function is evaluated based on the probable number of examples similar to the phenotype in 
the next generation. Therefore, fitness as related to genotype has an effect on its population, and, 
thus, fitness is at the heart of genetic algorithms that are involved in realising multi-objective 
optimisation in artefacts. This means that fitness is evaluated based on positive or negative effects 
on the next generation of devices.  
 
Holland describes the performance measure of adaptive design in different fields, such as genetics, 
economic planning, and game theory as follows: 
                                                
12 Geoffrey Miller (2000) in Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary Process Edited by John Ziman 
Cambridge University Press 
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Field Performance Measure 
Genetics Fitness 
Economic planning Utility 
Control Error function 
Physiological psychology Performance rate (in some contexts, but often unspecified) 
Game theory Pay off 
Artificial intelligence Comparative efficiency (if specified at all) 
 
Table 2: Typical Performance Measure13 
 
The selective forces in technology cannot be compared directly with natural ones in the biological 
world, because of the variant of 'human intention' (which includes the designer and the user). 
However, the selection process generally operates on a population of creatures (biological or 
artificial) which possess phenotypic variations due to their interaction with the environment 
(interactor units). Therefore, along with the reproduction of interactors, the transfer of replicator 
units to the next generation results in lineage as time passes. However, determining the nature of the 
evolutionary unit that plays the role of replicator in the evolutionary process of technology is of 
crucial importance. 
 
1.2  Replicators and Interactors and their Role in the Selection Process 
 
One of the most important elements in the selection process is the unit of selection, and the 
determination and limitation of the unit of selection is important for any investigation of historical-
evolutionary cohesion. Selective forces act on the unit of selection if it replicates itself and is copied 
many times in next generation. Therefore, the unit of selection can be expressed as a vehicle. 
Generally, selective entities can be termed as replicators, and their copies as interactors; this is why 
these terms are always context-dependent. Replicators build interactors, and they interact with their 
environment to become adapted. David Hull divides down this concept further to examine 
replicator and interactor units in a way that removes ambiguity regarding selection levels.14 Hull 
                                                
13 John H. Holland (1975) 
14 Hull, D. L. (1988) 'Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual 
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defines his terms as follows: 
 
1. Replicators: These entities replicate their structure directly. 
2. Interactors: These entities interact with their environment as a coherent whole and produce 
different counterparts.15  
 
Over the past few decades, the identification of the level and unit of selection has been a source of 
dispute among evolutionary biologists. These disputes have centred on discussions about genes, 
organisms, cells, and species. Selection is a result of the operation of replicators and interactors, and 
both these entities need to occur in natural selection. If there is a replicator but no interactor, then 
selection will not occur. In Hull’s view, a replicator only operates when it has structure and is able 
to transfer this structure in the replication sequence. Generally, genes are considered replicators, and 
organisms are considered interactors. Of course, assigning a replicator is context-dependant and 
path-dependant. Sometimes an organism, cell or genome is considered to be a replicator (Dawkins 
elects the gene as a replicator, whilst Lewontin16 treats an organism as a replicator, and Alexander17 
treats species as a replicator) Dawkins believes that species cannot operate as replicator, although 
its genome might, if produced asexually.18 He defines the three traits of a replicator in his 1976 
book The Selfish Gene, and argues that a replicator reproduces samples of itself in order to achieve 
longevity in the evolutionary process, and to achieve fecundity in order to create copies of it-self 
and to gain the ability of fidelity. 
 
The success of genetics in the 20th century was mainly due to the way it succeeded in specifying the 
fundamental unit of hereditary variation (the gene) and the processes that result in inheritance. 
Jablonka and Ziman19 note that the basis for understanding genetic engineering and biotechnology 
is DNA, and the manner of genetic information transfer to proteins, gene construction on 
chromosomes, and gene expression. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Development of Science' in Darwin: A Norton Critical Edition, 3rd Edition, Philip Appleman Ed (2001), 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press pp. 361–363 
15 Hull D. L. (1981) 'Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay' in The Philosophy of Evolution U.J. Jensen 
and R. Harré (eds.), Brighton, England: The Harvester Press, pp. 23-44; reprinted in Genes, Organisms, 
Populations, R.N. Brandon and R.M. Burian (eds.), Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1984. 
16 R. C. Lewontin 'The Units of Selection' Annu Rev. Ecol. Syst. (1970) pp.1-18 
17 Alexander, R. D. and Borgia, G. (1978) 'Natural selection, altruism, and the levels of organization of life' 
Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 9 pp.449-474 
18 Richard Dawkins The Selfish Gene (1976) New York City: Oxford University Press 
19 Jablonka and Ziman (2000) 'Biological Evolution: Processes and Phenomena' in Technological Innovation as 
an Evolutionary Process (Ed: Ziman J.).pp. 13-27. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
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Genes are made up of DNA and instructions known as genomes. A genome is a large community of 
genes, and genes are chemical instructions that are coded into DNA which direct the development 
and progress of the cell. A zygote contains the parent genetic information, and based on this, a 
genetic development pattern in phenotype is established. Living things operate using instructions 
found in their structure, and cell machineries are used for transferring genetic information from 
DNA sequences to various types of proteins and RNA molecules. Therefore, an overall collection 
of DNA is considered as an organism’s potential inheritance power. The list of instructions that are 
included in the genome, and that exist in organism cells, can be defined as the genotype. 
 
The distinction between genotype and phenotype is one of the conceptual foundations of 20th 
century genetics, and is based on the idea that an inheritable part is separated from a part which is 
not able to transfer from one generation to the next. Phenotypic emergence is the result of 
interaction between the genotype and its environment. However, this interaction is not a reaction; it 
only means that many organisms build their environment and affect the way the genotype interacts 
with its environment. Hence, a mutual interaction is made between the interactor and environment. 
In plants, various methods of expressing genotype can be seen, and propagating by slip can share 
identical genotypes in various environments, which develop various phenotypic effects. 
 
However, as Jablonka points out20, there has been research conducted into microorganisms that 
doubts the consideration that all variations that occur in DNA are blind and indifferent to 
environmental effects, and it seems that environmental pressures can have some effect on variations 
in DNA. This body of research offers a second theory about inheritance. The controversial theory of 
an epigenetic inheritance system (EIS) helps to establish similarities that are useful for the study of 
cultural evolution patterns. Epigenetic theory shows how evolution by natural selection can operate 
in a system of acquisitive variations, and it explains the interaction between selective processes and 
the constructor; it takes us beyond the digital information. 
 
1.3  Memetic Knowledge and Unit of Selection in Technology 
 
The selection process is very complicated because it operates between various levels of organisation 
                                                
20 Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb (1995) Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution: The Lamarckian Dimension 
Oxford University Press 
  30 
or structure.21 Probably one of the most challenging aspects of evolutionary theory is choosing a 
unit in technological changes on which the selection process operates, since such a theory cannot be 
understood without attention being paid to social phenomena. In the following paragraphs, I will 
review different theories that consider the mentifact as a unit of selection in technology.  
 
The accumulation and transfer of technical knowledge is part of cultural inheritance. As such, in 
order to be able to analyse how a developmental process interacts with artificial elements, we need 
to gain a better understanding of the transmission process in the accumulation of technical 
knowledge, as well as basic technological knowledge and the dynamic character of the development 
process in technology.  Replicators can be thought of as fundamental units, which embed 
themselves into a vehicle; their success or failure depends on their ability to produce successful 
vehicles. Vehicles reproduce replicators and, respectively, they create vehicles. The idea that 
cultural transmission can play the same role as genetic transmission, and can operate as a kind of 
non-genetic form of evolution (like language evolution) inspired Dawkins22 to consider the 'meme' 
as the replicator in the cultural evolutionary process. 
 
The 'meme' (like the gene) can transfer copies of itself in order to retain continuity in the 
evolutionary procedure, and that the 'meme' is the basic unit of cultural transfer. Melodies, ideas, 
key words, fashion, construction methods and architectural techniques are examples of this 
replicator. The meme can jump from one brain to another through an imitation process, just as 
genes do in a gene pool when they spread themselves from one body to another with the help of 
sperms or zygotes. Dawkins names the 'meme' as replicator in cultural evolution (like the gene in 
biology) and he compares the survival of a gene in a gene pool to the survival value of a meme in a 
meme pool, and he suggests that some 'meme' are more successful in the meme pool. This follows 
the model of natural selection. Dawkins notes three survival criteria: longevity, fecundity and 
fidelity that are valid for meme copying.23 The techno-meme is composed of technical ideas, 
technical knowledge and techniques, and can be thought of as the software for the fundamental unit 
of selection in technology. A techno-meme may spread out through learning, training, and 
imitation, which transfers to the next generation of industry. Such units are capable of replicating 
and responding to selective pressure, and they may evolve through heritability, variety and 
                                                
21 Hull D.L. (1988) p.477 
22 Dawkins (1976) 
23 Ibid p. 194 
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mutation. Spreading the techno-meme is a genetic-like activity and is done by means of the 
behaviour of the host. If they propagate less, then their population may become extinct. 
Alternatively, others survive and by means of genetic-like operators, they spread out to the next 
generation. 
 
Therefore, based on this theory, since technological innovation is part of culture, it is referred to as 
memetic. The techniques and procedures involved in production, and the aesthetic and economic 
factors governing technology can be distinguished from the artefact's structure. It is also possible 
that the evolutionary unit in technology can be explained according to social forces, but the problem 
here is that such forces lack general and public criteria; they are more related to idiosyncratic states 
and local conditions. In biology, although the general goal of selection may be to increase 
adaptation with an environment, the goals for lineage may be variable, but not because variation in 
genetics is blind, nor because of the non-intentional nature of natural selection, but because various 
aspects of the environment are constantly changing. 
 
Derek Gatherer accepts the idea of the meme as the informative unit inside the brain. He proposes a 
theory of behaviourism for overcoming the problem of a non-definable meme-host relationship.24 
Our understanding of the idea of the meme has been developed by specifying two concepts, both 
proposed by Dawkins; he refers to these concepts as Dawkins-A and Dawkins-B. Dawkins theorises 
about these concepts when he talks about the extended phenotype; he considers the meme to be the 
information that is placed in the brain. Gatherer explains these concepts as follows: 
 
- Dawkins A: Based on the 1976 definition, a meme is a cultural transferring unit that consists of 
ideas, fashions, techniques, beliefs, etc. 
 
- Dawkins B: This is a revision of Dawkins' 1976 theory. Dawkins feels he has not been clear 
enough about the distinction between the role of the meme as replicator, and the phenotypic effects 
or meme products. Therefore, he theorises about the extended phenotype. In Dawkins' opinion, a 
meme is an information unit placed in the brain, but it has a certain structure that is realised in the 
communication instruments used by the brain in order to save the information. Phenotypic effects 
may be in the form of words, music, visual images, fashions, and face and hand movements. 
Dawkins' orthodox approach considers the meme as information that has settled in the brain. 
                                                
24 Derek Gatherer Why the Thought Contagion’ Metaphor is Retarding the Progress of Memetics (1998) 
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Dawkins' theory is based on the idea that cultural traits are transferred from one person to the other, 
as are viruses and genes. Therefore, cultural evolution can be understood using the basic 
mechanisms that are involved in biological evolution (e.g. replication, variation etc.). Therefore, 
just as gene frequencies are necessary for the genetic population, meme frequencies are necessary to 
the memetic population. This interpretation focuses on non-observational elements, and is limited to 
the neural patterns and units in the brain that are the carriers of certain ideas, behaviour or specific 
attitudes which are then communicated to other people directly or indirectly, and this transfer can 
spread to people within a society25.  
 
This interpretation is the foundation for External-ism and Behaviour-ism theory, which places 
emphasis on a quantitative approach, and considers the study of cultural evolution in order to show 
the frequency of change in a cultural population. This idea leads Gatherer26 to be interested in the 
notion of the meme as part of a theory of expanding innovation, which concerns the production and 
development of artefacts and their corresponding cultural utilisation in a way that is not compatible 
with Dawkins B theory. The meme is defined as an observable cultural phenomenon such as 
behaviour, an artefact, or an objective of information, which is copied, imitated or learned, and may 
be reproduced within a cultural system. Objective information consists of instructions, norms or 
rules, procedures and social institutions, all of which are observable. Non-observable parts, such as 
beliefs and behaviours are learned by trial and error (tacit knowledge), and are distinguishable from 
the definition of a meme.27 
 
Behavioural-ism theorists like William Benzon28 compare an entire physical culture to a gene, and 
suggest that a culture expands from artefacts, expressions, writings, paintings and art works etc. 
Therefore, by reversing the standard memetic (a meme exists inside the brain, whilst its behavioural 
properties exist outside of the brain), mental processes set up as phenotypes, and physical objects as 
genotypes. I will refer to 'memotype' or 'genotypic meme' to define the role equivalent to a genotype 
(information transported by the gene and passed to the next generation). Additionally, I will use the 
term 'phenotype' or 'phenotypic meme' to discuss the role equivalent of a phenotype (the external 
                                                
25 This idea is similar to the 'mental viruses' idea proposed by Brodie, whereby ideas are transferred from one 
mind to another through imitation or communication. Brodie, R. (1996) Virus of the Mind: The New Science 
of the Meme. Integral Press, Seattle. 
26 Gatherer (1998) 
27 If tacit knowledge is copied through observation, it is classed as a meme by means of learning. 
28 William Benzon 'Culture as an Evolutionary Arena in Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 19(4) 
(1996) pp.321-362 
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emergence of an organism as it is assigned by the interaction between genotype and environmental 
traits). An understanding of the nature of the evolutionary unit and the role of DNA in the process 
of Darwinian engineering (and its role in separating lineages in the selection process) is vital to 
understanding the Darwinian process. Understanding fundamental differences between the meme 
and the gene, even though both play a replicator role in genetics and memetics, can help give us an 
understanding of the 'mentifact', which is the base evolutionary unit in technology. 
 
Dawkins29 points out two fundamental differences between the gene and the meme, as follows: 
 
1. Memes, unlike genes, do not occupy a distinct locus completely, nor do they have an identifiable 
allele. In the case of genes, when we talk about the phenotypic effects, there is not a difference 
between behaviour produced by a brain with or without the meme. 
 
2. When we talk about a meme, we need to question whether the copying process is similar to that 
of the gene.  
 
In genetics, genes can only transfer from parents to offspring (known as vertical transfer), but it is 
possible for a meme to transfer between different people within a society by means of horizontal 
transfer. Therefore, in cultural transmission, generational transfer is not always necessary, and 
information can be transferred much more quickly. Furthermore, the variation in a meme occurs 
more easily from novel memes because of the existence of more available resources, and the 
selection process is more efficient because of what Campbell 30 refers to as vicarious selection. 
Therefore, memetic evolution is quicker and more efficient than genetic evolution. In comparison to 
genes, memes have more fecundity, and less copying fidelity because of their plastic properties, and 
this increases evolve-ability.  
 
In contrast to the behavioural theorists, Robert Aunger considers memes as brain structures, and 
builds a theory about change in technology by focusing on the relationship between memes and 
artefacts.31 He argues that a set of neurons indicating brain states transfers the neuro-meme to the 
next node. Therefore, technology evolves by means of co-evolution between memes and artefacts. 
                                                
29 Dawkins (1976) p.112 
30 Campbell, D. T. (1960) 'Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge 
Processes' Psychological Review 67, pp.380-400 
31 Robert Aunger 'What’s Special about Human Technology?' Cambridge Journal of Economics 34 (2010) 
pp.115-123  
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Here, the artefact is the unit of selection, whilst the selection pressures that operate on it are 
interactors. In addition, they can be replicators for memes, as observed in the phenomenon of 
computer viruses. multiple relationships with memes are formed based on these different roles, and 
co-evolution exists in all cases because memes create artefacts, and artefacts may interactively feed 
memes in order to change them or produce a newer type. Both memes and artefacts follow their 
own selection pressures. If memes are ideas or techniques, then their phenotypic expression is an 
artefact or behaviour. For example, cooking instructions stored in the brain are a set of meme, and 
the prepared food is the phenotype. 
 
However, artefact production is simulated in the mind based on the brain's structural arrangement, 
where various alternatives are tested based on competitive advantages. This simulated process may 
occur in the research and development process (R & D), or in the market. Inventing new artefacts 
can occur based on the mutation or re-combination of techno-memes. Therefore, in this view, the 
techno-memes only transfer from brain to brain. In addition, the reproduction of techno-memes is 
not really a transferring process, because transferring a memetic unit to people in a population needs 
media and carriers, which have enough stability to show phenotypic expression without changing 
the form. 
 
In a strong account, the meme makes contact with people in society, and reaches the stage of 
phenotypic appearance that is created from brain structures and mental conditions (the memo-type). 
In other words, memes go through a process of memo-type expression. This introspective memetic 
process is when technology is at a stage where it emerges as a memo-type (in the human mind) but 
does not have any plan for transferring this phenotype to the outside world. 
 
Change and progress in technology are realised in society when technical knowledge and 
engineering sciences play a main role. In contrast to Aunger, Joel Mokyr32, criticises 'the blind 
variation with selective retention' model. Instead, Mokyr develops an evolutionary model of 
technological progress that comprises a general interpretation of the dynamic of a population’s 
history by means of sets of evolutionary units. He distinguishes between the underlying structure 
that determine traits (although they are not determined completely) and the manifested entity that 
can operate in the role of evolutionary unit. 
                                                
32 Joel Mokyr 'Innovation and Selection in Evolutionary Models of Technology: Some Definitional Issues' 
presented to the Conference on Evolutionary Models in Technology in Wallingford, England on Jan. 9-12, 
revised June 1997. 
  35 
 
Indeed, general interpretations of 'underlying structure' and 'manifested entity' in different fields 
may extract their own specific functions and methods. For example, in biology they can express the 
genotype and phenotype respectively. In evolutionary epistemology, the knowledge base, as 
espoused by Campbell (1974), of which the elements determine the properties of cultural entities, 
can be analysed in terms of its role in underlying structure. Cultural units, such as ideas, traditions 
and techniques, and so on can be considered as a manifested entity.33 Based on this view, 
techniques used in the economic history of technology can be considered as evolutionary units in 
the dynamic process that links the past to the present. Technique can play the role of manifested 
entity in the technological field. Mokyr indicates these possible techniques with the symbol λ, and 
he shows the useful knowledge equivalent to underlying structure using the symbol Ω.34 One of the 
most important parts of evolutionary theory is being able to map useful knowledge Ω into sets of 
feasible techniques.  
 
Mokyr defines three basic principles in the Darwinian model that comply with the above-described 
process.35 One of these is the relationship between underlying structure and the manifested entity, 
which in biology is the relationship between genotype and phenotype. Useful knowledge includes 
scientific knowledge and beliefs about the natural world, whilst technological knowledge considers 
rules and relationships between artefactual phenomena, engineering science, and rules governing 
over natural world. In addition to descriptive knowledge, this kind of knowledge adopts a normative 
stance, which is the result of a system of rules relating to empirical situations. Therefore, this theory 
is 'more operational' than cognitive. This is why science is constantly trying to explain, describe, 
and observe, and renew abstract concepts based on universal rules. However, the production and 
research of technology uses rules to control natural phenomena and to manipulate natural structures 
to meet human needs. Therefore, there is a difference between scientific predictions (which are 
concerned with finding proof) and technological predictions (which are concerned with the manner 
of influence on events and tools). 
 
One of the central principles in the evolution model concerns the interaction of Ω and λ. How does 
                                                
33 Campbell D.T. 'Evolutionary Epistemology' In The Philosophy of Karl R. Popper edited by P. A. Schilpp, 
pp.412-463. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.  
34 Joel Mokyr (1998) 'Science, Technology, and Knowledge: What Historians Can Learn from an Evolutionary 
Approach' in Neither Chance nor Necessity: Evolutionary Models and Economic History (1998) 
35 Mokyr derived this word from the work of Simon Kuznets. 
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a change in useful knowledge, which is the carrier of information about the natural world, 
engineering science knowledge, and cultural beliefs, cause changes in engineering processes and 
construction instructions and patterns? Aristotle believed that knowledge and technology belong to 
two different fields of human experience, and, therefore, he separated theoretical knowledge from 
practical knowledge.36 Based on Aristotle's observations, a difference between 'knowing-that' and 
'knowing-how' can be distinguished. Scientists working in the field of scientific knowledge can 
explain phenomena, and evaluate the truth of scientific theories according to efficiency, safety, 
value, and aesthetic aspects etc. in order to prepare norms for technology to be used by practical 
engineers who evaluate the function and efficiency of engineering processes, and design and use 
patterns, techniques, and artefacts, etc. 
 
In order to analyse the development of technical knowledge, Walther Vincenti divides technological 
knowledge to three parts: descriptive, prescriptive, and tacit knowledge.37 These three fields of 
knowledge inter-act with each other, and they involve different levels of industrial production. The 
interference co-efficient of these knowledge levels is directly related to the type and structure of the 
artefact, production instructions and techniques, design procedures and traditions, and engineering 
norms and standards, etc. this establishes one of the most challenging theories in the history of 
technological knowledge, which examines the relationship between useful knowledge and 
technique. The goal of science is to access the reality of the external world, which is then described 
based on experiment and evidence, whilst technology wants to change, control and manipulate the 
outside world according to human needs and demands. 
 
The rules and traditions of design and engineering are based on empirical research resulting from 
trial and error, and even if the rules are based wrong principles, this may result in techniques that 
survive the selection process. The application of descriptive knowledge uses descriptive rules, 
which have been formed because of experience and practice. However, although these sorts of rules 
seem to describe phenomena in a similar way to scientific rules, they only prescribe an operation 
partially, and they still do not work within the complete framework of scientific theory. These rules 
have general structures and principles that explain technological knowledge. Descriptive knowledge 
includes technical specifications of equipment and structural-physical properties, and, hence, it can 
                                                
36 Layton, E. (1974) 'Technology as Knowledge' in Technology and Culture, 15(1), pp.31-41 
37 Walther Vincenti What Engineers Know and How they Know It: Analytical Studies from Aeronautical 
History The Johns Hopkins University Press (1990) 
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determine the presence of scientific knowledge in technical artefacts.38 Therefore, it is useful to 
consider the evolutionary model of the techno-meme on two levels: a) in respect of the evolutionary 
interpretation of engineering science progress, and b) in respect of the effect of this conceptual 
evolutionary progress on technology. 
 
Mario Bunge defines technological knowledge as theory, grounded rules and technical 
information.39 He divides theory into two main sections as follows: 
 
1. Substantive theory40 
2. Operational theory 
 
The close relationship between substantive theory and scientific theory can result in fields of 
engineering and applied sciences such as thermodynamic rules, fluid thermal systems, and 
engineering heat transfer, and the design of parts and rules governing electrical systems etc. 
Essentially, substantive theories relate to the application of the almost real conditions of scientific 
theories, such as flying theory, which is a function of dynamic flow. These theories prepare 
knowledge about the activity subject, for example the machine. Operational theories are a cross 
over between scientific theories and technology, and they bring technology one-step closer to its 
operational level and empirical conditions. Operational theory relates to the operation itself, and this 
is the starting point of the relationship with human activity, and the combination of human and 
machine in almost real conditions. In game theory, operational researchers who make decisions 
about the flow of urban traffic are using operational theory. In moving from applied science to 
technological knowledge there will be an encounter with substantive theory, which brings about the 
engineering-scientific method and background. Substantive theories only allow scientific methods 
to pass, so operational theories will inherit the scientific method. Based on this, Mitcham explains 
that it is within the realm of construction where substantive theory has been widely used whilst 
operational theory has been widely used for application. 41 
                                                
38 Herschbach (1995) believes that the framework of theoretical explanation in descriptive knowledge is not 
completely grown. 
39 Bunge (1966) 'Technology as Applied Science' in Technology and Culture Vol. 7, No. 3, Summer, 1966 
40 In Polanyi’s view, substantive theory is systematic technology which stands against empirical 
technology which results from descriptive rules, Mitcham (1978) 
41 Mitcham (1978) p.257 
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1.4 Evolution of the Scientific Part of the Techno-meme 
 
Discovering to what extent scientific theory affects technological theory has been the subject of 
much debate throughout the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries. Establishing the engineering sciences after 
the industrial revolution, and basing industry in part on scientific discovery, became the popular 
norm. However, this interaction between science and technology can be indirect and it does not just 
include scientific rules acquired from scientific theories. For example, the pre-hypotheses behind 
the design of the mechanical watch is one which uses Galilean equations to show mathematical 
order and the formalism that governs the behaviour of the world.42 Alternatively, the use of 
scientific rules in the field of Research & Development (R & D) as taken from functional and basic 
research is another example. 
 
It is possible to explore the designing of an artefact’s physical structure according to its function. 
However, the testing and evaluation process for prototypes implies putting the artefact through the 
rigour of scientific experiment and testing. Engineering science is involved with the interactions of 
physical factors in machines and artefacts, and with the idealisation of machines like thermal 
machines, for example, which rely on proficiency and efficiency. This indicates that engineering 
science differs from the idealisation and abstraction of basic science. However, apparatus like MRI 
scanners and transistors are good examples of the effects of scientific progress on the development 
of technology. However, scientists and theorists have often disputed the priority and recentness of 
the influence of science on technology in this field, and vice versa. 43 
 
Industrial innovations in their historical stage may have appeared through a trial and error process, 
and probably without comprehensive scientific research. If the breeze of science had not blown on 
them, then these artefacts would still be non-efficient and non-proficient. For example, the rules of 
fluid mechanics served to help the functioning of water turbines. In addition, an understanding of 
the gram in mathematical explanations and differential equations had an influence on the creation of 
the dynamo (generator) or gramophone. In addition, Longmire’s electronic equations were used to 
help convert power stations. Carnot’s principle was used to show how the diesel motor could be 
useful and proficient and the principles of electricity and electrodynamics’ rules have contributed 
                                                
42 Layton (1974) p.31 
43 Marc J de Vries and Peter Kroes investigated examples such as the steam engine and the can opener (which 
was made by Brabantia, the Dutch company) and named these as examples in a historical reasoning theory 
about the effects technology has on science and vice versa. 
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towards vehicles, as we know them today. In addition, the rules of fluid mechanics have helped to 
grow air transportation systems, and to facilitate a scientific perception of hydraulic systems and 
combustion chambers.  
 
The accumulation and growth of engineering-scientific theories in the field of descriptive-normative 
knowledge has had a direct and indirect effect on the evolutionary model of technology. 
Researchers such as Bondi look at the relationship between science and technology in the same way 
as they view the relationship between the bird and egg.44 Epistemologists such as Campbell (1974), 
Bradie (1986) and Callbout (1987) try to present recognition in humans as a biological 
phenomenon. Bradie 45divides the evolutionary theory in two distinct but related sections in order to 
describe the epistemological reasoning, as follows: 
 
- The Evolutionary Epistemology of Mechanisms (EEM): This relates to the development of a 
biological reasoning for selective-ism, which interprets in order to develop and evolve the cognitive 
mechanisms of organisms, i.e. the brain and neural systems etc. 
  
- The Evolutionary Epistemology of Theories (EET): This is an effort to infer the biological model 
of selective-ism for developing human knowledge, especially scientific knowledge. Therefore, the 
evolution of recognition mechanisms and cognitive products such as science, culture and 
technology, can be the result of biological evolution. In EET, scientific and epistemic theories 
evolve in a similar way to evolution in biology. 
 
In this regard, M. A. Notturno46 distinguishes the two concepts of evolutionary epistemology as 
follows: 
 
- Scientific change can be described as an evolutionary process conforming to Lamarckian and 
Darwinian principles, in the same way as Campbell (1974) describes the Popperian methodology of 
conjecture and refutation in an evolutionary model. 
 
- Understanding the cognitive capacity of humans and other animals in terms of evolutionary 
                                                
44 Hermann Bondi 'What is Progress in Science' in Problems of Scientific Revolution: Progress and Obstacles 
to Progress in the Sciences edited by Ron Harre (1975) p.4 
45 Michael Bradie 'Should Epistemologists Take Darwin Seriously?' in Evolution, Cognition, and Realism: 
Studies in Evolutionary Epistemology edited by Rescher, Nicholas (1990) p.33 
46 M. A. Notturno 'The Evolutionary Turn: A Role for Philosophy in Evolution, Cognition, and Realism: 
Studies in Evolutionary Epistemology, Edited by: Rescher, Nicholas (1990) 
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development in a way that increases survival value. These capacities have survival value in their 
own biological niche. 
 
We impose our own theories and interpretations on our observations. Therefore, scientific theories 
are not the result of observations, but they are conjectures that are selected or omitted by testing. 
Therefore, the growth of scientific knowledge can be seen as adaptation in an evolutionary process 
(an approach to truth). Each time, there exists a set of observational statements that are accumulated 
in scientific theories that are the outcome of scientists’ interaction with the environment. What 
evolves from this is a set of theories, and these theories contain an observational logic that gives 
each theory a rational credit or fitness in relation to observational statements, and is the criterion of 
empirical statements in science. 
 
Thomas Samuel Kuhn47 outlines a developmental approach for scientific progress that is different 
from that purported by most philosophers of science. Kuhn believes that it is the consensus of 
scientific society and scientists, which sets the criterion for the progress of theories. He rejects any 
criteria for reasonable selection between theories48. Kuhn's understanding of the levels of progress 
and change in science is as follows: pre-science, normal science, crisis, revolution, new normal 
science, and new crisis. In short, he suggests that scientific society goes from one paradigm to 
another while facing insoluble problems and the above-mentioned circle continues. The non-
continuous results from the change process of paradigms, and paradigms become non-measurable 
based on criteria, methodology, and world-view etc. This gives the scientific revolution an 
exclusive and non-accumulative transition. Stephen Toulmin (1972) Ronald N.Giere (1970), 
Lakatos (1970) and Laudan (1984) are the most important theorists who engage with Kuhn in this 
field. 
 
In contrast to Kuhn, Toulmin’s analysis49 suggests that humans (by means of their various cultures 
and historical eras) have a mental loyalty to certain different sets of concepts. He suggests that the 
role of concepts in the growth and expression of knowledge is only possible by considering their 
relationship with conceptual development and evolution in the past. Therefore, scientific progress is 
                                                
47 Thomas S Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) The University of Chicago Press 
48 Positivists, including members of the Vienna circle discussed logical positivism, verification-ism, 
falsification-ism, and analysed the selection criteria for theories. 
49 Stephen Toulmin (1972) Human Understanding: The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts Princeton 
University Press p.133 
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not merely a descriptive explanation of developmental patterns, and it is not necessary to equate 
rationality and logicality in scientific growth. Toulmin focuses on rationality and interpretation to 
explain continuity and change in rational enterprises, and he looks at the mental content that forms 
the conceptual population. This population is a reflection of the balance between the innovative 
factors that are responsible for the appearance of variations in populations, and for selection factors 
that revise them by developing suitable variations. 
 
Of course, selection between intellectual variations can be a complex process because every 
intellectual innovation has the potential to optimize our understanding in one aspect, and confuse it 
in another aspect. Therefore, we do not know if criteria such as prediction, inheritance, domain, 
accuracy, and empirical efficiency, etc. are functional and measurable in every case, since 
methodology, theoretical models and basic questions in the scientific field and in historical 
processes include gradual change.  
 
Intellectual Enterprises are created in the same way as organic types, and defined as separate 
scientific disciplines. Each discipline is attributed fundamental goals, methods and concepts. The 
intellectual content of these scientific fields can change over long periods, and subsequently, 
intellectual methods and goals change more slowly. It should be noted that each scientific field has 
a recognisable continuity, which can be unstable, particularly as a result of selective forces that 
cause changes to its content. Although continuity is created, long-term changes can transfer or 
substitute scientific content. 
 
Continual changes involved in a gradual process. In each scientific field, intellectual innovations 
come from a current pool of ideas and techniques, but only a few innovations find a place in the 
canon of the scientific field that is transferred to the next generation of scientists. Therefore, the 
permanent creation of intellectual innovations is balanced with the continual process of selection. In 
suitable conditions, this process can be interpreted in order to achieve stable adherence of a certain 
scientific discipline, and also for the fast transfer of information in a new and different scientific 
discipline. Therefore, the main principles of Darwinian Theory that theorise on the continuity of 
organic types and their methods of change (based on the perpetuation process of innovation and 
selection) are met as a result of intellectual changes. 
 
Humans with curiosity and intelligence keep the flow of innovation or intellectual variations stable. 
Popper (1963) describes scientific method as a dialectical succession of conjectures and refutations 
  42 
that can be interpreted as an evolutionary model. Ecological conditions, variation and selection can 
result in effective scientific change. 
 
Sometimes, the selection process in the scientific field operates to gain accreditation of a 
competitor’s innovations in response to intellectual-environmental demands. Intellectual variants 
and concepts that co-exist with them are designed to meet these demands. Therefore, words like 
competition, benefit, demand and success are comprehensible in intellectual evolution by seeing 
them in the historical process of intellectual variations and selection in the scientific field. From this 
viewpoint, we can consider that scientific fields are made up of an evolutionary set of processes and 
techniques that are used to consider theoretical and scientific issues. In addition, we can consider 
the idea that science is an evolutionary set, which comprises organisations, institutions, and humans 
who use certain techniques and processes. 
 
Over the years, theorists and technologists have explored these ideas. William Whewell (1794-
1866) tried to organise morphology of scientific progress. Larry Laudan50 sees scientific theory as 
an effort to solve empirical and intellectual issues about the intellectual world. He argues that 
scientific progress is achieved in three ways, as follows: 
 
- When a substituted theory succeeds in solving empirical issues better than previous theories have 
done. 
- When the theory succeeds in order to solve an irregular case. 
- When intellectual agreement is created between competing theories. 
 
Most of the evolutionary models of science, unlike those of the positivists and falsifiers, explain 
theory as a unit of progress in science. this model looks at scientific theories in the form of 
structures which rely on research programs, and which comprise a hard core and a protective belt. 
What evolves from these models, are abstract things like a population of theories or concepts, or a 
research program. 
  
 
In contrast, Ronald N Giere suggests using the scientist as the base unit for analysis.51 He looks at 
                                                
50 Laudan (1977) Progress and its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth ISBN 978-0-520-03721-2 
51 Ronald N. Giere 'Evolutionary Models of Science' in Rescher Nicholas (Ed) Evolution, Cognition, and 
Realism: Studies in Evolutionary Epistemology Lanham, NewYork, London: University Press of America 
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growth in the population of scientists rather than growth in the population of concepts and 
theories.52 However, intellectual evolution involves the evolution of a scientists' society, which can 
reproduce, as well as pose questions about growth and change in scientific theories and the 
evolution of individual theories. Questions about truth, reality and progress can logically be 
separated from evolutionary observations. Therefore, in many ways, Giere follows Quine (1969) 
who makes epistemology natural, not because of evolutionary theory, but as a cognitive science. 
 
The second idea that Mokyr proposes about the Darwinian model is that each basic evolutionary 
model must comprise a dynamic system of change over time, and a probable process of definable 
properties that can relate the past to the future. As previously mentioned, he considers technique, 
routine, and procedures as selection units.53 In the biological world, stable changes occur through 
mutation (or random changes), and evolutionary direction occurs by selection on organisms 
carrying those changes. In technology, new items occur in the useful knowledge sphere (change in 
Ω) which is then involved in a random process of mutation and selective retention. Such mutations 
may be explained by phenotype (λ). If they are not mapped in λ, they can be kept in Ω, and be 
activated at a certain time as a part of adaptation to a changing environment. In engineering science, 
theories like aerodynamics, heat transfer, vibration, and hydrodynamics, etc. each have such an 
experience in their stages of technological growth. Techniques may also reproduce themselves by 
learning, both practically and empirically. 
 
The imitation and repetition process, like that present in memetics, can be considered as the techno-
meme replication process. A phenotype can be constructed based on wrong theoretical concepts, 
superstitions or traditions, but it may survive because of its positive interaction with the 
environment in the selection process. He calls such techniques singleton techniques, and an 
example of this is using cinchona bark to cure Malaria.54 Techniques are created in a socio-
economic environment based on human needs. Therefore, a significant part of knowledge, like the 
natural mutations in biology, may or may not be used directly in production stages. Technique as a 
construction instruction, and methods used to manipulate nature, are distinct from operational 
principles that explain how objects work together. This is similar to the algorithms of computer 
                                                                                                                                                            
(1990) pp.127-171 
52 A scientists’ society consists of 6 groups: science in general, scientific fields (physics, chemistry, etc.), sub-
domains (such as geo-physics etc.), investigation experts, investigation groups, and individual scientists. 
53 Mokyr (2000) 
54 Ibid 
  44 
programs that can explain the manner of production and manipulation of nature's powers. 
 
Techniques that operate in the role of replicator can be transferred from one generation to the next, 
and simultaneously appear as the phenotypic expression of knowledge, but due to a lack of  
integration, other vehicles and techniques are eventually used. We can classify the main classes of 
vehicles as follows: 
 
- Techno-social System: The place where the techniques are embedded. For example, the technique 
of working and using train station. Of course, other carriers of technique are able to change the use 
of patterns and operational methods. An example of this might be when we use a chair to stand on 
to getting access to something. Therefore, artefacts, as phenotypes, or as the phenotypic expression 
of instructions and procedures for engineering and construction, can be the carrier of technique. 
 
- Experienced People: Technical information can be stored in books, dictionaries, electronic 
memory, etc. independently of being used or not, and in the minds of experts and technologists. 
 
Therefore, it seems that technique in itself cannot work in interaction with environment in the role 
of interactor, but vehicles can be used in interaction with the environment for techniques related to 
use, and for reproduction, when the re-production instructions are proposed. Tacit knowledge can 
be found in the technique itself, and, to a large degree, is the result of judgment, skills and 
individual acts. In The Tacit knowledge, Michael Polani55 distinguishes different phenomenological 
aspects, such as semantic and ontological. 
To a large extent, situational knowledge relates to interpretation by the individual mind, and it is 
related to individual properties and experts. It can be distinguished from other knowledge based on 
accessibility. One of the characteristics of inaccessibility is that it cannot be expressed formally, 
and, therefore, diagrams and images etc. are used to imagine it. This kind of knowledge can be 
transferred via training as part of the relationship between the supervisor and trainer. It is possible 
for a significant part of industry and modern technology to be influenced by these kinds of 
traditional and non high tech skills.  
 
Situational knowledge, which can include technical knowledge and commercial rules and 
techniques, brings a personal and individual dimension into the knowledge held by experts and 
                                                
55 Polani (1966) The Tacit Dimension. London, Routledge University of Chicago Press 2009 reprint 
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experimenters. In his review of the aviation industry, Walter Vincenti distinguishes six conceptual 
tools that, he argues, contribute to technological knowledge.56 
 
1. Fundamental concepts in design (operational principles and normal configurations). 
2. Criteria and technical specifications of the design. 
3. Theoretical tools (mathematics, reasoning and the rules of nature). 
4. Quantitative data (descriptive and prescriptive). 
5. Practical principles. 
6. Design instrumentalities (procedural knowledge). 
 
The concept of design implies that rules and principles govern the relationship between components 
in a system, the architectural plan, and the locating of those parts. Standards of basic engineering 
always affect prototypes. In addition, theoretical tools, such as plan drawing software and technical 
calculations (like the calculations relating to static force in a steel structure and calculations relating 
to pressure resistance in hydraulic systems) are the tools that enable engineering science. 
  
Physical-chemical traits can link to functional aspects, for example the order of activities in a 
technical system’s components (such as a production line). In addition, geographical, local, 
political, and social factors and limitations could be classed as influencers of situational knowledge. 
It can be seen that situational knowledge plays an important part in technical innovation. 
 
The third factor that Mokyr considers as important in the Darwinian model is fertility and super-
fecundity. This means that for the selection process to be able to operate within the system, there 
are always more entities than those that actually enter the environment. As mentioned before, the 
selection mechanism operates on two levels in respect of technique and useful knowledge. In 
technology, the intellectual selection process occurs by the selection of production methods, 
physical-chemical structures, the use plan and final products, in which companies, experts, and 
users (market pressure) can be classed as selectors.  
 
There are similarities between Mokyr’s evolutionary model of technology and the biological one.  
Changes in useful knowledge Ω occur by blind variations and selective retention. However, the 
emergence of new techniques by chance in every evolutionary system may face resistance because 
                                                
56 Vincenti (1990) What Engineers Know and How they Know It: Analytical Studies from Aeronautical History 
- The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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these changes are rarely what the system needs. Sometimes optimal mutation occurs without 
attention to previous knowledge, such as the discovery of X-rays for example (by Rontgen in 1895) 
or when the smallpox vaccine was discovered. Then, the next operator is a re-combination one that 
is the appearance of techniques that are the result of new forms of useful knowledge recombination. 
This re-combination can also occur in the production of certain artefacts like installing a 
combustion engine on a balloon. Therefore, both natural selection and biological innovations occur 
hierarchically. In addition, the function of a technological or biological structure can be used for a 
different goal from that which it was selected for it, and a trait with a specified function shows 
another behaviour or operation during its own selective history.  
 
Of course, in technology, designers may not be able to predict the alternative function of a structure 
in an adaptive environment. Natural selection can optimize the available structures for the current 
functions. The idea that the function and operation of industry may change throughout its 
evolutionary history is investigated by Vrba & Gould, and they devise two different concepts of 
fitness: 
 
1. A trait that has been shaped in the past for a particular function (adaptation) can now be 
considered for a new function (exaptation). 
 
2. A function that does not carry a direct act of natural selection, and is considered as a side effect 
of a trait.57 
 
How birds use their wings is one of the classic examples of this kind of thinking. Wings were first 
used as a way of regulating the body temperature of living creatures, but they evolved to be used for 
flying. In fact, the function of wings changed from being a system of temperature regulation to a 
flying system during historical evolution. In addition, artefacts can show this kind of change in 
function also. Mokyr places emphasis on the Lamarckian idea of technological evolution, and the 
reflection from Ω to λ. Whether a technique is ever used or not it has a subset in Ω a named 
epistemic base, and this evolutionary model is illustrated below: 
 
 
                                                
57 Gould, Stephen Jay, and Elizabeth S. Vrba (1982) 'Exaptation — a missing term in the science of form' 
Paleobiology 8 (1): 4–15. 
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Figure 2: Darwinian Standard Model and Evolutionary Epistemological Model of 
Technology58  
 
                                                
58 Joel Mokyr 'Natural History and Economic History: Is Technological Change an Evolutionary Process?' This 
is the draft of a lecture. (April 2000) 
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Technical knowledge and techniques are effective factors in the process of technological 
development. Other aspects that can contribute to this process are design traditions and procedures, 
aesthetic, and social and legal aspects. In addition, restrictions resulting from the use of resources 
and technical-constructive aspects can give direction to the evolutionary process in technology. 
Scientific methodologies and tools can be effective contributors to any research processes, but the 
majority of technologies are not constructed based on these factors alone, nor do they have less 
dependency on them, except in fields such as biotechnology and pharmacology that concern 
exploration rather than design. It depends on human factors for the emergence of its vital power, 
and is subject to various limitations. 
 
Focusing on knowledge to develop technology is necessary, but it is not enough to explain 
technology. Concepts, techniques, procedures and cognitive ideas are part of a social-material 
interaction that makes technology more effective as an activity that influences the real world. 
Engineering sciences can determine design space based on concepts that result from science, but the 
effort to transfer technological art to a science has never been successful. Science rarely produces 
optimal or enough 'operants' for technological functions, as the scientific-ation of technology does 
not necessarily create a satisfactory productive language. 
 
Stankiewicz59  emphasises that design space is determined and developed in almost all 
technologies, and new 'operants' are created as the evolutionary base unit by random explorations, 
or by research or fusion with pre-existing design spaces. Research regimes require a minimum basic 
knowledge that is placed under vicarious testing techniques within a structured research 
environment. This results in effective heuristic research. Therefore, final solutions are realised in 
the form of artefacts or particular technologies, rather through designing or following a transfer 
process from exploration to design. The following processes can be considered as process of 
transferring from discovery to design. 
 
1. Reverse Engineering: The science oriented analysis of natural systems that humans intend to take 
control of such as biomedicine and biochemistry. 
 
2. Analytical Deconstruction: A science-oriented analysis of available technology to describe 
scientifically its functional principles. This scientification creates a priori design space. For 
                                                
59 Stankiewicz Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary Process Edited by John Ziman Cambridge 
University Press (2000) 
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example, the effort to identify principles governing the function of a steam engine has led to basic 
knowledge that is used to construct currently used steam turbines. 
 
3. Fusion: An important trait in modern technological development is fusion with an already 
available technology, or with a specific scientific field. Scientific structures can play a key role in 
these technologies. For example, chemistry is combined whit mechanical engineering and establish 
engineering chemistry,  or result of combining microbiology and biochemistry is molecular biology. 
 
Some of the most important technological theorists, historians and evolutionary economists have 
considered the artefact as an important unit of selection. Basalla (1988), Petroski (1992), Farrel 
(1993), and Kauffman (1995) consider artefacts as phenotypes on which the selection process acts. 
Nelson and Winter consider the unit of selection as an 'organisational routine',60 whilst Ziman looks 
at it as a type of technical idea and refers to technological 'memes'.61 Dennett suggests that the 
meme is equivalent to an idea, and based on this, he explained the genotype in terms of concepts 
and phenotype in terms of the physical effects of such concepts.62 Therefore, in his view, 
technology is the phenotypic appearance of technical ideas (the memo-type). Artefacts are memetic 
vehicles from which ideas are created in the brain.  
 
According to Asunción Álvarez, Dennett’s ideas about the memo-type have syntactic character.63 
Dennett suggests that pure formal entities follow a meaningless mechanical process, and although 
phenotypic manifestation is of a semantic nature, the terms are only meaningful subject to 
interpretation. This transfer of information in cultural evolution is thought of as a lingual-neural 
concept of information. Syntactic concepts in theory may be understood in relation to the brain 
structures which surround them, and based on this, meme is primarily a semantic classification 
rather than syntactic one. Meme refers to the phenotypic appearance (semantic) of a mental 
representation (syntactic). This subjective theory views technical artefacts as the semantic 
phenotypic expression of syntactic mental entities. Álvarez explains the contrast between genotypes 
and phenotypes in memetics based on following approaches: 
 
                                                
60 Nelson & Winter (1982) 
61 Ziman (1996) 
62 Daniel C. Dennett  'The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts' Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research Vol. 50, Supplement (Autumn 1990) pp.177-194 
63 Asuncion Alvarez  'Three Memetic Theories of Technology' Techne: Research in Philosophy and 
Technology Vol. 9, No. 2 (Winter 2005) 
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Cognitive/mentalist 
representational/internalist 
memetics 
Behavioral 
externalist 
memetics 
Neuromemetic 
Memotype 
(memetic 
genotype) 
 
Mentifacts Artefact Brain configuration 
Phenotype 
(memetic 
phenotype) 
Artefacts Mentifacts ? 
 
Table 3: Asunción Álvarez - Table of Memetic Terms 
 
 
Standard memetics considers artefacts’ as phenotypes or as the phenotypic expression of concepts. 
Based on an internalist viewpoint of memetics, technology is seen as the phenotypic appearance of 
an intellectual genotype, which is in a humans’ mind. Behavioural memetics considers mental 
representations not as the starting point for the analysis of cultural transfer, but in terms of the 
demand for definable and authorised units. It should be noted that there could not be a complete 
symmetry of evolutionary units, natural selection and evolutionary processes in biology in the 
creation of technology. Artefacts lack essential vital elements for evolutionary development and are 
created out of human desire and conscious effort. Various elements in technology can play various 
roles in a hierarchical classification. These various elements are set out by Fleck as below:  
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Figure 3: Fleck's Hierarchical Classification64 
 
There is a need to identify a building block that can be used as a fundamental unit when examining 
the development process of structures at different levels, one that works as replicator to transfer an 
intact structure to the next generation. These units need to include all elements with which the 
technology interacts, such as cultural, technical and organisational aspects. Therefore, in this thesis, 
the word 'mentifact' will be used to identify a unit of selection in technology which is under the 
process of artificial selection, and one which shows that the artefact can interact with its artefactual 
environment as a dynamic expression of technology.65 It can be used in an indexing role to define 
the degree of artificiality of a technical system, and how it finds a role in artificial processes. 
Human intention, either in production or in usage, is vital to the development of the design space. 
An evolutionary theory that focuses only on the artefact as the gene can be compared to looking at 
bones whilst ignoring the soft tissues. 
 
Changes in technology are related to the conscious deliberation and foresight of human agents. 
Many theorists suggest that this is an extreme opinion, especially in the light of the principles of 
biological evolution. The debate about the extent to which the variation and selection process 
                                                
64 Fleck (2000) 
65 In the final chapter of this thesis, I will talk about modularity as a dynamic process that can relate the past to 
the future in the evolutionary history of technology. We can consider modules as interactors in modular 
systems and the selection process operates on them. 
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sometimes involves conscious and foresighted selection still continues. For example, theorists such 
as Philip Brey (2008) investigate the contrast between natural selection and artefactual selection. 
Selection by humans occurs with an awareness of the effects on the desired object, and the 
consequences of these effects. Therefore, when humans are involved in selection, the process of 
natural selection does include intentional and forward-looking activities. This type of selection can 
also be seen in the animal kingdom, for example, when animals select their own mate, when the 
hunter selects the prey, when animals select the environment in which they live and interact, and 
when parents select which one of their offspring they should feed more and protect more. However, 
the main difference between the processes of natural selection and artificial selection is that in 
artificial selection, phenotypic traits linked to the goal of meeting pre-determined demands. In other 
words, artefactual selection, unlike natural selection, is purposeful. Therefore, both of the processes 
involve a kind of forwarding looking procedure, and the difference lies in purposefulness of these 
activities. 
 
In evolutionary processes in technology, designers play the main role in creating purposefulness 
variations in artificial products. Designers and producers do not have complete awareness and 
control over the value of fitness in the market, because multiple and different factors are involved in 
the competitive environment of consumption. Based on this, it can be said that the, 'blindness 
principle' exists in the technological development process. Marzia Soavi66 found other differences 
between how selection theory can work for artefacts and for organisms as follows: 
 
1. There is no single rule that distinguishes the inheritable characteristics of artefacts from non-
inheritable ones. 
 
2. Items and elements of equal types of artefact are not always a copy of each other.  
 
3. In biological entities, the total number of elements involved in production as related to the type of 
given entities (e.g. types with sexual and asexual reproduction abilities) is certain. However, for 
artefacts, a new design may be inspired by different types. Therefore, sometimes there is a weak 
relationship between artefacts of one type, and this is due to the designer’s inspiration from 
previous artefacts. 
 
                                                
66 Marzia Soavi 'Realism and Artifact Kinds' in Functions in the Biological and Artificial World by Ulrich 
Krohs and Peter Kroes (2009) 
  53 
For a better understanding of the selection process as it operates in the social-technical world, it is 
necessary to try to specify the evolutionary unit (a unit which selection acts upon). It should be 
recognised that artefacts, technical ideas, or even techniques could not be considered as an analysis 
unit in the theory of technological evolution. In order to develop the concept of the 'mentifact' as the 
unit of selection in the current analysis, it is important to look at two similar concepts. One concept 
is theory in terms of  unit of the artefact-activity couple, which examines the dynamic analogous of 
an artefact’s static state. This theory examines a set of artefacts and the human activities related to it 
in connection with use and production. Looking at this theory helps to establish the minimum 
necessary and adequate conditions that work at the lowest level of the selection process, and it 
encompasses all the factors involved in production, use and development of an artefact according to 
the extent of complication of the technology. 
 
when discussing the 'artefactual part of the mentifact', it is necessary to consider all things as 
'artificial things' in Randall R. Dipert’s wording. These things include linguistic utterances, works 
of art, and performing a play.67 Dipert's theory considers how natural phenomena are affected by 
deliberately actions in order to meet needs. Of course, this does not result in giving the quality of 
artificiality to every object that is tainted by the existence of intention and goal. For example, our 
body grows and uses organs for various uses, but organs are not classed as artefacts, although they 
may be used artificially produced, and there may be what can only be described as artificial traits 
working in our bodies. The thesis will examine the limitations of artificial types and distinguish 
them from natural types in the next chapter.  Another aspect of the evolutionary unit is the 
‘software’ that is involved in creating technological development. Software is usually discussed as 
part of the idea of technological procedure. These procedures can consist of organisational aspects, 
design traditions, engineering procedures and techniques, exploration operations, and operation and 
maintenance. A mentifact needs to act as a coherent whole in order to achieve stable reproduction in 
technology. Fleck68 considers the artefact-activity couple, and uses as functional integrity test for 
the evolutionary unit in order to establish long-term stability. This test is an example of what makes 
up the role of technological replicator in the aforementioned coupling. This is illustrated as below:  
                                                
67 Randall R. Dipert Artifacts, Art, Works, and Agency Temple University Press (1993) 
68 Fleck (2000) in Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary Process Edited by John Ziman p.379 
Cambridge University Press, 2000 
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Figure 4: Fleck's Artefact-Activity Couple 
 
Although this cycle of functional integrity does not guarantee to trigger an evolutionary mechanism, 
when resources and conditions change, it can resemble an evolutionary approach, and, therefore, 
has the ability for stable reproduction based on an understanding of means-end relationships. 
Changes can affect the other elements in a feedback circle from both the artificial and technological, 
and results in evolution in a stable pattern. Of course, these revisions may be destructive and non-
useful, just like biological mutations, or they may change according to external conditions. In 
addition, they may have no effect on the technological development procedure, for example like 
producing a motorcycle in India, or making a Samurai Sword in Japan. Therefore, the above 
outlined reproduction process justifies the essential conditions for an evolutionary process.  
 
We need to apply practical reasoning to prepare a description of the means-end hypotheses for the 
progress of activities in order to justify conditions for efficiency. Means-end reasoning allows for 
adjustment in the real world in order to realise an optimal situation. Subsequently, this can be 
related to actions that result in a change in the current state of affairs.  
 
Technological lineage may be distinguished functionally in the reasoning of means-end theory. The 
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Mentifact could distinguish various lineages productively by means of looking at the tacit 
characteristics of related activities. The casual relationship prepares enough conditions to limit the 
lineages, which avoids multi-functional issues.69 This method can be applied well in order to 
analyse the transferring, operation and maintenance of technology. For example, after establishing a 
factory and starting and operating production plants, the production lines need maintenance and 
spare part replacements. 
 
In most cases, the generation of spare parts and equipment is classed as being outside of the range 
of production, and different manufacturers can offer different and new types of part. These 
alternatives often comprise of their own parts, each that has its own particular appearance, 
construction and/or function in operation and maintenance. although the Mentifact is stable, if the 
resource conditions or basic goals change, the reflective cycle of functional integrity will become 
unstable quickly. However, if these changes are useful, the Mentifact will follow them to reach a 
stable point. Examples of such adaptation in technological history are widely seen. Therefore, 
mutation or productive variations can affect the mentifact. 
 
Technological change is an evolutionary process based on artefact-activity coupling (which is a 
combination of artefact, knowledge,  organization and ect). This coupling is able to operate in 
technological development dynamically, and it operates as both replicator and interactor. Theorists 
such as Richard Stankiewics examine the cognitive aspects of technology, but they do not accept 
the technological paradigm, and criticisms against such model usually originate from those who 
favour a scientific paradigm. Critics of the ‘paradigm approach’ argue that technological paradigms 
consist of concepts, methodologies, and particular issues and solutions that are not measurable, and 
they argue that the idea of change does not include the continuous growth of accumulative-
evolutionary development. More importantly, ideas that are used as criteria for progress may have 
different meanings in various paradigms. As a result, Stankiewics decided to introduce the concept 
of a 'design space'.70 The element that grows in evolutionary history is the 'design space', and this 
space accumulates technological knowledge using a problem-solving approach such as the 
cognitive-empirical mechanism. However, a design space is a combined space that is produced by 
oprants. 
 
                                                
69 I will talk more about functional interpretations and theories in Chapter Three 
70 Stankiewics (2000) 
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Oprants must include routines, components and operational units in order to define the relationship 
between function and structure (process). Therefore, each artefact or technical system is a 
configuration of oprants, which can access primary constructive oprants by the analysis of systems 
and artefacts. in evolutionary terminology, oprants are techno-memes in the inheritance process of 
technology. Therefore, it is the design space that is exposed to changes.  
 
Arranging oprants can facilitate the problem solving process, and oprants move forward to stability, 
reliability and transparency in an adaptive process. Stankeiwics71 divides the unpredictable 
evolution of design space into four more or less distinct regimes: 
 
1. The craft regime. 
2. The engineering regime. 
3. The architectural regime. 
4. The research regime. 
 
The craft regime works when personal experiences are accumulated and transferred from teacher to 
pupil. These skills are context-dependant, and selection usually occurs based on final use. 
Engineering regimes appear when a complexity of artefacts and standardisation is achieved. 
Therefore, design activity is distinct from manufacturing and production processes, and engineering 
sciences is one of its fundamental parts. Architectural regimes appear when multi-functional 
systems are designed that are related to the development level of previous regimes. However, these 
regimes differ from classic engineering regimes because this design process is connected to the 
integration and internal capability of the artefact, and the architectural designer must consider the 
functions and relationships with the user also. 
 
Architectural knowledge, like craft knowledge, transfers and accumulates with difficulty, because 
implicit knowledge (tacit knowledge) and subjectivity are mixed into the equation. In the last 
chapter of this thesis, I will talk about modular systems and I will analyse their nature thoroughly 
based on the development of architectural procedures apparent in technology. 
  
Research regimes develop design space by exploring and revising oprants. In traditional 
technologies, such explorations are the subsidiary and random result of regular technical activities 
                                                
71 Ibid 
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like manufacturing and production. In advanced technologies, engineering sciences play a crucial 
role. The effect of knowledge upon innovation and technology development has been discussed, but 
it can be seen that the history of technology is also full of random innovations. For example, in 
1954, when observing the effect of radiations on a bar of chocolate, Spencer accidentally discovered 
the main technology behind the microwave oven. In addition, the artificial sugar (saccharin) was 
discovered by Falberg based on a similar kind of event. These accidents are accepted in the 
selection process because increase objective functions. The analysis of the evolutionary unit and the 
artefact selection process cannot be performed completely until the artefact’s nature and the 
functional-constructive aspects that comprise to construct it are described completely. An 
investigation in this respect will be undertaken in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Metaphysical and Ontological Aspects of the Artefactual World 
 
Understanding the artefactual world in order to examine how evolutionary theory works in 
technology is crucial. Looking at how artefactual interactors work can help this process. Chapter 
Two will concentrate on the question of whether artefacts are distinguishable from natural entities, 
and whether the artefactual world can be determinable ontologically and epistemologically. A 
theory of artefacts should be able to establish coherence in respect of physical-chemical and 
intentional elements, and analysing artefacts should not comprise merely a raw analysis of their 
structural properties. This chapter will look at metaphysical theories that show that a functional 
analysis is not sufficient to determine an artefact's membership of the artefactual world. Identity 
criteria links to artefactual kinds, and I will explore the use of the concept of Fregean cardinality 
and relativism in order to examine the identity of artefacts. 
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2.1 Artefactual Kinds and the Theory of the Artefact 
 
Is it a good idea to try to distinguish artefactual kinds from natural kinds? Any response to this 
question must surely consider whether the practice of describing Darwinian theories in the context 
of technological growth can move beyond the status of general metaphor. When considering the 
development of artefactual kinds in relation to Darwinian theories of the natural world, it could be 
argued that examples of natural entities are those entities that share one or more fundamental 
properties. These properties can be used to identify the constructive elements and structures of 
natural objects. we can distinguish natural objects from artefactual objects in terms of function and 
intentions involving in design, manufacture and use of it. For example, Randall R. Dipert explains 
that artefactual things can comprise linguistic utterances, works of art, and objects that are 
constructed with the intention of maker, designer or user.1  
 
Artefacts can be seen as basic components that are used to construct an artefatual kind. Therefore, 
in order to specify an artefactual kind, it is necessary to look at theories of the artefact. In this 
context, it is also necessary to look at particular concepts and conceptual tools that play a role in the 
artefactual world. The interaction of an artefact with a milieu can be affected by factors that are not 
usually considered when looking at the interaction of natural objects with their environment. 
Artefacts are constructed purposefully, and human interference plays a part in their structure. 
Therefore, the historical-intentional property of an artefact usually plays a main role in its 
artificiality, and such traits are considered when determining the object's function. Artefacts that are 
designed by humans are made in order to meet human needs, and users benefit from them based on 
a means-end idea. The purposefulness of the artefact can be one distinction criteria used to 
distinguish artefacts from entities in the natural world. However, because of the presence of 
multiple functions for artefacts (for example, aesthetic, legal, and lawful, etc.) purposefulness 
cannot be considered as preliminarily concept of intentionality. 
 
Levinson presents a historical-intentional account of artefacts in the world of art.2 In this regard, all 
artifacts are part of the process of historical evolution. The intentional creation of artefacts creates a 
stable identity for them, and a use plan maintains the historical-intentional framework of technical 
                                                
1 Randall R. Dipert, Artifacts, Art, Works, and Agency Temple University Press (1993) Dipert argues that 
intention is not always a necessary condition for the creation of artefactual traits. 
2 Jerrold Levinson, 'Extending Art Historically in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol. 51, No. 3, 
Philosophy and the Histories of the Arts (Summer 1993) pp.411-423 
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systems. However, even though human knowledge about techniques and raw materials etc. may 
change over time, intentional connection results in the establishment of artefactual kinds. Some 
theorists think of artefacts as the institutional definition of art, and, therefore, they do not consider 
the background of the historical-intentional interpretation of artefacts.3 However, in spite of 
criticisms surrounding this approach, it is worth remembering that, from a epistemic point of view, 
we may never be able to identify or classify items fully, because a historical approach is limited 
according to how far back we can 'look back into the past'. However, the risk of a lack of complete 
and necessary knowledge of the past is irrelevant because, if an intentional background for works of 
art is not discoverable, it will still be generalised into the artefact, and, it will never be possible to 
work out the exact number or nature of intentions involved in  the construction of an artifact 
historically. 
 
Before attempting to establish a theory of artefactual kinds and their nature, it is necessary to 
consider concepts such as intention and purpose in order to discover how intentional action is 
involved in the process of production and use. Using this approach, it is possible to generalise the 
boundaries between artefacts and non-artefacts, in order to examine the distinction between 
artefactual and natural kinds. One common concept of technology is the manipulation of natural 
objects, and physical-natural environments in order to meet human needs and purposes. In this 
context, it can be presumed that technology is a particular configuration of actions and natural 
components that leads to the production of artefactual systems. A sequence of actions brings about 
alterations and changes and includes software and hardware engineering. However, many questions 
can be raised about the boundaries between artefactual and natural kinds. Is every object or action 
that meets a human goal or human needs an artefatual one? For example, if we plant a tree to cast a 
shadow, is this tree now an artefact? In addition, when we genetically breed animals, should we 
then consider them to be artefacts? These ideas remain open to discussion, and lead back to the 
question of the extent to which human beings and all their actions and creations are part of nature. 
Can humans work to change nature intentionally? 
 
In order to explore further the development of artefacts, Paul Bloom developed a theory based on 
Levinson’s historical-intentional ideas.4 Bloom does not determine a theory of artefactual kinds 
based on physical structure and a use plan, but he manages to clarify why something can be classed 
                                                
3 Dipert (1993) points out to Dicke (1984) as an example. 
4 Paul Bloom Intention, History, and Artefact Concepts Cognition 60 (1996) pp.1-29 
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as an artefact, which is successfully created with the intention to belonging to that specific kind. His 
theory explains why certain objects are members of the artefactual world, even if they are different 
from some other members of that kind. This explains why some properties like shape, for example, 
are more important than other properties such as colour, for example, when determining 
membership. It is important to prepare a framework that can be used to show how malfunctioning 
objects are separated from functioning ones, and how innovation produces successful artefacts. 
 
In artefact theory, accounting for malfunction and innovation are particularly important endeavours. 
Artefact theory is not reducible to the straightforward analysis of the physical-chemical properties 
of objects, and we cannot infer an object's function without considering the design and use context. 
Artefacts leave a footprint of intentional action that has been used to improve and construct them. 
However, it is necessary to ask the question, can the intended function or current use of an artefact 
be considered as a criterion to determine its artefactual kind? Is having a common function and use 
a necessary and sufficient condition to limit the criterion? An investigation of the criterion used to 
recognise artefactual kinds needs to gather a true description of an artefact by means of 
incorporating the classification of objects, by taking into account an ontological approach. In this 
way, a historical-intentional interpretation can be achieved which can determine the elements that 
contribute towards assigning the artifactuality.  
 
Dipert 5explains the main schema of objects and events classification as follows: 
 
1. There are completely natural objects that are neither modified nor considered for a particular use. 
 
2. There are useful objects with a particular use that can be classified into two categories: 
a) Those that are not intentionally modified for a desired usage are called natural instruments. 
b) Those that are intentionally modified for a desired use are called tools. 
 
3. Tools can be further divided into two categories:  
a) Artefacts that are intentionally modified in order to be recognised as tools; and 
b) Non-artefactual tools that are revised for improved usefulness. 
 
Artefacts themselves can be divided into four more categories that are detailed: 
 
                                                
5 Dipert (1993) 
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1. Those that have communicative purposes; 
2. Those that have expressive purpose; 
3. Those that have artistic purpose; 
4. Those that have practical purpose as distinguishable from the above three kinds. 
 
An artefact may have more than one purpose, and/or the desire, and origin intention may not be the 
considered purpose for current use of artefact, then this classification system is not meant to be 
exclusive and rigid. Indeed, intention is one element that defines an artefact, and this intention can 
include the intentional use of natural objects (instrument), or the design and construction of 
artefacts. However, to proceed to a consideration of the metaphysical aspects of an artefact’s 
conception, it is necessary to ask questions such as 'does intention only mean human intention?' For 
example, a beaver uses pieces of wood in order to build a dam, so, in this case, do we classify these 
pieces of wood as tools? In addition, to what extent can the objects of non-intentional human 
production be classified as artefacts? For example, a pathway can be created between a village and 
a farm because many people have trodden down the pathway by using a particular route over time. 
Therefore, although artefacts can have a common function, this common function cannot prepare 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership of the kind. For example, humans often use 
a screwdriver as a can-opener, or a chair as a stool or stepladder. Therefore, how important is the 
actual intentional function of an artefact in terms of applying means-end reasoning?  
 
According to intentional theory, artefacts cannot change because they are created by means of 
successful intention, to have a desired function. However, physical appearance and chemical-
physical structure cannot prepare the necessary conditions to limit the artefact’s kind. Although 
physical appearance and chemical-physical structure may have an affect on determining the 
function, and consequently the kind, they do not prepare the necessary conditions for membership. 
Malt and Johnson note this idea when they discuss the use of ancient objects used for decoration, 
and they talk about a 'family resemblance' theory in which various functional and structural factors 
can be effective for determining our interpretation of membership.6 
 
Therefore, outlining a satisfactory theory in order to categorise an artefact’s membership of a group 
is required when considering the intentional factors of its historical design and use. In addition, 
                                                
6 Malt, B.C. and Johnson, E.C. (1992) Do artefact concepts have cores? Journal of Memory and Language, 31 
pp.195-217 
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functional properties can determine membership of category. Function can be described and 
prescribed by the designers of artefacts, and it is the general tendency to accept the intentions of the 
designers that contributes towards us gaining an epistemic knowledge of an artefact. However, over 
time the intended function or functions of an object may change. Thus, historical relationships may 
be important in membership. However, the potential use of an object can assign an object to being a 
member of a category. For example, when we sit on a rock, we use it as a chair without thinking of 
any historical connection. In addition, any similarities of feature between a new object and a 
previous one of its kind can be considered as important in the perception of its function and 
intentional origin. 
 
Therefore, when thinking about the distinctions between natural and artefactual objects, it is 
necessary to ask the question, can artefactual kinds be equivalent to real kinds? Consequently, can a 
dependent identity be considered for them? Therefore, determining artefactual kinds by the 
connection of function to a productive intention may pose some theoretical problems. Function is 
not a rigid criterion for artefactual kinds; an object might be used in an unusual way, and therefore, 
is not classifiable based on the function it performs. The designer's intention and the functional 
concept of an object may be specified in the design and production process, but the production 
phase is only the physical realisation of an object just before its operating stage. Prior to the 
production stage, a research phase takes place that follows instructions and generates ideas for the 
design process. The important thing is that the production process must be somewhat successful, 
and this success can be evaluated by two distinct factors: in the conceptual design phase, it is 
assumed that physical constraints should be enough to ensure the performance of the desired 
function of the object, and in the physical realisation phase, the object should meet structural 
requirements which are specified by the designer. 
 
The physical realisation and design phase may be intertwined to the extent that the distinction 
between them becomes impossible. Physical realisation might not only be concerned with 
performance intentions, but also be concerned with creative aspects. This means that function 
cannot always be related to the designer’s intentions. Function might originate from the intention of 
the users, or a use plan, rather than the designer. Another factor to consider is how an object's 
function relates to the components of the artefact. One way in which an artefact is produced is by 
means of trial and error. In such conditions, the designer may ignore how the artefact performs a 
desired function, and how different parts are shared in the total activity. Therefore, a strategy of 
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accepting intentional criterion is not always a realistic way of examining an artefact’s components.7 
With these ideas in mind, Soavi 8 outlines a theory based on the intentions of an artefact’s designer 
as follows: 
 
An object can be 'K’ an artefact kind, if and only when 'O' is produced for the input-output system 
of the structure of the interactor object.9 
 
To clarify the meaning of this definition, it is important to clarify the interpretation of the word 
‘function’ when it relates to artefactual objects. In this context, the word ‘function’ is used in terms 
of the input-output of a system, which realises a final state based on certain primary conditions. 
Alternatively, it may refer to intention involved in the realisation of the technical artefacts. In 
addition, ‘function’ might relate to the use plan (the user’s intention) rather than just to the 
designer’s intention. The interaction with a system prepares the true conditions an object needs in 
order to perform and be used for a specific function. Of course, these proper use conditions do not 
always involve an intentional idea of use, and, based on this, in some cases, we cannot say that the 
proper use of an artefact has been intentional. Consequently, the malfunction of artefacts introduces 
an element of ambiguity. 
 
The object’s structure, which includes all components related to its functional aspects, should 
provide a description of materials and dimensions. This functional description relates to the 
structural-physical description of the object, and is known as the functional-constructional 
description. This criterion provides a reference point for a description of the object’s structure kind, 
which avoids the problem of multi-realisations. The artefact’s kind is determined by the raw 
functional descriptions related to the functional-structural description, which is related to designing. 
Therefore, if a proper function is considered, then no gap is created between the function and the 
membership of a kind. However, restricting artefactual kinds based on functional features, without 
specifying its deliberate history would be an incomplete way of analysing function.   
 
Crawford L. Elder10 talks about 'culturally generated kinds' (CGKs), and his theory takes into 
                                                
7 The trial and error stage is for finding out the structural restrictions of an object. 
8 Soavi (2009) 
9 Sometimes it refers to function. 
10 Crawford L. Elder, 'Realism, Naturalism, and Culturally Generated Kinds' in The Philosophical Quarterly 
Vol. 39, No. 157 (Oct. 1989) pp.425-444 
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account not only an artefact's kind but also its cultural inheritance, such as social behaviours (like 
jokes and promises) and social institutions (like marriages and legal contracts, etc.).  
 
they are real kinds only because they have enough necessary common properties.11 This kind of 
theory calls for a definition of realism that refers to a set of beliefs that are about components of the 
world as understood and received by particular believers, which are not set apart from main 
mistakes contained in a belief set. Artefacts and social entities do not meet a 'realism criterion' 
mind-independence because they relate to human intentions. Amie. L. Thomasson12 challenges this 
view of realism and poses three viewpoints: 
 
An Ontological View: Kinds dependent from human beliefs and procedures in their nature.  
 
An Epistemological View: Gaining knowledge and awareness about kinds based on substantive 
discovery despite the possibility of error and ignorance. 
 
A Semantic View: based on this view, referring to  a kind via causal relationships, other than those 
linked to independent concepts and beliefs. 
 
A semantic and epistemological approach cannot be applied to classify artefacts because of the 
ontological differences they have with natural objects. Therefore, in this respect, it is necessary to 
formulate a different theory for examining ontological aspects, semantics and epistemology in 
respect of objects and their relationship to the human mind and social sciences. The strong account 
of Realism claim that not only does the world exist, but also it has a certain structure that exists 
independently from the mind. There are kinds ‘K’ that are independent from the mind and are not 
mental states, and  have natural borders (defined according to the Independence Principle). To have 
a natural border means that these kinds are not human conceptions that suffer from error or 
ignorance.13 However, the error and ignorance principle can be used as a criterion to limit the 
natural borders of a kind. 
 
As a result, classifying artefacts in terms of their common causal/functional capacities cannot be 
                                                
11 The common properties of CGK referents are metaphysically necessary in order to be a kind. 
12 Amie L. Thomasson, 'Realism and Human Kinds' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 
LXVII, No.3 (November 2003) pp.580-609 
13 The ignorance principle states that the membership condition of (K) a kind may be unknown to someone. 
The error principle states that as natural borders are not determined by accepted beliefs or principles, then 
beliefs may mainly be wrong. 
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considered, because multi-functioning  and malfunctioning artefacts may make problems with 
membership of a kind. Therefore, any classification based on desired function has a better 
possibility of considering both malfunctioning and proper artefacts. However, we cannot view 
intention alone as being enough to classify a kind. It is necessary to examine historical productive 
elements as they refer to desired properties. 
 
2.2  The Identity and Sortal Structure of an Artefact 
 
Identity criteria can be linked to artefactual kind. In the classic definition of an artefact, an object is 
made intentionally by an agent. Agents design and produce artefacts by using acquired knowledge 
and/or instructions that guarantee the achievement of a desired goal. The ascription of goals by a 
rational agent may face restraints, including presumed goals that are always relative to an artefact's 
user.14 Intentional production is an essential property for the existence of an artefact because an 
object is placed among artefacts only if it is the product of intentional production or use. The human 
design process carries the intention of creating an object with properties that can meet human needs. 
Therefore, in these cases, an artefact is always tied up with a productive intention.15 However, at 
least one of the intended characteristics should be a description of sortal category in relation to other 
objects. This not only contributes towards determining an object’s identity, but it prepares a 
criterion for its distinction from other objects. 
 
The origin of an artefact, the author’s intention, and the structural-physical properties of the 
components can reveal sufficient and necessary conditions to limit its identity. For example, a pen 
has a sufficient set of superficial characteristics, but something that has an equivalent nature does 
not necessarily make something pen. Rather, a certain set of particular characteristics makes a pen. 
Nominal kind members do not have a hidden common nature, but we can give them analytical 
characteristics based on their form and function as nominal kinds. Artefact terms are a sub-class of 
what are called 'nominal kind terms', simply because if an artefact kind has a common nature, then 
the artefact's terms can be referred to them. 
 
                                                
14 Pawel Garbacz refers to artefacts that are used for the production of other artefacts as 'artefact-oriented'. 
Similarly, he refers to artefacts that follow other goals as 'human-oriented'. Pawel Garbacz The Four 
Dimensions of Artefacts KR pp. 289-299 AAAI Press (2004) 
15 Hilpern called this a Dependence Condition. Hilpinen, R. (1992) Artefacts and Works of Art Theoria, 58: 
pp.58–82 
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By using the Fregean Cardinality Concept and Relativism, Massimiliano Carrara16  investigates 
whether an artefact can be thought of as a sortal concept or not. Relativism aims to identify the 
relative relationship of a kind or concept. An artefactualist's hypothesis is that an object and an 
artefact do not possess an identity criterion, and sortal concepts do not possess an identity criterion. 
Therefore, relative identity is treated as term for artefacts, because identity is always relative to the 
total term of the certain artefact kind. Further, the concept of cardinality is relative, and the reasons 
that justify cardinality can also be used to justify relative identity. Therefore, for relativists, relative 
identity is similar to cardinality and there is nothing that can be simply measured and counted.  
 
 There can be a sortal concept, if, and only if, it carries an identity criterion. Although a property is 
not necessary for all samples of category, it is necessary to have a common criterion for all of its 
samples. It is not possible to select a synchronic and diachronic identity criterion for all artefacts. 
An object is an artefact if and only when it is a product of human intentional manufacturing, and 
human intentional manufacturing is a process where by an object is materially created from a 
design. Therefore, intentional manufacturing is a necessary property for artefactuality. From the 
discussion of these theories, we can proceed to two outline further theories about how objects come 
to be referred to as kinds: 
 
1. The definitional proposals of Katz and Fodor17 discuss a definitional theory for artefacts in a 
1963 article 'The structure of a semantic theory.' 
2. Eleanor Rosch & Carolyn B. Mervis18  investigate the internal structure of categories, and talk 
about the proto-typicality criterion as a function for referring items to kind, because categorisation 
requests the necessary properties for membership. Their main hypothesis is that members of a 
category can be named when they possesses family resemblances and properties which overlap each 
other19.  
                                                
16 Massimiliano Carrara, 'Relative Identity and the Number of Artefacts' in Techné 13 (2) (2009) pp.108-122 
The next chapter will look at identity criteria from the view of Baber (2000) who reduces it to a relationship 
between the basic and constructive elements of artefact. 
17 Katz and Fodor (1963) The Structure of a Semantic Theory 
http://www.biolinguagem.com/biolinguagem_antropologia/katz_fodor_1963_structure_semantictheory.pdf/ 
18 Eleanor Rosch and Carolyn B. Mervis, 'Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories' 
in Cognitive Psychology 7 (1975) pp.573-605 
19    The structure of the proto-typicality criterion is close to 'cue validity' theory as a model of classification, 
because it concerns the idea of shared properties, which by validity of a cue are determined based on total 
frequency among the discussed categories. Therefore, the family resemblance principle can be restated 
according to cue validity theory, because properties which have the most distribution in one category, and 
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‘Family resemblance' illustrates a structural principle rather than a procedural model. Therefore, 
prototype structure carries distinctive properties that are usually used in defining the category. 
Based on family resemblance the proto-typicalities are those that share the most properties with the 
member of their own category, and have minimum resemblance with other categories. Rosch and 
Mervis20 consider three different types of category, as follows: 
 
i) Super-ordinate semantic categories: like furniture and automobiles that are abstract and share few 
properties for membership. These categories comprise items that are related to each other by family 
resemblance.  
 
ii) Basic level semantic categories: Artefacts like chairs and automobiles comprise objects with a 
level of abstraction that are built from basic level categories. Although membership of this category 
comprises an infinite numbers of objects, family resemblance definitions can imply the creation of a 
set. 
 
iii) Artefactual categories: This category shapes prototypes under consideration. 
 
Appearance together with function can make a different contribution to how a person judges the 
specification of an artefact’s kind, in terms of the relatedness between members of categories and 
the proto-typicality of these members. To an extent, categorisation may restrict analysis to the 
extent of similarities with original members (prototypes) of the category. However, the intentional 
action of the agent (the designers and users) is a key factor in assisting to specify membership of a 
category. In this sense, membership of a category takes into account both the functional and 
structural aspects of an artefact. 
 
Prototype theory argues that membership of a kind can be inferred based on properties like 
function, common use and physical appearance. However, a historical-intentional analysis views a 
chair-shaped object as something that a person can sit on, because we naturally infer that such 
objects are successfully built in order to be a member of a specific kind based on previous and 
historic function and use. Although there are similarities between these two opinions, there are 
explanatory differences. The difference between the two theories involves the prediction of non-
                                                                                                                                                            
the least distribution another category, are the most valid cues in that category. 
20 Eleanor Rosch and Carolyn B. Mervis, 'Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories' 
in Cognitive Psychology 7 (1975) pp.573-605 
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specifiable and ambiguous superficial shapes and forms. In prototype theory something is 
considered as the member of a kind to the extent that it possesses the form of the other normal 
members of the kind, but it is also possible to consider artefacts which do not have a 'normal', 
'usual' or 'similar' appearance to be an artefact of the same kind. Therefore, prototype theory cannot 
ascribe 'abnormal' artefacts to a kind. 
 
The logic of intentional-historical theory also faces this dilemma in cases which possess ambiguity 
in constructive intention or when constructive intention cannot be exactly determined. Similarly, 
innovative artefacts also pose problems for categorisation and definition. Prototype theory suggests 
that we should consider an entity as the member of an artefact’s kind to the extent that it is similar 
to other recognised artefacts of that kind, while intentional-historical theory invites us to consider 
other factors such as a person’s perception of a modification of an artefact based on the physical 
structure and proper function. 
 
When a designer produces a prototype, his/her activity is focused on the properties which he/she 
intends to place into the artefact, and this process might involve innovation and the creation of 
properties that previous examples of the same kind of artefact do not possess. Therefore, he/she has 
a substantial idea of what he/she intends to design.21 Design by intention has epistemological 
results, because human ideas find a path to determine traits and the nature of artefactual kinds. In 
Rosch and Mervis’ 'Proto-typicality Theory'22 the interpretation of family resemblance is an 
interpretation of prototypes based on distribution of properties rather than their simple repetition 
(this is the factor that also distinguishes family resemblance from the cue validity definition). 
However, this means that there could be a distribution of properties that fall into contradictory 
categories rather than those that only fall into the category being focussed on. Therefore, the 
following needs to be considered: 
 
1. The distribution rather than the frequency of properties has the most symmetry with prototypes in 
the natural category. Distribution is related to calibration of proto-typicality in super-ordinate 
categories. The size of the items’ frequency (which is not necessarily related to properties 
repetition) is not related to proto-typicality in the categories. 
 
2. Overlapping characteristics within contradictory categories have distributional properties and not 
                                                
21 Kinds of properties that are related and are the result of intention to realise them in an artefact 
22 Rosch & Mervis (1975) 
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simple frequency properties (sometimes the distributional property is equivalent to the simple 
frequency). 
 
Therefore, prototypes in the natural categories are items with the highest cue validity. The more 
prototypical the member is, the more properties it shares with other members of the category, and it 
has fewer properties with contrasting categories. Based on this, a prototype is a member of category 
that reflects structure as a whole. Looking at historical-intentional theory, there is a close conceptual 
relationship between agent intentions, the artefact and the nature of an artefactual kind. Due to this, 
certain forms of epistemic privilege exist in respect of the nature of artefactual kinds. Attempts to 
answer critics of this theory have been made by explaining that manufacturers, especially of modern 
technology, may not have information about the nature of the artefacts being produced, because 
design can be separated from the manufacturing and production processes. This ignorance occurs 
when people work on different production lines, and any perception of a conceptual relationship 
between artefact and manufacturer is not needed, and the manufacturer may someone that is 
causally related to the physical existence of the object (manufacturer means everyone who is 
involved in the creation of the artefact by intention, even if they have a causal role in production). 
Therefore, in order for something to be an artefact it is the result of a controlled intention to produce 
it. 
 
The epistemic relationship mentioned above is not gained between all manufacturers and artefacts, 
for example, objects that are built by animals like the beaver that builds a dam. Therefore, it should 
be emphasised that to be classed as a constructor of an artefact, it is necessary to assume the 
substantial instructive intentions of the constructor, which results from engaging in an intellectual 
relationship with the artefact. 
 
The idea of epistemic privilege always poses the questions, 'is the manufacturer actually the 
manufacturer, is an object really an artefact, and does a particular artefact really belong to a 
particular artefact kind?’ Not knowing the answers to these questions weakens the epistemic 
relationship between the manufacturer, the artefact and artefactual kind. Thomasson23 suggests that 
a manufacturer is someone who has certain intentions to create an object from a certain kind. Where 
these intentions are substantial and involve particular criteria to control activities, then they should 
                                                
23 Amie L. Thomasson 'Artifacts and Human Concepts in Creation of the Mind: Essays on Artifacts and their 
Representation, Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, eds. (2009)  
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be successful in performing their intentions.  
 
It should be considered that although technical and social artefacts are related to human intentions 
and beliefs, their methods of realisation and existence are related to engineering procedures and 
chemical-physical properties.24 Therefore, although they do not meet a realism criteria (by existence 
and nature), they are not purely mental constructions. Epistemology and ontology are approaches 
used to investigate and classify scientific and natural kinds, and for considering the dual nature of 
artefactual kinds, and they cannot be used to consider fabricated artefacts. Therefore, it is necessary 
to formulate an ontology based and epistemological understanding of dual nature. 
                                                
24 Social artifacts gain a kind of relational function based on collective and organisational agreements. 
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2.3  Ontological and Metaphysical Reflections on Artefacts 
 
Epiphenomenalists believe that all causal powers operate at a fundamental subjective level. 25 These 
theorists try to prepare a hierarchical picture of nature, suggesting that fundamental level entities are 
real. In this section, I will examine two main approaches used to analyse artefact ontology. 
 
Lynne Rudder-Baker26 proposes a 'constitution view' theory. She uses the example of a bronze 
statue to challenge the view of philosophers who propose that it is the relationship of a material 
thing to the thing itself that defines its identity. According to 'constitution view', all coherent 
objects, except the basic elements, are built up of aggregates of objects. This view is in contrast to 
that of philosophers like Aristotle and Leibniz, 27  etc. who suggest that artefacts are ontologically 
incomplete. In Rudder-Baker’s theory artefacts can have ontological status, and this is why 
constitution is important. Unlike identity, which is timed and probable, constitution creates an 
integrated relationship without identity. Constitution is the glue of the world in that reality can be 
found in different kinds, and each object is constructed of a primary kind. An existing primary kind 
                                                
25 Jonathan Schaffer formulates this reasoning as follows: 
- Distinctness: Higher-level entities are distinguishable from their lower-level components. 
- Micro-power: Lower-level entities are causally potent. 
- Exclusion: Both higher level and lower level entities cannot be causally potent. 
- Epiphenomenalism: Higher-level entities are causally impotent.  
           Jonathan Schaffer Is There Fundamental Level. Nous 37:3 (2003) pp.498-517 
 
26     Lynne Rudder Baker 'Why Constitution is Not Identity' in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 94, No. 12, (Dec.    
1997) pp.599-621  
27 Aristotle defines the sufficient and necessary conditions to understand an object as an artefact as          
detailed below: 
 
- Artefacts should lack an internal principle of change or inertia (except via its matter).  
- An artefact should lack the capacity to make itself or its species stable. 
- An artefact should ontologically be related to another thing that is not a substance. 
- An artefact should have a low-level of unity. 
 
The first criterion establishes the sufficient and necessary conditions of a boundary between the artefactual 
and natural world. Therefore, animals and plants are substances, to the extent that they have capacity for 
their own survival in nature, and natural objects are ontologically dependent on species. Therefore, in 
Aristotle’s viewpoint, animals and plants meet the first criterion that is a sufficient and necessary condition 
for essentialness. However, artefacts do not have a high-level of integration, and they owe their primary 
existence to a designer. Therefore, they can meet the first criterion, and artefacts do not have any substantial-
ness because they have low-level integration. 
 
Keith Bustos 'The Nature of Artefacts: An Aristotelian Response to Katz' Second Annual Meeting, Joint 
IAEP-ISSEE Conference (2005) 
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is the most basic constructive level of entities. Each object has its own primary kind, and entities 
with different primary kinds have different persistence conditions.28 Therefore, construction is the 
relationship between things that have different primary kinds. An entity cannot lose the properties 
of its primary kind, but it can still exist at the same time. Primary kinds are constructed by function 
and structure, or from components.  
 
In this way, artefacts are made up of aggregates of things, and an aggregate is determined by the 
elements in it. The elements in an aggregate can be determined by their own primary kinds. 
Therefore, the aggregate may include items with different primary kinds. This concept is explained 
by using the example of chair. A chair is made up of a certain aggregate of woods and nails. The 
primary kind of aggregate is constructed of a primary kind of wood and a primary kind of nails. The 
wood is built of an aggregate of molecules, and a nail is built of iron atoms. Therefore, the 
aggregates of wood and nails are themselves constructed by the aggregate of natural non-artefactual 
things. However, what distinguishes an artefactual primary kind from other primary kinds is proper 
function, where the proper function is based on the producer’s intention. Therefore the properties of 
a primary kind have ontological importance.  
 
Human agents create artefactual entities; ascribe function, and specify components. However, what 
makes artefacts different from animals and plants (which are the result of biological evolution) is 
the interference of human intention in construction and use. However, the question still remains as 
to whether the nest that has been constructed by the bird can be classed as an artefact or not? This is 
probably the most important question that needs to be considered when trying to establish the link 
between biology and technology. This question is important because it would seem that function 
and purpose play a central role in the creation of artefacts.29 The evolutionary process as it appears 
                                                
28 Lynne Rudder Baker The Ontology of Artefacts: Philosophical Explorations 7 (2004) pp.99-112 
29 In contrast to, Aristotle, Katz believes that the ecosystem possesses artefactual ontological elements. It could 
be argued that ecosystems possess the power to change or place inertia on that which occurs in the ecosystem 
itself. Therefore, an ecosystem can re-balance and maintain a certain level of stability after a minor disorder; 
it has the power to optimise itself.  Katz (1992) The Big Lie: The Human Restoration of Nature 
However, Bustos emphasises that this cannot be a classed as criterion for change in a high-level entity, 
because changes in the ecosystem are due to the nature of entities which are in it, and not the ecosystem itself 
Bustos (2005). This becomes clear in the example of the mule, which is a genetically modified creature. 
Creatures such as the mule do not have the ability to survive and reproduce themselves, and therefore we 
should consider Aristotle's idea that substantiality must be potent. However, although some entities may not 
have substance, it is clear that they have substantiality when we consider other criteria.  
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in artefact construction can be examined by considering these elements. In other words, a chair does 
not evolve independently to become another something that prohibits its use as for sitting on.  
 
Based on the constitutionist view, artefacts have ontological status because there are artefactual 
primary kinds, and the properties of a primary kind give ontological status to non-derivative 
bearers. However, the aggregate may be without structure, function and causal interaction, and an 
aggregate cannot be something higher than the items already in it. Therefore, artefacts have an 
ontological status equivalent to natural objects, but aggregates do not have this ontological 
importance. However, the realisation of an artefact depends on purposeful human action 
ontologically.  
              
In contrast to Baker, Houkes & Meijers30 investigate the extent to which we can apply a proper 
ontology to the general interpretations that account for the relationship between objects of a high 
order and their material base. These researchers consider the constitution view and the 
supervenience view to find out if these views can meet the criteria of a proper ontological artefact 
or not? The criteria that they propose are un-determination and realizability constraints. Un-
determination determines that an ontological view of artefacts must show that there is no one-to-
one relationship between function and structure Realizability Constraints determines that an 
ontological view of artefacts should provide us with understanding of ascribed function in terms of 
components. Therefore, it is necessary to establish conceptual framework that can be used to 
consider the dual nature of an artefact. Ontological adequacy criteria are usually involved in 
engineering procedures that have roots in structural properties, in terms of human intentional 
activities. 
 
Justifying the function ascribed to artefacts is of epistemological concern. In order to specify the 
position of the artefact in analytical philosophy, from a metaphysical viewpoint, some questions can 
be raised about persistence conditions and the relative identity of artefacts. An ontological adequacy 
criterion tries to understand multiple relationships between function and artefact structural 
components. According to the constitution view, structure is defined as a causal relationship 
between things with a different nature. Un-determination in terms of function can be interpreted by 
referring to different sets of conditions, and the relationship between function to structure can be 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
30 Wybo Houkes and Anthonie Meijers 'The Ontology of Artefacts: The Hard Problem' Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 
(2006) pp.118-131 
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interpreted by determining the range of proper aggregates (components). The un-determination 
constraint examines the use plan, rather than the intention of designer and manufacturer. 
 
The ontology of an artefact should be bound to realizability, and it should enable us to understand 
the possibilities of an artefact and its functions. In other words, ontology prepares an understanding 
of the interaction of the components of the artefact. For example, this can be seen in standard 
engineering procedures for design, maintenance and repair processes, and when finding out the 
reasons for failure. The relationship between an object with its material base is exclusively 
dependent on conditions.31 We can interpret malfunction, but function inference remains without 
ontological support. Houkes & Meijers propose a supervenience theory in the context of the 
philosophy of the mind.32 The main idea of this concept is that if two individuals are physically 
identical, then they cannot be mentally different. This theory allows a top-bottom multi-realisation, 
but there still remains the problem of the bottom-top relationship. For example, two persons who 
are physically similar are not necessarily similar in mental or functional super-venience properties.  
 
Constitution theory provides artefacts with an ontological importance. Artefacts are created of 
different aggregates with different causal powers and persistence conditions. Therefore, the abilities 
and capacities of artefacts determine an artefact’s primary kind, rather than its materials. For 
example, what makes a car a car is its ability to drive, and not its aggregates of metal and plastics 
etc., which are its constructive aggregates. However, a broken down car does not have the ability to 
drive, and based on this we can say that a broken artefact ontologically lacks reality. 
  
Following on from the construction theory, in 2009 Rudder-Baker presented her deflationary 
theory, and cemented her reputation as a ‘practical realist’. Deflationary theory considers a 
distinction between concepts, such as language and human interests, and what really exists. Rudder-
Baker33 describes two aspects of this view: 
 
Eliminativism: Based on this approach, there are no artefacts, there are only raw materials and 
basic elements that are configured and formed artefact-wise. When an artefact is destroyed and 
                                                
31 Conditions refer to a set of intentions, voluntary actions and beliefs. 
32 Houkes & Meijers (2006) - three ideas are discussed i) If two entities are indistinguishable in their basic 
properties, they are also indistinguishable in their super-venience properties. ii) Super-venience properties 
are related to or determined by basic properties. Therefore, mental traits have multi-realisation in a physical 
structure, and iii) Non-reductionism: super-venience properties cannot be reduced to the properties of lower 
levels. 
33 Lynne Rudder-Baker 'The Metaphysics of Malfunction' in Techne (2009) 
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broken, there will be only a change in the combination, formation and the order of its elements.  
 
Reductionism: Artefacts exist conceptually because the names of the artefacts refer to aggregates 
of material that are formed artefact-wise and in space-time. 
 
Ontologically these two approaches are similar, and there is no ontological difference in reality if an 
artefact is destroyed. Both approaches agree on what exists are only elements which are organised 
in certain way. The only difference which remains is, 'can such an order of components be classed 
as an entity or not?' Reductionism sees the artefact as an order of particles, but eliminativism cannot 
refer the term of an artefact to anything, because the mereological sum in an aggregate of elements 
cannot be seen. Although there is nothing more than an aggregate of elements in the context of both 
approaches, in the first approach this aggregate is not an object, and in the second approach an 
aggregate is an entity that we can conceptualise. Then, regarding the deflationary view, artefactual 
concepts do not tell us anything about reality.  
 
Function is dependent on intentionality and is comes from aggregates that are organised artefact-
wise. Social-technical artefacts exist but they do not have any existence without the application of 
the mind. The mind-dependent and mind-independent metaphysical distinction faces ambiguity in 
an analytical philosophy. The mind-dependent and mind-independent metaphysical distinction faces 
problems of ambiguity in the context of analytical philosophy. This opens the door to combining an 
epistemological and metaphysical approach to looking at artefacts. The world has ontological 
importance because it includes human products and concepts. 
 
2.4  The Dual Nature of Artefacts and the Coherence of Functional and Structural Aspects 
 
In contrast to natural objects, technological objects are created based on the integration of structural 
aspects that originate from a geographical configuration, and physical-chemical properties. They 
can be described in the context of physical laws, and their functional aspects come from 
intentionality and the means-end embedding system. However, in order to raise the technological 
argument, we need to address the ascription of function to physical-chemical components. This has 
proved to be a controversial task among theorists, because function is concerned with a normative 
stance, which is not determined based on physical-chemical properties. Physical objects when 
placed in the context of human activity can obtain technological properties, and consequently 
acquire artificial property. Objects become artefacts due to the intentional process of design and 
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use. 
 
It is difficult to discuss functional descriptions in the context of a physical-chemical description. 
Design methodology which is involved a dual nature may refer to a general rough sketch to show 
how a technical function is operating, or it may show integrated realisation in a prototype. At this 
stage all technical specifications of components are specified.34 Then, the design process starts with 
a description of the function of the object, and the designer looks at structural components and 
configuration.  Of course, it is important to notice that a design is something more than a complete 
description of the object’s physical properties and it also consists, at least implicitly, of an 
explanation of the way in which the object will carry out a required function. Such explanations 
might be technological explanations that differ from functional explanations (the ascription of 
function to the structure) which are an explanation of the manner of functional realisation. This 
explanation places a normative stance within itself.35 Therefore it is possible to say that an artefact 
should show certain behaviours, particularly behaviours that are connected to proper function. 
Proper function refers to reasons and purposes behind their design, constitution and use, which 
creates an explanatory link between function and structure. 
 
Kroes36 imagines a technological explanation. In this respect, he explains the function of a steam 
engine as a example, and asserts that we should consider both natural phenomena and empirical 
facts (like producing steam from water using fire) and certain related activities (like opening and 
shutting the valves off and the manner of creating rods to move the mechanisms) which combine to 
perform the function of The Newcomen Steam Engine. He provides a technological explanation of the 
steam engine as below: 
 
1. The physical phenomena: 
- Converting the water into steam which multiples the volume. 
- Cooling the steam in a closed area that creates a vacuum. 
- The atmosphere pressure imposes a power equivalent to 1 kg/cm2. 
 
2. The design: 
                                                
34 The next chapter will look at the specifications of the design of artefacts and the evolutionary methodology 
of the design process 
35 Chapter Four will discuss the concept of the normative, and will investigate functional theories. 
36 Peter Kroes (1998) 
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- A steam engine is made up of a boiler, a cylinder, a piston, etc. 
- The piston moves up and down in the cylinder. 
- The piston is connected to the great beam by a chain. 
 
3. Related activities: 
- After opening the steam valve, the cylinder is filled with steam and moves upward. 
- By shutting the steam valve off and injecting the cool water, a vacuum is created in the cylinder. 
 
In this explanation the steam engines are means that move the pump rods up and down (which is the 
function of a steam engine). The explanation includes functional concepts such as a description of 
the piston and the cylinder that is based on describing the motor design, and the actions involved in 
that operation. This explanation is only one description of the function of a steam engine, which 
relates to the conditions of the up and down movement of the motor rod, rather than the movement 
of the motor. It is not an explanation of proper function in terms of structure, rather it is a 
description of an interpretation of how the artefact’s function is performed and it tells of the 
behaviours that are constructed based on chemical-physical properties. In order to ascribe proper 
function based on actions, the relationship between the explanans and the explanadum cannot be 
successful37. According to the rule of actions and preliminary-final conditions, we can confer the 
function of an artefact, but without embedding the explanation into a means-end system, it is not 
possible to ascribe proper function. What is inferred from the explanation of the steam engine is that 
if the desired artefact is going to be used for a purpose, it needs capacity to gain a function. 
 
It is important to consider that we may explain a phenomenon causally as having properties with a 
technical object's structure, with physical principles and actions, but we cannot infer the object’s 
function inductively and logically, because an equivalent physical phenomenon can be applied for a 
completely different purpose, depending on the use context. However, transferring the causal 
relationship in practical terms prepares the ground for Kroes to aim to bridge the gap between the 
structure and function of an artefact. 
 
In a 2006 article, De Ridder38  presented a mechanistic explanation of an artefact's function based 
                                                
37 Kroes explains that we can easily use the explanation appertaining to the engine for a spinning machine 
without making any change to the explanation. Therefore, it is possible to determine logically different 
functions of an inductive method based on explanation. 
          Peter Kroes (1998) 
38 Jeroen De Ridder 'Mechanistic Artefact Explanation' Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) pp.81-96 
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on two explanatory strategies in order to point out the human role in the explanation of an artefact. 
De Ridder outlines a mechanistic explanation in contrast to a technological explanation to specify 
and highlight the role of human action in an explanation, but his description is silent about the 
components with which this behaviour is performed. The explanans in the mechanistic explanation 
is based on behavioural roles and the mechanisms in the physical-chemical structure that create the 
behavioural roles. De Ridder39 explains how artefacts can show various behaviours by outlining two 
strategies:  
 
1. The 'Top-Down' strategy deals with the relationship between general behaviours and the sub-
behaviours of components, in order to prepare a behavioural understanding of the function of the 
artefact. Based on this strategy, general behaviour is decomposed into sub-behaviours, and general 
behaviour realisation is described on the basis of this. Therefore, this strategy relies on a 
behavioural analysis rather than a structural analysis. A sub-behaviour can be performed by one or 
more structural parts. 
 
2. The 'Bottom-up' strategy deals with the structural forms of components in relation to general 
behaviour, and prepares a structural understanding. This strategy separates the structural 
components based on the artefact's geometric configuration, and consequently shows which 
structural part and chemical-physical property produces which behaviour.  
 
These two strategies supply each other in the design process. Designers should be able to give an 
interpretation of the property of materials and components, and the behaviours that these 
components present.  
Figure 5:  De Ridder's Schema for Sub-behaviours   
                                                
39 Ibid 
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Behavioural descriptions based on causal mechanisms prepare a normative stance when placed in 
the context of human activity. In the context of an artefact's use, purposefulness causes a change in 
the state of affairs and gives functionality to objects. Therefore, we can distinguish the object’s use 
based on the intentional act from the use of a passive agent.40 However, we need a conceptual 
framework to describe the physical and intentional/functional aspects of an artefact. It is possible to 
use intentional theories of function as a starting point to look how agents refer to the working of 
artefacts in a means-end relationship. This concept of an artefact combines two different 
worldviews: 
 
1. We can consider the world in such a way that it includes physical objects that interact with each 
other in causal relationships. 
2. We can consider part of the word as including human agents that act in the world based on 
knowledge and reason. 
 
As far as artefacts are physical objects, they can be placed in a physical concept of the world, and as 
far as they have related purpose functions, they can be placed within the context of intentional 
concepts. However, both aspects are necessary to describe the artefact. 
 
Kroes and Krohs investigate inference patterns in separate articles that examine the integration 
between structural and functional description. In 'Coherence of Structural and Functional 
Descriptions of Technical Artefacts' Kroes selects practical inferences from among explanatory, 
analogical and practical inference patterns.41  However, these inferences cannot prepare a complete 
basis for coherence of structural and functional descriptions for technical artefacts, because every 
kind of interpretation of coherence should refer to intentional forms. The question of coherence 
between function and structure is about the relationship between the parts of the conception of an 
artefact’s structure and its function. Coherence is the idea that structure and function in artefacts are 
connected to each other in such a way that any change in one creates effect in the other. 
 
Logical connection between physical and functional language may lead to an epistemic analysis of 
                                                
40 This agent can comprise human action that does not have any purpose, or the production mechanisms’ action 
that is not placed a means-end process. 
41 Peter Kroes 'Coherence of structural and functional descriptions of technical artefacts' Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 
37 (2006) 137-151
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coherence. Of course, this gap in the logical-structural description is related to proper function and 
not accidental function. Coherence and consistency relate to what kind of relationship is possible 
between structural and functional propositions. The consistency of a system of propositions does 
not imply a high degree of coherence, because causal relationships play an important role in the 
coherence of physical objects. Non-consistency does not imply non-coherence, although it may not 
be considered as a positive sign for coherence, and one conceptual framework may be more 
coherent than another may. The explanatory coherence between functional and structural 
propositions does not work according to the D-N model, although we can explain the general 
behaviour of objects causally based on component behaviours by using physical knowledge. This 
explanatory connection can connect structural propositions to functional propositions. 
 
The second kind of relationship which coherence creates is analogy. Although this coherence is 
weaker than the previous one, an analogy between structural and functional experience may refer to 
coherence. Mapping the hypotheses between components and sub-functions, between propositions 
about capacities, and propositions about the relationships between sub-functions, prepares a basis in 
order to describe functions based on structure and vice-versa. Of course, this connection between 
capacities and sub-functions need not necessarily be explanatory, but it may be referenced based on 
the experience of a physical structure to function. 
 
The third kind of relationship is deductive coherence, which has a human application for 
mathematical and moral theorems, but practical inference has the ability to connect the means-end 
relationships with causal structural relationships. In other words, the means-end relationship may be 
related to the causal relationship. To the extent that functions are part of means-end relationships, 
they may connect also to causal relationships42.  
 
Therefore, the explanation of a function in terms of structural components is based on a practical 
inference, despite any theoretical inferences that may exist. This kind of inference is the main 
framework of a structural and functional description’s coherence, because the technical function is 
                                                
42 Kroes (2006) suggests an example: 
1. Someone wants to build a habitable cottage. 
2. It will be habitable only if it becomes warm. 
3. Therefore, the cottage should be warm. 
1 notes the end action, 2 notes the causal relationship between temperature and habitability, and 3 notes the 
practical necessity to perform an action. 
          Kroes takes this example from Wright (1963) p.160.  
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action-oriented concept, and activities are directed by practical reasoning. The coherence issue 
cannot be generally considered without considering intentions. Practical reasons that connect 
functional and structural descriptions together should also import intentions. The discussed practical 
inference shows that an object is a necessary device to access purpose based on its causal capacities 
in certain conditions, and, therefore, it may refer to a certain function. In other words, the pattern of 
practical reasoning is enough for claims about proper function based on structural descriptions. 
 
In his 2009 article, Ulrich Krohs talks about coherence between the functional and structural, and 
refers to the dual nature of artefacts.43 An investigation of these two models results in an 
interpretation for coherence, because for coherence to occur a relationship is required between the 
elements of these two models, consistency alone cannot result in coherence.  
 
Krohs tries to reconstruct a sandwich structure. Like Hooks & Meijers (2006), Krohs does not 
accept the super-venience theory for artefacts, and, therefore, he rejects functionality as an emergent 
property of technical and biological systems. Based on this, he does not agree with the reductionism 
of these systems to physics, because function has a normative property that distinguishes it from 
other properties. A function may still be given to artefacts with malfunction. it is determined by 
objects, their relationships with each other, and function. This is a theory about physical-istic 
relationships and functional relationships. However, Krohs’ does not explain how these two 
statements interact.  
 
In contrast to Kroes, Krohs selects an interpretation called 'coherence by analogy'.44 Krohs places 
emphasis on mapping relationships in order to reconstruct the idea of two-sorted theory as a 
functional theory that is needed in order to refer function to the components of a system, and 
present a description of the interaction of the two aspects. The role of function theory is to show 
relationships between the physical-istic and the intentional aspects, and to show how multi-
realisations and functional relationships can be studied in a context-dependent way. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, Simon considers the interaction of internal structures and the external 
                                                
43 Peter Krohs Structure and Coherence of Two-Model-Descriptions of Technical Artefacts Techné 13:2 Spring 
(2009) 
44      The example of the transistor is used to show the analogical coherence in the sandwich structure of the two-
sorted theory element. Therefore, the multi-realisation of an artefact function is seen in a context-dependent 
way. Ibid 
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environment of an artefact that seemingly suggests a link between purpose and an artefact.45 Indeed,  
that the environment with which the artefact interacts is an environment of human activity, and not 
merely a physical environment. Krohs46 looks beyond this concept, and he changes the idea of an 
environment of human activity to an environment of human description, which takes into account 
problems that arise due to multiple correspondences between the functional and structural models. 
 
Most of these model-based theories refer to 'no-function-in-structure’.47 This principle argues that 
the rules for specifying the behaviour of each system’s components cannot refer at all to the manner 
of general function. The function of a device refers to its expected use, and the behaviour of how 
this function is imposed.  A description of the function of an object taken from the structure without 
looking at knowledge about use its context is inadequate. This absence warns us that an intelligent 
agent should be positioned in the ‘use’ context of an artefact, and this leads to the consideration of 
the social aspects of artefacts. 
                                                
45 Herbert A. Simon The Science of the Artificial (1969) MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1st edition 
46 Ulrich Krohs (2009) 
47 Anne Keuneke and Dean Allemang, 'Exploring the No-function-In-Structure principle' J. Expt. Theor. Artif. 
Intell 1 (1989) pp.79-89 
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2.5  Analysis of Collective Purposefulness Based on the Social Aspects of Technology 
 
In this section, I will look at a concept of technology that gives weight to the social aspects and 
engineering procedures involved in production. The purpose of this section is to provide an 
interpretation of social activities that are involved with subjects that have a 'pre-told dual nature'. 
Although necessary causal powers can be related to a function’s reference in the chemical-physical 
combination, we cannot prepare a proper theory for artefacts without considering these social 
intentions and activities. Artefacts are made and used in a social context, and, therefore, social 
factors affect the technology. Social factors cannot only affect use patterns, but they can affect the 
design and process of the production of artefacts. Social factors may affect both physical-material 
and functional forms. 
 
The function of an artefact is related to structural properties and physical capacities, and the 
intentions of designers, manufacturers and users. Without intention, there will be no function and 
purpose, and if we eliminate the function from an artefact, there remains nothing more than a 
physical object.  
 
Searle presents an ontological view of the world that considers that there is no fundamental gap 
between social technical artefacts and the physical world.48 For Searle, artefacts have observable 
and user relative properties.49 An artefact meets the conditions for artefactuality in order to be used 
by the user, and to be placed in an intentionality process. This can also be true about objects with 
biological functions. However, it is important to note that whenever anyone talks about function, 
the person make reference to a value system (which suggests purpose or a kind of etiology) which is 
pre-assumed as a value about the biological function of survival. This interpretation of assignment 
of function has raised some criticism, but Searle50  distinguishes three classes of function that he 
uses to investigate criticisms of his interpretation of function with reference to objects: 
 
1. Agentive function: The user and designer refer to the function to artefacts, and these artefacts 
include technical artefacts and social objects like tools and money. The causal power of technical 
objects is dependent on their internal structure, but the causal power of social objects is given to 
them by collective intentionality and has a demotic power. 
                                                
48 Searle, John. The Construction of Social Reality New York: The Free Press (1995) 
49 This theory can be used to examine basic particles in physics.  
50 Searle (1995) 
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2. Non-agentive function: Functions like the function of the heart pumping in the body of a living 
creature. These biological functions may be considered in a historical-evolutionary context. 
 
3. Status function: A sub-set and particular kind of agentive function. Based on this, an object has a 
function because it has a status that is prepared for something else based on collective 
intentionality. In order to give a status function, there is a need for collective agreement in the arena 
of institutional-legal power rather than in respect of the chemical-physical properties of artefacts.  
 
Searle provides the example of a screwdriver because its physical properties enable it to operate as a 
screwdriver. However, for Kroes this is a controversial example because this tool is involved in a 
normative judgment.51 Therefore, normative and real observations are tied to each other. However, 
there is ambiguity in Searle's interpretation in respect of his causal function interpretation, based on 
collective intentionality and the inherent properties of object, where the function assignment is 
based on collective intentionality, and its performance is subject to inherent properties. The 
assignment of agentive function only meets a necessary condition, and it fails in meeting the 
sufficient criterion, because it does not prepare an interpretation for the difference between proper 
and accidental function.52  
 
The second critical approach is that purported by Miller.53 Miller criticises Searle’s ideas about 
cognitive states, and in contrast to Krose, Miller argues that Searle's interpretation does not consider 
the necessary conditions for artefactuality in respect of passive observers that’s why observer 
should be causally active agents. Therefore, if an artefact has never been used, it is still an artefact, 
but if artefacts are used for another purpose than that which they were designed for, then they are no 
longer that kind of artefact. For example, some antique artefacts may be used for decoration, rather 
than used for the purpose of their main function. 
 
Artefacts should have properties related to the purpose of their use and properties that are related to 
the using agent. For example, a pen should be able to both write and be placed between the user’s 
fingers. Considering these two institutional and non-institutional factors, artefacts have an 
                                                
51 Peter Kroes 'Screwdriver Philosophy; Searle’s analysis of technical functions' Techne 6:3 (Spring 2003) 
pp.22-35 
52 The issue of malfunction is the second point of Kroes’ criticism of Searle's interpretation. 
53 Seamus Miller 'Artefacts and Collective Intentionality' Techne 9:2 (Winter 2005) pp.52-66 
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intentional dimension and a physical dimension, and the distinction between them is controversial.54 
Functions are imposed based on both the use patterns of users and the designers’ intentions. For 
technical artefacts this imposition of function is mostly due to the structural properties of the 
artefact, and for social artefacts function is obtained based on collective agreements. For Searle, 
imposing a function does not only include ascribing a function, but a state with demotic properties. 
However, for Miller it is the strong connection between function and properties that poses 
problems, and how properties can be driven from the function idea when they are connected with 
intentionality.55 Therefore, for Miller, demotic powers are a necessary condition for the existence of 
an institutional artefact.  
 
In contrast to Searle, Scheele56 also considers this subject and criticises Searle’s reasoning on two 
fronts: 
 
1. Social observations in the best state are necessary conditions and not sufficient conditions. 
2. Proper function finds an objective framework in a biological area that can be used for evaluating 
the artefact’s use. 
 
In biology, function is evaluated based on evolutionary history and the capacities which it has for 
survival, and not the purposes those organs may have. Chapter Four of this thesis will examine 
biological function from the perspective of an evolutionary-etiological interpretation. 
 
We cannot ignore social aspects in order to ascertain proper ascription. The importance of social 
aspects is highlighted through the example of when the function of an artefact is changed based on 
social processes.57 This kind of change in functionality is completely observable in modern 
industry, and usually it occurs as the result of collective agreement and an evaluation of competent 
users. Therefore, when a chair is commonly used as a stool, this commonality does not change the 
                                                
54 Miller proposes that we can distinguish between objects based on the purpose of different function. 
1. A non-institutional artefact creates changes in the physical world based on its function or purpose. 
2. An institutional artefact creates changes in the institutional world based on its function or purpose. 
Miller discusses four ideas based on Searle's work: the imposition of function, the demotic power of people 
and institutional objects, the distinction between constructive and regulative rules, and collective 
intentionality. 
Miller (2005) 
55  Miller (2005) 
56 Marcel Scheele 'Function and use of technical artefacts: social conditions of function ascription' Stud. Hist. 
Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) pp.23-36 
57 Some believe that even if building use changes, it cannot change the intention of its original function and 
use. 
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proper function of the chair, i.e. no one claims that the proper function of the chair is now a stool, 
but the alternative use is accepted as another use of the chair. Therefore, in an action based 
theoretical approach, the analysis and explanation of an artefact is more important than its function, 
and function ascription occurs because of how the artefact is used for human purpose. Of course, 
we should consider that this approach focuses on the rational reconstruction of use (activity). 
 
The influence of social aspects can be analysed by considering that they have necessary conditions, 
but are not enough to ascribe function and use alone. Social structures are not stable over time in 
relation to the methods of natural mechanisms. Social structures only exist due to the activities that 
make them limited or capable. Therefore, social structures are dependent on the activities of human 
agents and their understanding of structures. Social relationships reproduce and transfer in technical 
activities. Techno-social artefacts have partly social aspects and partly technical aspects. Therefore, 
if society is destroyed, only the social part will be removed.  
 
Therefore, artefacts originate as a result of social activities that derive from a set of values, 
activities, and social relationships. Artefacts can be understood socially because they originate when 
technical objects are inserted into a social network, and then the artefact is used as part of various 
social relations, and is reproduced and transformed. Artefacts as social objects can be further 
examined by looking at the work of Peter Mc Laughlin (2005), Alfred Nordman (2007), Amie L. 
Thomasson (2007 and 2008) and Allan Gibbard (1975). 
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Chapter Three 
Evolutionary Methodology of Design 
 
The subject to be discussed in this chapter is evolutionary methodology. Technical systems are 
considered to be the product of a design process, and an understanding of how evolutionary 
mechanisms work in the design space is a pre-condition for the formation of an evolutionary theory 
of technology. Design methodology is concerned with the improvement of the design process. John 
S. Gero1 describes the design process as the formulation, synthesis, analysis, evaluation, re-
formulation and production of a design description, and, due to the performance of these 
procedures, function, structure and behaviour are bonded together. The exploration of design can 
enable new elements to be discovered based on additional or substitutional patterns, through 
relational knowledge. Design methodology is related to the design product, and an understanding 
of evolutionary design methodology can facilitate a greater understanding of creative design space. 
                                                
1 John S. Gero and Udo Kannengiesser, 'The situated function-behaviour-structure framework' Design 
Studies 25 (2004) pp.373-391 
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3.1  The Theoretical Structure of Design  
 
An artefact can be considered to be the product of a design process. Previous chapters have 
discussed the dual nature of the structural and functional aspects of an artefact. However, we cannot 
construct a complete image of a technical object and discuss its position within the social-cultural 
environment without considering the methodology and processes involved in designing technical 
objects. Kroes2 suggests that when we examine design methodology we cannot avoid questions 
about the nature of designing products, for the two main reasons outlined below: 
 
1. The design process and the design of products are linked together in such a way that a conception 
of the nature of the design process needs an understanding of the nature of designing a product and 
vice versa.  
2. Design methodology is involved in design process optimisation, and, therefore the quality of a 
designed product should be considered. 
 
When design methodologies are concerned with the quality of a design, they take a normative 
stance. Designing involves human cognitive power in order to meet certain needs. The concept of 
design implies the undertaking of a purposeful activity which will change the state of affairs, and 
which begins with a concept of certain design space demands and issues. The design process starts 
with an understanding of functional needs, and leads to a structural formation that is realised in a 
simple linear movement. The particular knowledge involved in this process consists of both formal 
knowledge and the personal, empirical, and, often, tacit knowledge of the designer. Basic and 
detailed engineering, process design, and flow sheets are all involved in the design process3.   
                                                
2 Peter Kroes 'Design methodology and the nature of technical artefacts' see front matter Design Studies 23 
(2002) pp.287-302 
3         Hubka and Eder classify the properties and aware nesses involved in the design process as follows: 
1. Engineering science knowledge (basic knowledge) concerns the strength and mechanics of materials, the 
materials’ properties, the constitution of the technology, and principles of mathematics and physics, etc. 
2. The experience resulting from related engineering processes indexed in relation to functions, action, 
operation modes, and maintenance, etc. for products of one type. 
3. The knowledge relating to constitution, resources, marketing and selling. 
4. Procedures, methods and techniques that can make the design process more effective and programmed. 
5. Methods and techniques that can help the designer describe and communicate the design. 
6. Institutional and executive standards and techniques. 
7. Knowledge of tools and working equipment that can help the designer perform their duties. 
8. Knowledge of standards, codes, and options, etc.  
9. Market knowledge, artistic and aesthetic knowledge, and related areas 
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Design knowledge is constructed based on rules and criteria, some of which are drawn from the 
personal experience and tacit knowledge of the designer. Other knowledge is gained from market 
information and engineering norms. However, it should be remembered that this knowledge is not 
always explicit, prior to the technology being designed.4 The history of mechanical engineering 
demonstrates many examples where empirical action (design and manufacturing) has been gained 
prior to theoretical knowledge. For example, thermal machines were created before thermodynamic 
science. Therefore, it should be considered that scientific-engineering theories have helped the 
process of the growth of technology. To some extent, design is dependent on scientific knowledge 
and engineering norms, but it cannot be explained using these concepts alone. In respect of the 
design process, many questions can be asked, such as how are design concepts related to the 
artefact? Is designing a necessary or efficient condition for the creation of the artefact? What are the 
cognitive processes involved in designing? What is the relationship between designing and the 
artefact? 
 
Dorst investigates the structure of design problems. He looks at design problems as undetermined 
problems, which are placed between two paradigms of the design methodology5. The nature of 
undetermined problems in the design space may lead to the evolutionary aspects of the design 
process. However the levels of indetermination in a design process highlight the problem space and 
solution spaces. The design process does not necessarily have to refer to prior methods in order to 
explore problems in the existing design space, and the problem space and solution space can 
develop in tandem with each other inherently. Multi-realisation and the variety of function in terms 
of physical-chemical structure, and vice versa, show the recursive path of the design space. 
 
Some design problems are indeterminate because the designer is free to face these problems 
according to his or her personal experiences, abilities and style of thinking. An understanding of 
human needs and how environments can be changed encourages a conceptualisation based on 
                                                                                                                                                            
V. Hubka and W. E. Eder, 'Design Knowledge: Theory in Support of Practice Journal of Engineering 
Design, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1990) 
4 Methods of acquiring such knowledge include induction, deduction, analysis, generalising, concretizing, 
comparison, the systematisation of experiences, and observations of design practice etc. 
5 Kees Dorst 'The Problem of the Design Problem' in Cross, N.G. Edmonds, E.(eds) Expertise in Design- 
Design Thinking Research Symposium 6, Creativity and Cognition Studies Process Sydney (2007). The 
subject of design methodology was first discussed at a 1962 conference in London, although Zwicky (1948) 
is regarded as the first to refer to design methodology. Later, Hall (1962), Asinow (1962), Alexander (1964) 
et al. and Cross (1993) discuss this subject. 
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personal and individual elements. Human cultural-social environments prescribe certain values and 
purposes, and, these, along with physical environments, help to form ideas behind purpose, 
function, behaviour and structure in the design process.6 This means that although the exact purpose 
of a required design can be specified, the actual functions and behaviours needed to realise the 
artefact are not always specifically considered in the design process. We can get a clearer image of 
this approach to design, an evolutionary methodology, and its paradigm, by preparing an 
intellectual framework that looks at links between social-cultural environments and physical 
environments.  
  
A structural description comprises the geographical-geometrical and chemical-physical properties 
of an artefact. The designer creates a design solution in a design space by considering structural 
qualities. A description looks at the behaviour of processes and the object’s behaviour in certain 
conditions. The object operates within an external environment in a certain way, and this is called 
behaviour. Function and behaviour are both related to physical properties. A purpose is created in 
order to be linked to a human value system (based on usefulness). We can assign purpose based on 
function, and we may attribute different functions to an object based on our intentions (of course 
these functions are linked to an object's behaviours). 
 
The process of movement from purpose to structure in the design process is illustrated in the figure 
below: 
                                                
6 Cross thinks of the design process as an ill-structured problem-solving activity. 
           Nigel Cross 'Science and Design Methodology: A Review' Research in Engineering Design (1993) 5: pp.63-
69 
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Figure 6 – The Process of Movement from Purpose to Structure in the Design Process  
 
Rosenman and Gero7 defined Synthesis as the process of interpreting structure in terms of required 
behavior and Analysis as the process of deriving actual behavior in terms of structure. By 
considering phases of analysis, a rational reconstruction of design methodology can be seen. Design 
levels show how concepts are formulated based on needs that are rationally organised. A rational 
problem solving process is the main paradigm of design methodology as noted by Simon.8 In this 
theory the problem space is rationally searched in order to find solutions.  
 
One of the main hypotheses of the rational reconstruction process is the existence of a certain and 
                                                
7 M. A. Rosenman and J. S. Gero 'Purpose and function in design: from the socio-cultural to the techno-
physical' Design Studies 19 (1998) pp.161-186 
8 Simon's theories are discussed in Chapter One  
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definable design space. This design theory focuses on the constructive role of the designer as a 
reflective agent, and the design of a possible solution by forming an action.  
 
There is no need for a priori structure in order for a design process to move towards a solution 
space. In the late 1970s Feyerabend challenged the idea of rational and objective methods that result 
in providing suitable solutions in design.9 He suggests an idea of methodology in which variation is 
given importance based on human and structure-oriented viewpoints (where mind perception and 
reality structure are related to each other). In the 1980s other theorists challenged the linearity of 
design methods and favoured a pluralistic approach. The creative design process as a reflective 
dialogue between situation and conditions, and it can be described in the context of the concept of 
reflection-in-action10  as a consideration of orientated perception in terms of a current situation. In 
this way, design emerges as a symphonic process. This concept focuses on implementation, from 
reflection to perception, and suggests that designers search for various solutions in their problem-
solving space by thinking and investigating during the design process that incorporates individual 
thoughts and experiences.  
 
However, this is a reflective perception and it has a deep effect on the manner of interpreting certain 
conditions, and the manner of the creation and development of design solutions. It is the task of the 
designer/s to perceive problem space and functional requirements in terms of existing sources and 
raw material.11 Simultaneously the designer prioritises how the design will work, and, 
consequently, criteria will appear for future evaluation. During the process of designing, designers 
come to new perspectives based on actual and potential situations and conditions. This is 
accompanied by new ideas, new criteria, and a new semantic and visual language that triggers 
reformation. Of course, their personal experiences and knowledge affects their reflective perception, 
and these perceptions will incorporate market information, engineering norms and tests of users in 
other areas etc. Consequently, new solution space leads to innovative prototypes, and there is a 
focus on revising and optimizing the models and prototypes. Blueprints are a mental image used by 
                                                
9 Paul Feyerabend 'Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge’ (1975) in M. Radner & 
S. Winokur, eds., Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
10 Katja Tschimmel, 'Design as a Perception-in-Action Process' (2011) in Design Creativity (2010). London: 
Springer Verlag. Pp.223-230 
11 This stage is the same as Schon’s naming stage in Donald Schön (1983) The Reflective Practitioner: How 
professionals think in action. London: Temple Smith. 
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the designer, and an evaluation of the models at this stage can trigger revisions or fundamental 
reforms. 
 
Therefore, it is clear that perception and reflection interact with each other during the design 
process, and both are important for the originality of design solutions in order to achieve a 
definition of reality. By taking these perceptions into account, description of design cannot be 
formed based on the priori classification of design problems. Although design problems can be 
investigated and classified rationally, in the designer’s view they are thought of in a place-time 
situation.12  Then, the designer must move from the classification of the design to thinking about 
design situations and conditions. 
 
Garbacz distinguishes between the theoretical ideas of design and the actual engineering 
description.13 The design engineering description considers design principles and stages, while the 
theoretical idea is related to the design in general and the states of the objects. Design incorporates 
an intentional state of affairs, and that a special relationship exists between designing and 
describing the design structure. This is connected to the relationship between the corresponding 
parts of these states. Designs are similar to other aspects of reality such as objective and subjective 
components. They can manifest in physical objects of different kinds such as maps and images etc. 
that are considered and represented by rational agents. The objective factors of an artefact may 
remain stable, but the subjective factors can change. For Ulrich and Seering, 14  function sharing is 
part of a stage of evaluation in technology. Function sharing in mechanical design means 
performing many functions using one structural element. Whenever a structural element 
encompasses more than one functional element, a function-sharing situation is created. The function 
sharing procedure might omit structural components or modified design space. Choosing a 
structural element may produce side effects, which will need to be evaluated as part of the design 
process. The omitted structural element will correspond with the functional component, which is 
supported by other structural elements. 
 
                                                
12 The next chapter will talk about 'context-aware' as a concept in evolutionary methodology for designing. 
13 Pawel Garbacz 'What is an Artefact Design?' Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology Volume 13, 
Issue 2, Spring 2009 The fact that the artefact may have more than one design enables us to distinguish 
between artefact token and artefact kind. 
14 Karl T. Ulrich and Warren P. Seering 'Function Sharing in Mechanical Design' Design Studies Volume 11, 
Issue 4, (1990) pp.223–234 
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In mechanical design, artefacts may do not have equal structures or behavior, but they may do have 
equal functions and purposes. Artefacts can share functions but the value criterion of human society 
imposes various purposes on an object. For example, knives have the function of cutting due to a 
perception of functional requirements, and a use plan is constructed by the communication of 
intentions. For example, some knives with the same structural components may have a function to 
cut bread, or to cut cheese etc; there are different functions of cutting, but ultimately the overall 
purpose is geared towards feeding humans. Agents (including users and designers) construct their 
own interpretations in the physical-structural elements of designing. The existence of confusion 
about methods of use, concepts, and various theories that are involved in engineering norms brings 
about the theoretical dynamic of design research, and unnecessary plurality and multiplicity in 
design theories and concepts. 
 
Love suggests a methodological analysis in order to remove these concerns, and to achieve more 
accurate concepts and design theories. 15  This meta-theoretical approach can help prepare a tool for 
analysing communications and situations of validity in respect of concepts and theories. Theories 
and concepts are obstructions that are placed in an inter-dependent hierarchy. In the lower levels of 
obstruction there is a direct perception of reality, where the information available for people is 
gained via the senses. The highest level of obstruction is related to the beliefs and values connected 
with essential fundamental subjects. For example, stress can be defined as force per unit area. The 
concept of obstructions to power is related to more coherent concepts of obstructions relating to the 
physical object's movement. Love16 proposes a meta-theoretical solutions approach, as detailed 
below: 
 
1. The direct perception of reality. For example, we sit on chair, and we watch the sunset, etc. 
 
2. The objects description. This is the simple description of objects, procedures and systems. For 
example, a vacuum cleaner, the body of a car, etc. 
 
3. The behaviour of elements. The description of the behaviour of elements that exist in objects 
procedures and systems. For example, the aerodynamic mechanism of an aeroplane body and the 
                                                
15 Terence Love 'Philosophy of design: a meta-theoretical structure for design theory' see front matter Design 
Studies 21 (2000) pp.293-313 
 
16 Ibid 
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mechanism of air flow around it. 
 
4. Mechanisms of choice: Descriptions about methods and choices constructed around objects, 
procedures or systems, and the manner of evaluating solutions. 
 
5. Design methods: When theories and suggestions are described about design techniques and 
methods. For example how a chair is designed. 
 
6. The structure of the design process: Theories about the structure of the design process. This can 
be affected by culture, artefact type, and other similar conditions and properties. For example, this 
includes methods of design and the construction of artefacts in various and different industrial 
societies. 
 
7. Theories about the internal processes of the designer’s association: A description of the reasoning 
of theories and recognising how designers work individually, and in a group, and the cultural effects 
of their reasoning. 
 
8. General design theories: The details of general theories that describe the general activity of 
design and its relationship to objects - for example, the design activity of a turbine. 
 
9. Objects theory and design theory epistemology: The analysis and discussion of the critical study 
of nature’s basic criteria, limitations and the validity of design knowledge. For example, what is a 
design theory? What does it include or exclude? On what hypotheses do these theories stand? 
 
10. Design ontology: The ontology based philosophical study of design theory and design activity. 
This includes an investigation of human values, fundamental hypotheses and the values of 
researchers, including theoretical criticisms.  
 
From the above, it can be seen that levels 2 and 3 are related to objects, levels 4-7 are related to the 
design process, and levels 8-10 are related to the philosophical aspects of design. The theories 
relating to the design process include elements with fewer abstract entities. It is at levels 2 and 3 
that a detailed description of a technical object will be considered. The first concepts of mechanical 
design are encountered with the environmental conditions. However, the problem is solved in the 
initial and final states of the system. The process of designing itself includes an analysis of how 
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changes can occur from the initial state to the final state. 
 
Mechanical design is an abstract need that creates a product during the problem-solving process. 
Therefore, for a classification of design techniques, we need information about objects, and about 
the environment and the design process. For a complete description of the human environment, its 
properties and resources should be considered. One aspect of intentional theory is that certain 
activities are interpreted based on a means-end system, and functions are referred to as activities or 
objects. Technical artefacts are objects with a technical function, and a physical structure, which are 
intelligently designed, produced and used. The design process is a direction-oriented process in 
which the rationality of intentional agents causes the adaptation of the means to end. 
 
Talking about a technical artefact is meaningless without reference to the context of human action. 
Consequently, because function is accepted as part of the intentional concept, talking about function 
is meaningless without considering the context of intentional action. For Kroes the technical 
artefact is related to key properties, as described below: 17 
 
1. The concept of physical structure.  
2. The concept of technical function.  
3. The concept of human intentional action.18 
 
These properties are portrayed in a schematic as shown below: 
                                                
17 Kroes (2002) 
18 Simon considers the artefact environment as equivalent to human action, while Kroes reduces it to human 
description. 
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Figure 7: Kroes’ schematic of the dual nature of artefacts 
 
This diagram shows the difference between Kroes' analysis and Simon's analysis. Firstly, the 
'purpose' idea that Simon proposes is replaced by Kroes' 'function' idea. We may ascribe a function 
to artefacts, but this is not the main aim or the end. Secondly the 'environment' idea19 is replaced by 
the 'human activity' idea.20 This is important because only environments that refer to the context of 
human activity are applicable to artefact construction, and not every kind of environment. Without 
such environments (processes and activities) the function idea loses its concept. Although the origin 
of design theories can be placed in scientific methods, scientific methods are not the only pattern of 
the behaviour that can be examined in relation to problem solving. Design methodology studies a 
pattern of behaviour used for inventing and creating things that do not exist. However, the third 
generation of design methodologists place emphasis on the evolutionary pattern of the design 
process, together with a combination of the two previous approaches, and they take a creative look 
                                                
19 Simon's 'environment' idea is discussed in previous chapters. In his view, the artefact is a kind of common 
surface between an internal and external environment, and the artefactual science focuses on the common 
surface of these two models, where the physical structure realises itself in an external environment.  
20 Human activity consists of a design context and use context, from which the artefact shows itself in these 
two different methods. The function idea loses its concept. (Kroes, 2002) 
Function 
Technical 
Artefacts 
The context of 
human activity Physical 
Structure 
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at design methodology.21 
 
3.2  Creative Design 
 
This section will discuss and investigate the intellectual framework behind the design process from 
the perspective of an evolutionary methodology, as noted by Gero et al.22 In the technological 
history of the production of artefacts; the process of design has enjoyed a paramount status for 
many years. However, during the past twenty years, modern technological design has gradually 
become separated from construction, production and manufacturing activities. Thus, design is now 
analysed as a distinct field. In addition, an evolutionary methodology of the design process is being 
studied in order to examine the creative design space. A design prototypes concept is important 
when thinking about an evolutionary perception of design, because it prepares a meta-schema for 
design that can be seen as part of the evolutionary process. This is the same role that organisms play 
in biological evolution.  
 
A design prototype can be both a structure and a vehicle for genetic-like material, which shows 
certain behaviour (fitness) in an activity context. A design description/prototype allows for showing 
how genes are explained as structures. Such descriptions can help to explain the relationship 
between structure and behaviour, and the relationship between behaviour and functions. As 
mentioned before, design is a purposeful and direction-oriented process in that it requires the 
functions for human needs to be visualised in the design description. A design description (which 
will be, from this point onwards, referred to as 'D') can be presented in the form of maps or tables, 
and gives a description of structural elements and their relationships. Gero considers the general 
model of design as the process of the activities listed below: 
 
1. Formulation  
2. Synthesis  
3. Analysis  
4. Evaluation  
5. Reformulation  
                                                
21 Hahka (1982), Palhl and Beitz (1984), Cross (1989), Pugh (1991)  
22 Gero wrote important articles about the design process. Especially the FBS model of design and evolutionary 
methodology. 
  
 
        100 
6. Production of design description 23 
 
Before looking at a pattern that shows the operation of these actions in the design process, it is 
necessary to define the following set of signs and stages: 
 
Be = (expected behaviour) - a set of required behaviours.  
BS = a set of the structure’s actual behaviour.  
D = design description.  
→ =Transformation  
↔ = Comparison  
 
1. The Formation Stage. This stage considers the transferring of function to expected behaviours. 
 
 
2. The Synthesis Stage. During this stage, function is transferred to behaviour. This expected 
behaviour is used for selecting and synthesizing structure, and is based on the knowledge of 
behaviour caused by structure.   
 
 
 
3. The Analysis Stage. This stage infers behaviours placed on the structural elements.  
                                                
23 John S. Gero 'Design Prototypes: A Knowledge Representation Schema for Design' Journal AI Magazine, 
Volume 11 Issue 4, (1990) pp.26-36 
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The Evaluation Stage: During this stage, acquired behaviour from structure is evaluated together 
with expected behaviour.  
 
 
 
The Reformation Stage: This stage may occur when the comparison evaluation between structure 
behaviour (Bs) and expected behaviour is not satisfactory. This can lead to a change in expected 
behaviour, and functions are determined based on this.   
 
 
The Production of Design Description Stage: During this stage a description of the components', 
structure and their relationships is presented in order to achieve the required function. During this 
stage we can create a direction from structure towards function by looking it up in the catalogue. 
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The design process operates according to the designer’s perception of context. Therefore, designing 
is an activity which changes the physical world due to the presence of intentional elements. The 
intentionality element in the design process tells us about the goal-oriented activity for the purpose, 
but this can be distinguished from the problem-solving process. However, the routine design 
process and rational problem-solving process are both goal-oriented processes. In an evolutionary 
perception of the design process, the goals are not always fixed or stable. According to the above 
definition, design is also a constrained activity. There are constraints and limitations that affect the 
designer’s capability to achieve goals. These limitations can comprise available resources, 
knowledge and experiences, production mechanisms, and economic and political conditions, etc.  
 
Design can also be viewed as a decision-making activity. This approach looks at the value of 
structural variables that are decided during the design process. An exploration definition is 
important in order to develop a theory of creative design. Explanation can be placed against the 
research process that is concerned with routine design and certain and pre-determined state space. 
However, an exploration approach develops a problems space, and this is why new solution space 
may expose new problems. A design prototype includes behavior, structure and function according 
to the above-mentioned schema. Primary design prepares a translation of behaviour based on 
structure and function.  
 
The research process in routine design space proceeds to search for a potential solution. Therefore, 
creative design is the usually result of exploration taking place in the developing design space, and 
this adds new variables to the design.24 Design description evolves by adding or replacing new 
variables, and, consequently, prototypes can be optimised.  
                                                
24 Gero talks about innovative design as concept that is similar to the routine design concept, where the design 
moves in a certain state space of potential designs. However, what distinguishes innovative design from 
routine design is the value of variables. The result is a similar design or structure but with an innovative 
appearance. 
  
 
        103 
 
Research to find a solution in a certain design space is considered for all possible design spaces in 
the routine design process. However, if we want to consider creative design, we should introduce a 
model that can be used to acquire knowledge during the design process. In other words, the problem 
space itself changes during the process, based on the results. Design space can be divided into three 
sub-spaces as follows:  
 
1. S, Structural Space (often-called decision space).  
2. B, Behaviour Space (often-called operation space).  
3. F, Function Space (which is the Artefact’s end). 
  
In the next section, I will examine an evolutionary methodology called FBS. However, for now, it is 
necessary to outline the processes which take place during design space revision, because creative 
design occurs when a new variable is introduced into the design, and, then, the design space 
undergoes change. Two classes of possible change can be distinguished as 'addition' and 
'substitution'. From the 'addition' viewpoint, a new state space will include a main state space, i.e. 
new variables are added to available variables. From the 'substitution' viewpoint, a new state space 
does not include the main state space because some variables are removed and some are added. 
Rosenman, Gero and Maher25 explain the processes that have potential power to add and substitute 
variables as follows: 
 
1. Combination: Adding part or all of a design prototype to an available design prototype. Usually 
structural variables are added.  
2. Analogy. This can be defined as the process by which coherent aspects of conceptual structure 
surrounding a problem or an issue are transformed to another problem or an issue.  
3. Mutation. This is the change in variables in the design prototype. It can directly occur in structure 
variables, or like mutation in genetics, in coded representations (the genotype) of the structure (the 
phenotype). 
 
The added variables to the design space can be divided into two kinds as follows: 
 
1. Homogeneous additions: the added variable is of the type that other variables have been in the 
                                                
25 M.A. Rosenman, J.S. Gero and M.L. Maher ( 1994) 
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design before. 
 
2. Heterogeneous additions: the added variable is of a different type from other variables that have 
been in the design before.26 
 
Therefore, available knowledge is enough for the addition of homogeneous variables that can 
develop the design space. When heterogeneous variables are added to the design space, the 
available knowledge is not enough to reconcile design to the available design space, and this 
phenomenon is called 'emergence'.27 Similarly, the three processes that have the capacity to 
substitute variables are as follows: 
 
1. Mutation: This process substitutes heterogeneous variables, and removes some available 
variables. 
 
2. Analogy: This is a process whereby production is substituted by heterogeneous variables, 
especially when the substitution of related structural variables is caused by behaviour and functional 
analogies. 
 
3. Emergence: This is an important process in the substitution of variables. Emergent schemas can 
develop through genetic engineering. In fact, genetic algorithm makes a natural selection and 
evolution process in nature, which can be used as a model in the artefactual world. This theory is 
inspired by mechanisms, which occur in the natural selection process that are used for adaptation of 
population and the environment. 28 
 
Then, the addition effect occurs when a homogeneous variable is added to the design space, and the 
substitution effect occurs when the heterogeneous element is introduced into the available state 
space.  
 
                                                
26 John S. Gero and Thorsten Schnier, 'Evolving Representation of Design Cases and Their Use in Creative 
Design' in Computational  Models of Creative Design (1995) pp.343-368 
27 Gero notes the role emergence plays in an evolutionary process and discusses how the emergence of a 
phenomenon, which is implicit, and emergence properties play an important role in the introduction of new 
variables. Emergence is not only limited to structure. It can also relate to behaviour and function. 
          John S. Gero  (1996) pp.435-448 
28 Rosenman et al. (1994) 
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Figure 8: Gero's Addition and Substitution Effect 
 
In the natural world, the evolutionary pattern connects the fitness of active organisms with 
capability to survive. Genetic operators go through a gradual process of revision and optimisation in 
interaction with the environment. However, the model of evolutionary approach in design concerns 
a testing and quality control that is evaluated in terms of innovative variables. Creativity in design is 
evaluated based on the fitness function (behaviour), and new solutions are produced from available 
solutions using evolutionary mechanisms.29 
 
DNA base Bit Action/instruction/procedure 
rule/operation 
Gene Character/feature Set of actions/sub-routine 
Allel Feature value Specific action/instruction 
Chromosome String Set of actions/instructions 
Genotype Encoded structure Structure/set of design state 
Phenotype Decoded structure Design solution/object/artefact 
design case/instance 
Organism Solution Basic element/component 
Protein Building-blocks Class/schema/design prototype 
Species/class/group/behaviour Schema/objective fitness 
values/pay-off 
Behaviour/measure of performance 
Survival Optimization of O.F./ fitness 
function 
Function/purpose/intent 
Environment Problem context/domain Socio-eco environment/context 
(requirement/domain) 
Fitness/potential for survival Relation of objective values to 
optimal values/efficiency 
Satisfaction of 
requirements/efficiency 
Bio-chemical process Computational/symbolic process Form generation (geometric/physical) 
 
Table 4: John S. Gero’s Table of Comparative GA & Design 
                                                
29 Natural evolution places emphasis on the existence of random processes in production and selection, while in 
design methodology processes are placed in the framework of contextual and relational knowledge.  
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Creativity focuses on different points of the design space in order to optimise the design. Therefore, 
this kind of action will not be random; it is a goal-oriented action that is a necessary condition for 
the creative design process. However, creative design can be explained as the ability to perform 
goal-oriented shifts of focus in the search process. 
 
3.3  FBS Framework: Explaining an Evolutionary Methodology in the Design Process 
 
Gero & Kannengiesserin outline the FBS framework by examining the concept of situatedness as 
the dynamic interaction between different environments and constructive memory. In a dynamic 
perception of the design process, eight fundamental processes act among function (F), behaviour 
(B) and structure(S) variables, as set out below30:  
 
1. Formulation (Process 1): transferring the design requirements explained in function (F) to the 
expected behaviour (B) - the behaviour that is expected to acquire the function. 
 
2. Synthesis (Process 2): transferring the expected behaviour (B) to the solution structure (S) which 
can show optimal behaviour. 
 
3. Analysis (Process 3): acquiring actual behaviour from a synthesized structure. 
 
4. Evaluation (Process 4): evaluating the behaviour resulting from structure (Bs) with the expected 
behaviour (Be).  
 
5. Documentation (Process 5): creating the design description (D) for production. 
 
6. Reformulation Type 1 (Process 6): in the conditions where actual behaviour is not satisfactory, 
some changes are created in the design state space based on structure variables or ranges of values. 
 
7. Reformulation Type 2 (Process 7): in the conditions where actual behaviour is not satisfactory, 
some changes are created in the design state space based on behaviour variables. 
 
8. Reformulation Type 3 (Process 8): in the conditions where actual behaviour is not satisfactory, 
some changes are created in the design state space based on function variables.  
 
These processes can be visualised as shown below: 
                                                
30 John S. Gero and Udo Kannengiesser ' (2004) pp. 373-391 
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Figure 9: FBS Framework 
 
Design comprises a process of transference between various worlds, whereby artefact behaviour is 
adapted in an artefactual environment. The designer creates the design state space by purposeful 
and intentional actions, but the nature of the action that is called design may be subject to a process 
of evaluation. Perception of behavioural and structural space may change during design actions. 
Therefore, the idea of situatedness is a reflective-recursive process that concerns interaction 
between designer and the environment, and determines the design route. Interaction, situatedness31 
with construction and constructive memory32 prepares a base for our perception of the design 
process. Based on the FBS model and reformulation processes (structure, behaviour and function) 
the knowledge is reconstructed from past experiences. Tacit knowledge is not fixed in the time of 
creation (the main experience) but is, somewhat, a function of current conditions. New tacit 
knowledge can emerge as new interpretations of the main experience, and this is seen as a 
reconstruction process rather than a fixed status. 
 
The re-formulation process can consider as renew tacit knowledge. Every new design space (the 
new values and criteria that emerge from new variables of this space) potentially prepares an 
opportunity for re-formulation. In this concept, design can be understood as the order of operation 
of the current constructive process. Therefore, formulating the structure (s→s’) and behaviour 
(s→B’e) to design can produce creative properties. Describing available designs within the FBS 
conceptual framework prepares a satisfactory framework for routine design, where functional, 
behavioural and structural variables are determined, and what remains to be determined are the 
                                                
31 Gero took this idea from Dewey (1896) in order to develop it in FBS framework.  
32 This concept is taken from Dewey (1896) and Bartlett (1932). 
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values of structural variables and the reasoning of relative networks between those variables. 
However, where variables are not pre-specified, we move into the field of creative design. 
 
One of the mechanisms used to introduce new variables in the design space is analogy-based 
design. Some designs from different fields may have analogies in their structure. A description of a 
design structure comprises elements that specify which constructive elements exist in the design. 
These components are static in the structure space and are added into the dynamic process and 
operation. The goal of an analogy-based design process is acquiring new ideas about the structure 
variables of an old design using analogy-based function and behaviour.33 In this system, old design 
elements (resource design) are formulated based on analogy and an investigation process. 
 
The network knowledge between these elements, which expresses the link between function and 
behaviour, is communicated during the process of transferring to design. However finding analogy 
in designs is only possible by using a design description34.  
 
In design, the causal relationship route goes from structure to behaviour, and, consequently, to 
function. Therefore, from using a causal explanation we can infer behaviour from structural 
components, and then determine function. This causal knowledge flows in the FBS route and 
prepares fundamental causal knowledge, which enables us to argue for design by analogy. Structure 
and behaviour, and behaviour and function, is not a one to one correspondence. Structure can 
produce various behaviours based on the context in which it operates. Analogy is counted as an 
important process in creative design. If someone wants to solve a problem using analogy then that 
person should search for problems that are somehow similar to the problem. In design space, source 
problems and solutions are specified. Therefore, the designer can prepare a solution by adapting the 
new problem from source, and use a solving process using the source problem.  
                                                
33 Design prototypes are known as analogy-based when they show analogy-based functions and behaviours, 
originating from a structure based on analogy. 
34 Qian and Gero talk about analogy in relation to the design process. They emphasise that a design prototype 
has an ability to meet the requirements of an analogy-based mapping process in terms of knowledge 
representation. They develop their design prototype idea by considering the addition of qualitative causal 
knowledge. Qian and Gero outline the characteristics of an analogy based design process as follows: 
1. There is a qualitative causal relationship in respect of the manner of acquiring function in design structures 
through related behaviours. 
2. There is design knowledge. 
3. Distinguished categories of function, behaviour and structure.  
          L. Qian and J.S. Gero 'Function-Behaviour-Structure Paths and Their Role in Analogy-Based Design' in 
Artificial Intelligence in Engineering Design, Analysis and Manufacture (1996).  
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Gero and Kazakov note that problem solving based on analogy in design is used when a routine 
design cannot result in a satisfactory solution.35 They consider the analogy-based process in three 
stages, according to an FBS framework as follows:  
 
1. The matching and retrieval stage. During this stage the analogy of archived designs are evaluated 
with a target design, and the target design state space is retrieved. 
 
2. The mapping and transformation stage. During this stage design variables are mapped from the 
source state space to the target design space. The result of these operations transforms to the revised 
design space. 
 
3. Knowledge construction stage. Knowledge is passed from the target design state space to the 
revised state space. 
  
As previously mentioned, the generalised design knowledge helps to prepare a summary of 
individual design experiences, and it covers a range of successes and properties which are 
constructed according to the relationship of function, behaviour and structure variables. The main 
idea is that, by analogy, multiple mappings are perceived which flow into FBS routes. Until this 
point, analogy is limited to the structure state space in order to create the capacity to produce 
creative designs. The FBS framework gives potential power for a design to become creative, not 
only in the structure space, but also in the behaviour space.  
 
Behaviours can also develop in the same way within structure space, and these new behaviours can 
be result of new structural configuration or the introduction of new structural variables. The new 
criteria (behavioural components) have the potential to be expressed using the variables of the 
required structure. However, knowledge is needed in order to describe these new behaviours. 
Therefore, only behaviour space changes, and structure space remains the same. In some cases, new 
behaviours cannot be expressed based on the variables of the required structure space because there 
needs to be a revision of structure space. 36 
                                                
35 Gero and Kazakov (1999) 
36 The generalised design knowledge involved in analogy-based design is a form of causal and heuristic 
knowledge, which is impossible to achieve without creating analogies of the available case. Maher and Gazra 
highlight the models that can be used to represent generalised design knowledge, as follows: Casual Models, 
Stage Interactions, Heuristic models, Heuristic rules and Geometric constraints. 
          Mary Lou Maher and Andres Gomez de Silva Garza 'Case-Based Reasoning' in Design (1997) pp.34-41 
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Therefore, behaviour can be seen as a set of device states and transitions, which connect states to 
each other. These behaviours explain how device structural elements gain their function, and this 
causal knowledge can also be used to explain malfunction. 
 
One important aspect of creative design is the emergence concept, but its mechanism is not well 
understood, and it can be limited to the domain of shapes. However, this fault can be compensated 
for by considering an emergent ‘behaviour’ concept. Poon & Maher talk about emergent behaviour 
as part of a co-evolutionary model of design.37 This co-evolutionary approach can create an internal 
space (structure space) in response to a problem space (behaviour space), and Poon and Maher 
attempt to show how behaviour can emerge in a co-evolutionary process. Shape emergence is 
briefly discussed earlier in this thesis, but by examining the theories of Poon and Maher in more 
detail is it possible to generalise emergence in design beyond emergent shapes.  
 
Emergence and the process which leads to it is highly unspecified and unknown, but the common 
thing which links various definitions of emergence to each other is that the general behaviour of a 
system appears as the result of interaction between the units and elements of lower-level systems. In 
evolutionary genetic language, behaviour emerges in phenotypes, where organisms exist in the 
biological world, and solution space exists in a design process. However, the interaction of lower-
levels occurs in genotypes where information and properties are coded in order produce an end 
product. The gene as a biological unit for inheritance can copy itself on a sequence of genotypes. 
This is considered as a design variable in a design system, and emergence can be considered as the 
side effect of gene interaction inside the genotype. Further, design is an ordering process that starts 
from a problem formulation and moves towards a solution combination. In other words, there is a 
repetitive process of mutual interaction between problem space and solution production.  
 
The first repetitive stages of design only exist in the designer’s mind. By publishing the primary 
results, the final solutions may be considered as a dramatic and salient solution that puts the focus 
on the design description, or its product, rather than on the acquisition process of such results. It 
could be argued that the design process is just a process of selection, refinement, revision and the 
combination of available design and objects (in terms of constraints and operation requirements). 
                                                
37 Josiah Poon and Mary Lou Maher 'Emergent Behaviour in Co-Evolutionary Design in Artificial Intelligence 
in Design (1996) 
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However, it could also be argued that the design process can be seen in the evolutionary procedure 
of repetition. In design, an evolutionary process exists, where any creative and innovative design is 
the result of the retrieval stages of evolution and production based on pre-existed solutions.38 As 
previously mentioned, Type 2 reformulation (s→B’e) occurs when new behaviour variables in the 
available design are introduced from outside and change the behaviour state space, and this may 
affect the structure variables in a structure state space.  
 
The structure space determines the solutions’ space, and expected behaviours are related to the 
structure space, where current structural variables can produce behaviours or needs that serve to 
create new variables in the state space. This mutual action comprises structure and behaviour space, 
and one calculative model in design. FBS framework is the result of the interaction of three 
different worlds, which connect to reach each other by three classes of processes. Gero & 
Kannengiesser39 expand these eight stages to twenty stages in the context of interaction between the 
three worlds, and based on the interaction of agents with the external world. They visualise these 
three worlds as and external world, an interpreted world and an expected world, as shown below: 
 
Figure 10: Situatedness as the interaction of three worlds40 
                                                
38 L. Qian and J.S. Gero 'Function-Behaviour-Structure Paths and Their Role in Analogy-Based Design' in 
Artificial Intelligence in Engineering Design, Analysis and Manufacture (1996). 
39 Gero and Kannengiesser (2004) 
40 Ibid - The expected world is a sub-set of the interpreted world. 
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The external world refers to an external environment and agents, the interpreted world refers to 
sensory experiences, perceptions and concepts of design agents, and the expected world is the world 
in which designer’s imagined actions are produced. These three worlds connect to each other by 
three processes: 
 
1. The interpretation process. This transfers the variables received from the external world such as 
sensory experience, perceptions and concepts, which are the constructive elements of the interpreted 
world. 
 
2. Focusing process. This focuses on an aspect of the interpreted world in order to offer them as 
targets in the expected world. 
 
3. Action process. The action performed in the external world should lead to producing the states 
that support the targets. The result of an action is an effect that is created in the external world 
according to the targets of the expected world.  
 
The interaction of these various environments constructs a situation dynamic that is the basis for 
evolutionary movement in the FBS framework. Previously, it was noted that constructive memory 
is an interpretation process which works according to a push process (a data acquisition process) 
and a pull process (where the interpretation results).41 This model allows a new understanding of the   
evolutionary procedure that is constructed based on prototype. In fact, it shows how eight main 
design processes develop in interaction with different worlds, and due to the distinction between 
these different worlds, the FBS framework can show the possibility of a set of processes that can 
produce a design state space based on F, B and S. The main framework links the process of function 
(F) to expected behaviour (Be) due to the lack of distinction between the different worlds, and this is 
only a part of the formulation process. This idea is visualised as shown below: 
 
                                                
41 The push-pull process is used introduce the interaction of an agent with its external world (by interpretation) 
and its internal world (by constructive memory). 
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Figure 11: The Situated FBS Framework 
 
Fei, Sei, Bei variables belong to expected world. 
Fi, Si, Bi variables belong to interpreted world. 
Fe, Se, Be variables belong to external world. 
 
The twenty processes involved in this revised FBS model show the capacity of this framework. 
Stages 1 to 10 are the formulation stage. Stages 1 to 3 describe the design demands and 
requirements (the problem) which produce function, structure and behaviour variables in the 
expected world by using a push-pull idea, which is, to a high extent, based on a designer’s 
experiences and perception of design conditions. Stages 4 to 6 are used to optimise the mentioned 
variables in the interpreted world using constructive memory. Stages 7 to 10 are used as focusing 
processes between the interpreted and expected worlds in order to prepare a primary state space for 
design. Stages 11 and 12 stages are combination stages (octal processes).42 Stages 13 and 14 are 
concerned with analysis. In stage 13 a push-pull order shows that using Se based on expected 
targets, Si is obtained.43  Stage 15, which is the evaluation stage, is exactly the same as the primary 
                                                
42 In the FBS primary model, there is no Sie, and the expected behaviour transfers directly to the structure of 
external world in a combination process. 
43 In the primary FBS model, Stage 13 is not mentioned. 
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framework.44  
 
The documentation in the prototype of this process is represented by s → D.45  Stages 12, 17 and 18 
prepare the expected world variables for the external world in order to produce and construct the 
artefact. In the primary model, the reformulation of structure introduces new variables in the 
structure state space, but it cannot specify whether the available structure is internal or external, in 
relation to the design agent. Stage 9 operates as a stimulus for structure formulation. Stage 6 
represents the action of constructive memory as used in the interpreted world, whilst Stage 13 
proceeds to interpret the external world using a push-pull model. In this way a new Si from Se is 
created, and the function and behaviour of re-formulation works as a result of these related 
processes. 
 
This situatedness approach in design models tries to reconstruct the environment as a determining 
element in the evolutionary methodology of design. However, by removing environment in the 
design model, the design process cannot be described completely. This methodology uses a 
standard evolutionary algorithm, where design requirements are evaluated based on the fitness 
function of the design description. Design descriptions as genotypes consist of combinations of 
state genotypes can proceed to be developed into successful gene combinations. Combinations that 
create phenotypic effects or behaviours with higher fitness can develop in the gene treasury of 
future generation. The embedded processes in this model can generate a flow of introducing new 
variables into the design state space. In addition, adaptation in these new spaces operates in the 
same way as optimising does in design cases. Therefore, solutions are considered as genotypes, and 
operations are measured by fitness function.  
 
As previously mentioned, emergence is the result of the interaction of lower level units, and an 
evolutionary structure or behaviour variable can consist of emergent variables. Of course, the 
emergent behaviour should be goal-based in order to be able to evaluate emergent behaviours.46 
Emergent behaviours result from the evolution of behaviour phenotypes that are placed into the best 
current structures, and these evolutionary behaviours in their own turn can be used to find design 
solutions within the new design context. Therefore, it could be argued that evolutionary behaviour 
                                                
44 In the situated framework, the evaluation is between Be’↔Be - In the primary model it is Be ↔Bs. 
45 Today, the most used design descriptions are maps and graphs. 
46 Although it does not necessarily represent a causal relationship 
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can affect structure space.  
 
3.4  Critical Approaches to the FBS Model 
 
Design starts from functional requirements and leads to structural descriptions. In other words, the 
intentions and goals in a design process decrease according to structure space.47 The FBS model 
tries to infer an artefact’s function from actual behaviour. This actual behaviour is assessed based 
on physics/qualitative reasoning gained from an analysis of the structure space. The actual 
behaviour set is a subset of expected behaviour that prepares the function, and subsequently, 
teleological reasoning suggests that function connects to expected behaviour. Therefore, the 
behaviour of an artefact can be inferred from the acquired causal analysis of behaviour and 
structural components. According to a teleological analysis of function, behaviour is acquired as a 
result of causal analysis, and by examining the dependence network of structural elements. 
 
Dorst & Vermaas are the main critics of the above-described model.48 They see a problem in the 
absence of a fixed definition of the function variable in both the main and revised FBS model. They 
look at transference between intentional descriptions (function and purpose) to structural 
descriptions in the design process, and they raise questions about the transference of intentional 
descriptions to structural descriptions.49 The second problem they see relates to the question of to 
what extent can the FBS model be considered as a normative and descriptive model. The dual 
model as a descriptive model, the goal of which is describing the design process, and as a normative 
model, the goal of which is optimising design. In such a way, we should consider theories of 
function, structure and behaviour as progressing in three stages: 
 
1. The main FBS approach noted by Gero in 1990. 
2. A revised approach suggested in 1998. 
3. The 2002 approach that somehow goes back to the viewpoints of the main model. 
                                                
47 Structural variables consist of: structural elements, attributes (which explain the elements’ specifications) 
and communications (which generate communication between elements). 
48 Kees Dorst and Pieter E. Vermaas 'John Gero’s Function-Behaviour-Structure model of designing: a critical 
analysis' in Research in Engineering Design (2005) 16:17-26 and 'The Problem of the Design Problem' in 
Cross, N.G. Edmonds, E.(eds), Expertise in Design- Design Thinking Research Symposium 6, Creativity and 
Cognition Studies Process Sydney (2007) 
49 They show two different viewpoints of the FBS model. 
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In his 1990 article, Gero notes eight main stages in the FBS model. These stages are formulation, 
synthesis, analysis, evaluation, documentation, and reformulation of structure, behaviour and 
function. The first criticism raised is the instability of the conceptual framework of this model. The 
concept of function changes over time. The instability of this concept results in changes to the 
F→Be formulation stage. Vermaas and Dorst50 focus on design prototypes, where the design’s 
primary stages are performed, and where knowledge is needed for design.51 Therefore, the 
prototype’s content consists of a description about function, behaviour, structure52 and internal 
procedure and external effects. One of problems with the FBS model is the dual descriptive and 
normative state of design methodologies. By placing these states in a separate part of the model, it 
is suggested that we can prepare a solution for coherence in the design process, and, consequently, 
the prototype allows for a rational reconstruction of how stages are performed by the designer. The 
design prototype is a set of design experiences that show the relationship between behaviours and 
functions. Function is related to the purpose for which the product is produced. Vermaas and 
Dorst53 talk about four processes of eight primary design processes that result in design prototypes, 
as follows: 
 
i) The retrieval process. Retrieving all prototypes that have the F function possibly justifies all 
structural and behavioural requirements. During this stage information about structure and 
behaviour is related to accessing the required function. 
 
ii) Selection process. Selecting the related prototype prepares the selected prototype for the receipt 
of relational knowledge in connection with expected behaviour Be which realises function and 
provides tools to perform formulation (F→Be). Furthermore, the selected prototype provides 
                                                
50 Vermaas and Dorst (2007) 
51 As mentioned by Gero and others this knowledge consists of: relational knowledge (the link between 
function and the expected behaviour of structural elements), qualitative knowledge (the manner of the effect 
of structural elements on the actual behaviour of Bs) contextual knowledge (related to design materials) 
calculative knowledge (this specifies the mathematical relationship between behaviours, structure and 
contextual parameters). Qian and Gero (1996) talk about qualitative causal knowledge and develop the 
design prototype idea in relation to dynamic structures. Therefore, not only is the dependence relationship 
determined between structure and behaviour, but also structure is related to external effects, and based on 
this a comprehensive explanation of design is prepared. 
52 The distinction between state and structure is historical. The structural variable, which changes in a relatively 
short time, is called state. Behaviour can be considered as the successive change of states and method and 
result of these changes can be explained using qualitative physics. 
53       Vermaas and Dorst (2007) 
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information about the synthesis stage (Be→S). Therefore, focus proceeds to design state space that 
is related to design duties. 
 
iii) Instantation process. During this stage examples of design prototypes are created by assigning 
borders and re-considering design space. This information may convert into a more detailed 
division. Actual behaviour or structure is determined by formulation (F→Be) and synthesis (Be→S), 
retrieval, selection and instantation of the prototypes of structural elements. 
 
iv) Refinement process. This determines actual behaviour or structure by analysis (S→ Be) and 
estimation of the results through the evaluation stage Bs ↔ Be. If the results are satisfactory, the 
sample goes through to the documentation process, and if they are not satisfactory, they are used for 
refinement in the reformulation stages (S→ S΄, S→ Be΄, S→ F΄). 
 
Different definitions of function can affect the FBS model, and our perception of the formulation 
stage F→ Be acts as a suppressor of the definition of behaviour and function variables. The 
intentionality concept is challenged in the design methodology. The link between intentional 
descriptions and structural-physical descriptions should be considered in different FBS models.54  
According to Gero (1990) functions are design intentions or purposes. Behaviours are thought of as 
the manner of acquiring function from an artefact’s structure, and structure is the constructive 
components and the relationships of structural design space. Therefore, the transference of 
intentional description to structural description occurs at (F → Be) formulation and at (Be → S) 
analysis stage. However, in 1998 Rosenman and Gero begin to take a new approach to concept of 
function. They suggest that functions are the result of artefact behaviour, and that behaviours are the 
processes and actions demonstrated by artefacts in certain conditions, and in an environment. 
Structure is thought of as a material arrangement of components based on homogeneous 
relationships. This definition results in change, specifically where purpose is transferred to function 
and vice versa.  
 
The formulation stage develops to  and the “P” purpose is transferred to “Fe” 
the expected function, and then subsequently transferred to “Be” expected behaviour.  
                                                
54 Intentional description consists of mind states (purposes and demands) which meet needs. These needs can 
be placed in the different categories of aesthetic, terrestrial, etc. It should be noted that the directionality of 
these states towards needs distinguishes them from mere mind states like 'pain' and 'happiness'. 
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The analysis stage is also developed to  which is based on actual function 
and behaviour of the structure selected in synthesis stage. 
 
Eventually the  relationship stage is added which shows the Ps actual purpose that 
determines the design description. Therefore, the intention in formulation stage is not imported into 
a structural description and the behaviour of the artefact is determined by examining the artefact’s 
reaction in an environment.55  The result of this reaction produces function.56 In this interpretation 
function is distinguished from intention and purpose, and intentions are linked to behaviour as a 
result of expected function. Therefore, defining behaviour is not exclusively limited to expected 
behaviour (the 1990 interpretation) but it concerns actual behaviour. Consequently, only logic is 
needed to infer actual functions from actual behaviours, because artefact functions are the result of 
behaviours, and function is obtained by focusing on the behaviour results. This theory does not take 
the behaviour element out of structure, but causal reasoning is bound by the inference of expected 
behaviour and structure, and actual behaviour from structure. In their third interpretation Gero and 
Kannengiesser in (2002) look back to definitions similar to the 1990 interpretation. 57  Purposes are 
placed in the realm of function again, and behaviour is related to an artefact’s structure. Based on 
this idea, functions become the purpose of design, i.e. its teleology. Behaviours are taken or are 
thought of as expected properties, which result from structure, and, therefore, are the structure, 
elements and relationships of a design.  
 
Taking all this into account, it seems that it is, therefore, necessary to think about a theory relating 
not only to a function’s concept in relation to the design methodology, but also a theory of the 
artefact. The next chapter will investigate concepts and definitions of function, and place emphasis 
                                                
55 Such descriptions of behaviour comprise a combination of structural and intentional elements. For example, 
it can be shown that 'Construction Costs' have this combination (as a behaviour description). This is the cost 
of an intentional concept that refers to a value that people allocate to objects and actions. If behaviour is 
static, it does not change with time, and structure connects to behaviour based on a qualitative causal 
relationship. If behaviour is dynamic, the change of the qualitative state of the structure specifies behaviour 
mechanisms. 
 
56 The function of an artefact is inferred by the teleological reasoning of expected behaviour. In the 1998 
interpretation, this reasoning is involved in P→Fe, Fe→Be stages. 
 
57 Vermaas and Dorst (2005) 
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on a theory that can work with the intellectual framework of the FBS model.58 Terminologies will 
be considered that describe the behaviour and structure of components in relation to an artefact’s 
function as a whole. It should be noted that according to the 'no-function-in-structure' principle, 
function should be considered according to the relationship and dependence network of 
components. Therefore, any design theory should consider a perception of what a design is or 
should be.59 A realistic interpretation of the model would look at the expressions that refer to 
behaviour, function and structure, and consider the consistency of elements that converge prior to 
artefact construction.  
 
It is possible to construct descriptions that do not exist ontologically, and from this viewpoint a 
design description could be independent of the related artefact, because functions and behaviours 
are physical dispositions that can be considered as properties. By looking at realistic solutions, it 
can be seen that function and behaviour can exist as qualities in themselves. However, in the FBS 
model structure cannot be assumed to be independent of the artefact. The material elements that 
form to construct structure and their geographical relationships cannot be described as independent 
of the material. Therefore, design reasoning can be understood based on the knowledge acquired 
about structure and behaviour, and consequently this knowledge is placed among experimental 
knowledge of a coherent world. The FBS model shows how required function is transferred to 
structure, and there is no one to one correspondence between function and behaviour. Behavioural 
variables perform certain functions in specific environmental conditions. Additionally, an 
evolutionary theory of the artefact cannot be prepared without considering the theory of function 
ascription. The next chapter will look at this idea and will investigate theories such as:  
 
1. An overview of evolutionary computation - Spears et al. 
                                                
58 Vermaas & Dorst (2007) considered function as a physical disposition that co-operates with purpose, and is 
based on the analysis of a use-plan in formulation stage. Therefore, they connect intentions to physical 
structure because the use-plan is a rational reconstruction. The formulation stage is divided into two stages: 
1. Design a use-plan that links the purpose to action. 2. Determining physical dispositions that the artefact 
should have for effective usage. Designers act using their experimental knowledge (at the formulation stage) 
which can be shown by a use-plan. The concept of a use-plan will be analysed in the next chapter when a 
theory of function is investigated. 
 
59 Galle places emphasis on an ontological reasoning of the FBS model, and tries to increase its clarity and 
logical coherence. this article Galle discusses his meta-theoretical reasoning of design, and explains that 
results do not have direct function in the design procedure. Per Galle 'The ontology of Gero’s FBS model of 
designing' in Design Studies, 30 (4), (2009) pp.321-339 In  
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2. An introduction to simulated evolutionary optimization – Fogel 
3. A survey of evolution strategies - Bäck et al. 
4. Function, behaviour, and structure - Umeda et al. 
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Chapter Four 
The Theory of Technical Functions 
 
In order to present an interpretation of function, this chapter will review the advantages and 
disadvantages of various basic theories about function, such as intentional function theory, system 
function (or causal-role theory) and etiological evolutionary function theory. The question of 
whether single theory is adequate in order to interpret and explain different functional aspects and 
meet proposed criteria (such as the distinction between proper function and accidental function or 
malfunctioning etc.). It could be argued that conjunctive and disjunctive combination theories 
present an interpretation of function, and are designed to overcome the problems of essential 
criteria. In addition, other theories that take into account function analysis, such as a use plan and 
the action-oriented activities involved in production, designing and use will be considered. This 
chapter will provide an interpretation of function that can be used to facilitate an evolutionary 
model of technology, in the context of deliberative history, in order to present a forward-looking 
view in terms of the epistemic knowledge of agents. 
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4.1  Functional Knowledge: Proper - Accidental Function, Normativity and Malfunction. 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, any theory of the artefact should consider the idea of 
intentionality and normativity, the idea that directedness and purposefulness play important roles in 
the creation of intentional states. The idea of normativity can be understood in terms of how the 
mind is directed towards an artefact, and in the context of design, mental states are sometimes 
called intentional objects.1 If a mental state is directed towards a subject, this is called the 
intentional state.2  
 
Intentional states are the source of normative statements, which are statements that determine the 
difference between artefacts and objects. The practical actions involved in the designing, 
manufacturing and using of artefacts are not only based on theoretical reasoning and physical-
chemical characteristics, but on practical reasoning. It is this kind of reasoning that considers the 
instrumental value of artefacts for achieving goals. Practical rationality is based on knowledge 
found in an instruction manual, knowledge based on skills and techniques, and an analysis of the 
outstanding role of the agents, who are seeking function. 3 The idea of 'know-how' can be expressed 
in terms of when the agent recognises the necessary skills needed in order to run the procedure, but 
such know-how and knowledge do not provide enough evidence to draw conclusions about proper 
function. Artefacts may be malformed and unable to perform function. Indeed, when we recognise a 
malfunctioning artefact, normative states and engineering norms are used to formulate an ‘ought to 
be’ idea. However, the absence of such a deliberate thought process in natural objects means that 
the concept of malfunction seems to lose all its meaning.  
 
Engineering norms and standards play a crucial rule in describing normativity, and normative 
statements and judgments are based on such norms and normative reasoning.  Options and choices 
are based on rational reactions of agents, and they use normative reasons for meeting demands. This 
type of selection is undertaken by a rational agent in order to create favourable conditions. 
Desirability is graded, is context dependent, and may be dependent on mental states. Norms are not 
only used in the engineering process, but also are present in the artefacts produced by this process.  
                                                
1 An intentional state is not a specific class with its own content and nature, but only the state in which human 
agents are directed at them. 
2  
3 To carry out a sequence of actions in a use plan may need specific knowledge and skills, but one of the 
advantages of an instruction manual is that it includes a standard rationality. 
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Evaluative judgments about artefacts are part of an understanding of normativity. In normative 
judgment action-oriented theory of artifact using, designing and manufacturing can involve in 
normative judgments. This means that the artefact can be judged as a 'good' or 'bad' one. A 
description of both function and malfunction includes normative facts. Function-oriented theories of 
the artefact are usually based on the phenomenology of an artefact, whereby function is classed as 
the inherent essence of the artefact, and when proper function is undeniable. If the malfunction 
relates to the product, a lack of user skills, or unfavorable conditions, then normative facts that 
translate into engineering norms do not apply to the artefact. In addition, the accidental functions of 
natural objects cannot be considered in terms of normative norms. 4  
 
Ascribing function relies on normative stance and whether such ascription is based on the actions of 
the designers or users, and normativity draws a line between proper and accidental function.  
Houkes and Vermaas focus on an action centred approach when looking at design and use; they 
look at the actions involved in designing an artefact.5 In order to distinguish between proper 
function and accidental function, we should distinguish standard and non-standard, rational and 
irrational use.6 Proper function is achieved through the standard use of an artefact, and accidental 
functions are included in an alternative use category.7 The use plan has instrumental value in respect 
of the achieving of goals. This must be evaluated as a whole, because the sub-actions included in 
the pattern may not be helpful for achieving general goal independently, and a plan can only be 
useful when taken as a whole as part of a modular system. A standard use plan is the result of the 
                                                
4 In the next section, I will examine a variety of functional theories and examine the advantages and 
disadvantages of them. 
 
5 E. Vermaas and Wybo Houkes 'Technical functions: a drawbridge between the intentional and structural 
natures of technical artefacts' Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) pp.5-18 
 
6 Standard and non-standard use is not necessarily equivalent to rational or irrational use. According to an 
action centered approach, the standard use of an artefact is designed based on use plan or has traditionally 
evolved. However, users may also use trial and error in order to develop alternatives, and these innovations 
can be efficient, effective, rewarding, and rational, for example, using a flat headed screwdriver to open a 
paint-can. Conversely, the standard use may be irrational. In addition, designers may fail to develop a use 
pattern that has adequate intellectual conditions, and the designed use pattern does not lead to the desired 
results. Thus, the distinction between rational/irrational and standard/non-standard use is independent 
conceptually. 
 
7 These alternative uses may be confirmed by a community of users and change into standard use, or they may 
not be useful and fail. In any case, alternative and standard uses cannot describe the terms of accidental and 
proper function, and must be considered with reference to analysis of use and design. 
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use of an instruction manual and deliberative historical use. A manual presenting the order of 
actions is needed for achieving operation of technical systems (which draws on the privileged 
knowledge of the designers). Alternatively a use plan may be accepted by users based on the 
historical function of predecessors, or based on a process of trial and error. For example, although 
aspirin was made for alleviating pain, over time it has acquired the function of preventing blood 
clots.8 Thus, by means of an action-centred approach, an artefact's function is analysed based on use 
plan, and this requires a new metaphysic for malfunction. In other words, function and malfunction 
contribute towards the idea of intentionality in artefacts, and normative facts are nowhere more 
apparent than in an artefact's behaviour. Therefore, the notion of function without a consideration of 
malfunction is meaningless.  
 
Rudder-Baker refers to concepts that are not mental, but have no application without the mind (such 
as function and certification) as intention-dependent.9 Most economic, social and political concepts 
can be classed as intention-dependent. Thus, all artefacts and their properties, including function 
and malfunction, need to be evaluated in these terms. Malfunction can be caused by faulty 
materials, design, structure and technique of use and operation. It might be that each of these 
elements may not have been selected properly to achieve proper function. In addition, it should be 
noted that the status of malfunction can still be applied to an artefact when the performance of an 
artefact's function is possible physically, and when the necessary skills are available. However, the 
main point to be obtained from the above discussion is that normativity is a central aspect of 
intentionality. This relates to the usability value of artefacts when the context of practical rationality 
provides a reason for artefact use. Use refers to the performing of activities in a sequence that is 
specified in an instruction manual.  
  
Designers can use scientific and technical knowledge in order to design artefacts, and they write 
down technological explanations based on this knowledge in a manual.10 Knowledge contained in a 
manual contributes towards an artefact gaining a normative stance in terms of explanatory power. 
The connection between function and design in our daily use of artefacts can easily be seen. 
Designing involves capturing intentional elements, but, as Kitcher notes, design cannot always be 
                                                
8 The non-standard use can communicate to a community of users over the course of time and change into 
standard use - based on the teological elements that appear in the theory. 
9 Lynne Rudder-Baker 'The Metaphysics of Malfunction' in Techne (2009) 
10 The epistemology of proper function privileges the designer who knows the rational use plan. 
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understood in terms of design background.11 In technology, design is based on the designer’s 
intention, but in the world of biology the action of natural selection performs as the source (except 
in the case of genetic engineering). The relationship between intention and function is not always 
direct or clear, for example, if a screw is accidentally fitted into a machine but serves to make a 
necessary functional connection, although the connection was never anticipated, in the form of a 
direct intention, the accidental placing of the screw performs a useful connecting function.12 Here, 
the idea of function is the contribution the screw has in the system operation as a whole, and, as a 
result, a link is established between the designer and the function.13 However, the question remains 
of how the intentional aspect of function ascription can be interpreted. To what extent can function 
theories contribute towards an understanding of the presence of normative facts in engineering 
procedures, and normativity in artefacts? When talking about proper function or malfunction, it is 
important to address the concept of intentionality. McLaughlin believes that the three mainstream 
theoretical interpretations of function lack the ability to explain and interpret normative facts. 
McLaughlin articulates these ideas of function as follows:  
  
1. Intentional functions. This idea interprets function based on the tendencies of the intelligent 
agent. The designer, or person with epistemic merit, justifies subjective norms according to opinion. 
However, questions remain about the role desires play, and the extent to which desires contribute, 
in the creation of norms. The desire to achieve a goal or a state does not serve to establish norms. 
 
2. Causal-role functions. Function is interpreted in terms of the causal-role played by an item in the 
performing of an imposed action in a system. The problem here is that if the item loses its share 
contribution in the system, it is no longer functioning. Thus, the concept of malfunction is not 
comprehensible, and this would obscure normative criteria. 
 
3. Etiological functions. This perspective is concerned with the date of the selection of descriptive 
running normativity. However, what remains uncertain is how etiology can assure the future of a 
normative item.14 
                                                
11 Philip Kitcher 'Function and Design' Midwest Studies In Philosophy, Volume 18, Issue 1, (1993) pp.379–397 
12 Pieter Kroes and Larry Wright used this example to distinguish between proper and accidental function in 
their theories. 
13 Ibid  
14 Peter McLaughlin 'Functions and Norms' in Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds Comparative 
Philosophical Perspectives edited by Ulrich Krohs and Peter Kroes, (2009) pp.93-102 
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In response to these problems and questions surrounding normativity, McLaughlin discusses three 
ideas, as follows: 
 
1. Means-ends relationships. Each part of a system participates in the operation of that system and 
is considered as the means for reaching an effect (effects are referred to as 'ultimates'). Each link in 
the etiological chain can be a link for the next means. Therefore, when we talk about the function of 
something, we are considering the means to serve a purpose. From this perspective, functions are 
nothing more than the effects in a means-end relationship. These means-end relationships can be 
seen in nature too. It is possible to look at natural objects not only in the context of a cause and 
effect relationship, but in terms of a means-end relationship, and in this context, a pre-hypothesis is 
made about why something exists. It can be supposed that the means facilitates the achievement of 
goals, which are resources for normativity. 
 
2. Part-Whole relationships. A series of cause-effects and means-end relationships could be 
considered as a chain process. However, to a certain extent, in a system that has a hierarchical 
structure, the means-end relation is repeatable. The components of an artefact possess function in 
that they are part of a system (a containing system that is organised hierarchically) and the system 
itself has a function for something or someone. However, in organisms, components and organs (or 
their properties) have functions that are independent, and the question arises of whether an 
organism serves a function for something or someone other than itself. 
 
3. Type-tokens relationships. Function is given to special types of items. Tokens of one type can 
comprise a set (members of a special class). However, the members of a set cannot be judged in an 
evaluative manner, because, to an extent, members can possess the properties of the containing set. 
Further, tokens can possess the properties of their type in different degrees. This raises the question 
of to what extent a type token can function in the context of normative facts? This idea considers 
the notion that the type-token relationship is not an essential relationship for ascription function, 
and, therefore, a 'weak' normativity is introduced in this context. 15 
 
In contrast to type-token relationships and part-whole relationships, a means-end relationship 
contributes to a more in-depth analysis of engineering rational norms. Practical rationality is 
                                                
15 Ibid 
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different from a scientist's scientific rationality. When we look at the actions of an engineer, it is 
possible for an engineer to consider different and additional hypotheses for rationality to those that 
would be considered by a scientist. It could be argued that ‘true’ and ‘false’ as scientific statements 
change to ‘optimality’ and ‘efficiency’ in engineering science, and the question of normativity can 
be considered in terms of practical rationality. 
 
4.2   Functional Theories 
  
It could be argued that Larry Wright (who specialises in etiological function theory)16 and Robert 
Cummins (who specialises in functional causal-role theory)17 were the first to begin the debate 
about biological and artificial function. Since then, theorists have attempted to design a theory of 
function that meets function of organs (in biology) and function of artifact (in technology). 
However, this task has yet to be accomplished, and it still remains to be seen whether a single 
theory of function can be found which articulates both function in biology and technology. Function 
theories should distinguish proper functions from accidental ones, and ascribe proper functions to 
malfunctioning artifacts, and innovative artefacts.18 Of course, theories should address proper 
function in terms of physical-chemical properties.19 Theories of function need to incorporate a 
descriptive phenomenology of artefact production and use, in order to prepare an adequate and 
necessary condition for the theory, to ascribe function to capacity in the containing system 
performance, and for the consideration of distributing proper and accidental function. 
 
The three main interpretations of function theory (evolutionary theory, intentional theory and 
causal-role theory) can be measured using the above criteria. However, the inability of these 
                                                
16 Larry Wright 'Functions' in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 82, No.2 (1973) pp. 139-168 
 
17 Robert Cummins 'Functional Analysis' in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 20 (Nov. 20, 1975), pp. 
741-765 
 
18       A theory of function must distinguish between the accidental functions and the proper functions of an      
artefact. Proper functions can be understood as functions that are specified to the artefact in a standard way, 
whilst accidental functions are only used accidentally. 
 
19 Preston suggests that these criteria are incompatible with each other, and argues that either one of the proper-
accidental or innovative criteria must be deleted. He suggests deleting the later in favour of former because 
being able to distinguish between proper and accidental function in the phenomenology of production and 
use is crucial. Beth Preston 'Of Marigold Beer: A Reply to Vermaas and Houkes' Brit. J. Phil. Sci.  54 (2003) 
pp. 601-612 
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theories to account for all functional requirements has encouraged academics to combine theories, 
which have been created using a combination of the different components of the basic theories.  
Etiological theory is based on the history of selection, and causal-role theories are based on the 
contribution of components in the containing system in order to distinguish proper function from 
accidental function. The intentions of different agents may have different characteristics and special 
knowledge, and in this regard, it is possible to set designer intention apart from user desire, because 
some users may decide to use an artefact for alternative functions. A designer’s intent is that the 
designed artefact must have a proper function. The user’s intent might be to use the artefact in 
another way, or it might acquire an accidental function.  
 
However, if an artefact’s function is only dependent on intentions and the expectations of 
competent agents, who have privileged knowledge of the artefact, then there may never be such a 
thing as malfunction. The intentions of competent agents (designers and users) cannot explain 
proper-accidental function alone, and we need also to look at reproduction history and containing 
systems to be able distinguish proper-accidental function. Although intention may explain 
innovative and physical-chemical properties, function is also based on an agent’s knowledge. On 
the other hand, the production history of technical systems always refers to the intention of agents. 
 
The challenge for academics is whether a single theory of function can be formulated to link 
successfully the idea of function in the field of biology and in the field of technology.  
Ontologically an artefact's function is subjective, whilst an organism's function is objective.20  
Technical functions are ascribed by agents in terms of their mental states, and biological functions 
are context related.21 Further, technical and biological functions have different ontological status. 
Therefore, is it possible to establish a single theory to link function in both fields? 
                                                
20 Something is subjectively ontological if  it exists in a state dependent of the subjective state of the agent (like 
a painting) and something is objectively ontological if it exists in a state independent of the subjective state 
of the agent (like a car). 
21 Use and design create relationships between subjective states (intentions and goals) of user-designer and 
function. 
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4.2.1 Existing Functional Theories 
 
Vermaas and Houkes focus on the classification and measurement of various functional theories, 
and this thesis will remain committed to these classifications in the progress of the development of 
its overall argument.22  
 
Reaction to criticisms about proposed various theories of function have resulted in the correction of 
these theories using existing theories. One of ways in which academics have responded to criticisms 
of function theory is to attempt to combine the main interpretations of evolutionary/etiological, 
causal-role, and intentional theories in different disjunctive and conjunctive styles, and some 
academics try to resolve problems by presenting pluralistic theories. 
 
4.2.2 Etiological Theories23 
 
In 1973 Wright was one of the first theorists to distinguish between proper and accidental function 
using an etiological interpretation of function.24 Wright reviews the theories of Morton Becker 
(1959) and John Canfield (1964) and notes their inability to distinguish between proper and 
accidental functions. This is a common criticism of theories that are constructed based on the role 
and contribution of a capacity in a containing system, or of those that consider a determinant role 
for a user’s intention. Wright uses simple two-statement logic to explain the single concept of 
function in technology and in biology, as follows:  
 
The function of X is that Z means: 
 
− A) There is an X because it does Z. 
− B) Z is a consequence (result) of X’s existence.25 
 
Based on this logic, 'a' explains the etiological form of function ascription in both the technological 
and biological worlds. Function is seen as the reason for the existence of things, whether this is as a 
result of natural selection or conscious selection. This establishes a close relationship between 
                                                
22     Houkes, Wybo and Vermaas, Pieter E. 'Technical Functions: On the Use and Design of Artefacts', Springer, 
Jan 1, 2010 - Technology & Engineering 
23 From this point on the following abbreviations will be used: Intentional theory - 'I-theory', evolutionary 
theory - 'E-theory', and causal role - 'C-theory'. 
24 Larry Wright (1973) pp.139-168 He uses 'Functioning As' to refer to accidental function. 
25 Ibid 
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design and function, and shows how function can participate in an evolutionary interpretation. 
However, the problem of thinking about design in biology is fundamentally a problem that 
encompasses the question of the history of natural selection.26 When the term ‘design’ is used for 
human activities, a different approach is taken, in that ideas about design attempt to explore the 
formation of an object and its behaviour in the light of specific goals. However, etiological theories 
look at long-term history in biology, whilst conceptual artefacts with (one-shot) selection are linked 
to agent desires. Etiological evolutionary theories that consider function take into account the long-
term selection history. Using this approach Millikan proposes an etiological theory for function. 
Millikan describes proper function as it operates in the two fields of biology and technology as 
follows: 
 
1. Direct proper function theory (direct proper function). 
2. Derived proper function theory. 27 
 
Based on this, an item has direct proper function as a member of a special kind family known as the 
reproductively established family. In this family, similar things form reproductively, and the mean 
functions of members of this family are the same. Millikan distinguishes two kinds of these 
families, as outlined below:  
 
! Reproductively established families - first order. 
! Reproductively established families - higher order.28 
 
                                                
26   Lauder notes that the past history of an organism plays a role in the formation of their modern features. 
Lauder interprets design as biological structure in relation to function, and talks about a historical analysis 
based on three principles of transmission, as described below:  
1. There must be an explanation for the general properties of a structure or functional set, not for single 
features. 
2. A phylogenetic hypothesis of a relationship that is nested the hierarchy of structural features, (in their 
historical order) is necessary for analysing historical patterns. 
3. Historical hypotheses are tested by checking related proportions. 
George V. Lauder 'Historical Biology and the Problem of Design' J. theor Biol. (1982) 97, pp. 57-67 
In evolutionary theories, focus is placed on production history. Allen interprets natural design in the 
following way: T (trait) is designed naturally to do X, if and only if: a) X is a biological function of T 
b) T is the result of a process of changing the structure that is due to a natural selection. 
Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff 'Biological Function, Adaptation and Natural Design' Philosophy of Science, 
Vol. 62, No. 4 (1995), pp. 609-622 
 
27 Ruth Garrett Millikan (1986) Metaphysical Anti-Realism In Mind 95 (380) pp.417-431  
28 Millikan (1984) p.19 
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Members of the family type one are copies of each other, and the proper function of a family type 
two is only determined by referring to type one.29 However, most items are not a direct 
reproduction of each other. Mass production lines can produce an artefact indirectly. Thus, only 
members of first-order families are reproduced from each other.30 The direct proper function of a 
member of a reproductively established family refers back to the selection history of those items 
where ancestors performed a function. However, having proper function refers to a selection 
history, and the item does not necessarily have to carry out its function (in the case of malfunction). 
It is important to note that the proper function of item may not be able to be traced using ancient 
history.  
 
Apandis' historical relationship pattern examines the idea of function in relation to the distant past. 
By using the idea of derived proper function, it can be shown how innovations acquire proper 
function. However, intentional elements enter into this theory, and this suggests that an agent's 
desired elements have a role to play in proper function, because proper and accidental function is 
determined with reference to designer and user desires. Proper function is determined by the 
producer's intentions and demands rather than according to use patterns. Proper function is the 
result of a reproductive relationship because the normative states of functions can be linked to past 
performance.31 Artefacts can incorporate chemical - physical criteria and malfunction, and this is 
why we need to establish a normative stance for function in terms of past performance, even when 
we are incapable of describing innovative artefact function. Neander argues that the proper function 
of a trait is that which it is selected for, and he explains that structures and organic processes are the 
result of natural selection. In this way, biological proper function incorporates etiological elements. 
For example, if we assume that the unit of natural selection is a genotype, Neander32 explains 
proper function as: 
 
'the/a proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that which items of X’s type did to 
contribute to the inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and which caused the genotype, of which X is 
                                                
29 Reproduction is more similar to a copy. Viruses, genes and artefacts are created based on imitation 
reproduction behaviours, and not based on a single design. 
30 Millikan identifies higher order families. It is not necessary that the members of first order families are all 
produced in the same way rather there are a variety of ways of producing artefacts. 
31 Millikan (1993) extends proper function to the use plan, but after Preston's critique (Preston, 1998) which 
takes away a distinction between proper and accidental function, Millikan (1999) revises her theory. 
32 Karen Neander 'Function as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defence' in Philosophy of Science, 
Vol. 58, No. 2, (1991) pp. 168-184. 
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the phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection.' 
In another article, Neander argues that taking an evolutionary approach is not adequate to explain 
proper function.33 In addition, she attributes proper function to innovative artefacts, even those with 
malfunction, by suggesting that, even if an artefact does not work, the designer’s desire gives 
derived proper function to an exquisite artefact.34 Therefore, direct proper function based on natural 
selection date must refer to previous examples of successful performance,  but derivative proper 
function, regardless of successful performance, does not have to refer to a selection date.35 
 
4.2.3 Intentional Theory 
 
Intentional theory is based on the intentions, beliefs and demands of the designer and user. The 
designer uses physical-chemical capacities to design an artefact for a purpose, in order to contribute 
towards a goal related function. The idea of conscious selection provides a theory of design that can 
be explained regardless of past effects, and whereby selection is only based on hope and the belief 
of achieving a favourable impact in the present or future. Although this kind of theory can 
incorporate malfunction criteria, and the design of innovative artefacts, it cannot meet the support 
criterion, because of proliferation of function, especially when the user’s intentions are determinant. 
 
4.2.4 A Combination of Basic Theories 
 
Each one of the basic theories (I, E, and C theories) does not demonstrate an ability to meet the 
required criteria to facilitate an evolutionary model of technology. For this reason, many theorists 
attempt to present theories that are the result of the combination of ideas taken from all the basic 
theories.36 Two main strategies have been used by theorists in order to create this effect as outlined 
below:  
 
1. Disjunction combination theory. Disjunction combination theory can include all functional 
ascriptions of the basic theories in combination. The advantage of this strategy is that the theory 
does not suffer from basic theories limitation.  
                                                
33 Karen Neander (2006) 'Moths and Metaphors: Review Essay on Organisms and Artefacts: Design in Nature 
and Elsewhere by Tim Lewens' in Biology and Philosophy 21 (4) pp. 591-602. 
34 Karen Neander (1995). Explaining Complex Adaptations: A Reply to Sober's 'Reply to Neander'. British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4) pp.583-587 
35 It could be said we can ascribe proper function to innovative items and novelty in use.   
36 I and E theories can justify malfunction diseratum. Also C and I theories can justify innovative artefacts. 
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2. Conjunction combination theory. In this combination the only function ascriptions that are 
accepted are those stated in the basic theories. One merit of this theory is that it incorporates the 
whole merits of its constructive.37 
 
Disjunction theories can be introduced in two forms: theories that are based on intra-domain 
pluralism and theories that are categorised based on inter-domain pluralism. Inter-domain pluralism 
refers to different functions in the fields of biology and technology, while intra-domain pluralism 
refers to only one function for items in both fields.  
 
4.2.5 Causal-Role Basic Theory 
 
In causal-role theory, function is interpreted by examining contribution in the containing system. 
Cummins determines function ascription exclusively based on the contribution of structure 
components or system capacities.38 Thus, function is related to the capacities of the artefact 
constructor and the capacities that comprise the containing system, and is viewed in relation to the 
causal role.39 Cummins talks about two explanatory strategies (the sub-sumption strategy and the 
analytical strategy) as follows: 
 
'X functions as a Φ in S (or: the function of X in S is to Q) relative to an analytical account A of S’s 
capacity to Ѱ just in case X is capable of Q-ing in S and A appropriately and adequately accounts 
for S’s capacity to Ѱ by, in part, appealing to the capacity of X to Q in S.'40 
 
This functional analysis theory needs an (A) analytical interpretation to explain properly capacity, 
and general rules dominate on system behaviour. However, although the C-theories justify physical-
chemical properties criteria and innovative artefacts, they do not cater for malfunction ascription. 
As with intentional theory, this theory suffers from the problem of proliferation of function. 
Artefacts can play different roles within an inscribed system, and all these roles are performed 
according to function. This is true in the condition whereby an A-analytical interpretation for a 
                                                
37 Wybo Houkes, Pieter E. Vermaas Technical Functions: On the Use and Design of Artefacts, Springer, Jan 1, 
2010 - Technology & Engineering 
38 Robert Cummins 'Philosophy of Science Association' in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Jun. 1977) 
pp.269-287 
39 Preston names such type of function as System Function. Beth Preston (1998). Why is a Wing like a Spoon? 
A Pluralist Theory of Function. Journal of Philosophy 95 (5) pp.215-254 
40      Cummins, Robert 'Functional Analysis' in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 20. (Nov. 20, 1975) 
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system is available.41 
 
4.3  Forward-Looking Propensity Theory and Function as Disposition 
 
As mentioned previously, for Cummins, function ascription is evaluated based on the interpretation 
of its role in a containing system. Then, a functional analysis is considered as an analysis of 
properties, when the property is considered as a capacity or physical disposition. Based on this, 
function is linked to physical disposition. Kroes suggests that the idea of functions as physical 
dispositions is important in nature, because ascribing a physical disposition to an object is equal to 
the claim that the behaviour of an object under certain conditions shows lawful order. 42  
 
Although the contribution of item capacity in a system can be considered as function, it does not 
provide the necessary and adequate conditions for achieving desired function. As can be noted, 
etiological theories have a backward looking character and use prior reasoning to ascribe function. 
From the viewpoint of Bigelow and Pargetter, the function of an item at the time of 't' refers to its 
performance at the time of 't'.43  The describing of an item’s function does not only refer to certain 
effects in the current system. Some functions are available even when the current effects of 
character do not exist.  
 
In order to grant explanatory power to function, Bigelow and Pargetter propose forward-looking 
propensity theory in order to explain function ascription to items.44 Based on such a view, an item 
has a function when it demonstrates tendency for selection (due to the related effects). This idea 
interprets tendency according to physical disposition, and is inspired by the evolutionary concept of 
fitness (fitness is a state that determines the survival or the replication of an organism in an especial 
environment in nature). Physical disposition increases the survival probability tendency of being 
selected in the selection process. The granting of these tendencies is what comprises function. 
Fitness gives tendency for survival to organisms in a proper habitat, even if they don't survive or 
have never been in their habitat. However, the question is raised about whether this theory can be 
related to artefacts too? In response to this question, looking at the idea of disjunction theory 
                                                
41 Cummins considers pumping blood as a function of the heart based on the biological cycling system of blood 
42 Peter Kroes 'Technical Functions as Dispositions: A Critical Assessment' Techne 5:3 (Spring 2001) 
43 John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter 'Functions' in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84, No. 4 (Apr. 1987) 
pp.181-196  
44 Ibid 
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applied in the field of technology might be a valuable approach. Propensity refers to the capacities 
that give tendency because they are selected by agents, although the effects of these capacities are 
not necessarily needed in pre-determined blueprints.45  
 
In order to illustrate this theory of function, we can use the example of the sound of a heartbeat. The 
monitoring of the sound of the heartbeat can play a role in achieving a medical diagnosis, which 
increases chances of survival, and, therefore, this can be considered a function. However, in 
etiological theory, the lack of an evolutionary history would mean that this sound does not have any 
function. Therefore, it would seem that this theory omits the boundaries of proper and accidental 
function, and in respect of innovative artefacts, together with malfunction, it lacks explanation.  
 
4.4  Robert Cummins and Neo-Teleology 
 
In response to critics of Functional Analysis, and in contrast to those who believe that the existence 
of traits and organs is not describable in terms of their function, Cummins proposes a neo-teleology 
conjunction theory of function.46 An etiological interpretation of function tries to explain the 
existence of biological traits, structure and behaviour with regard to function. In other words, it 
attempts to answer the question why something is there by answering the question what is there. 
This kind of analysis tries to explain system capacities, and deals with the question of how does it 
work? By applying this line of questioning, the mechanism of function and system design can be 
understood. Neo-teleology theory is composed of two hypotheses, as outlined below:  
 
1. We have hearts because of what hearts are for. 
2. Traits are spread through populations because of their function.47 
 
In this way, we can explain why an organism has a trait or structure in terms of a function. For 
example, if we have hearts because of what hearts are for, then hearts perform the function of 
blood circulation, and not the production of heart sounds. Therefore, in contrast to classical 
etiological theory, in neo-teleology theory, current effects and their function act as clues to 
discovering an object's existence. In this theory, properties are selected according to function, and 
                                                
45       In their 1987 paper, John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter talk about the similarities between their theory and 
etiological theory, but indicate two crucial differences. 
46 Robert Cummins 'Neo-Teleology Functions: New Essay' in The Philosophy of Psychology and Biology 
edited by André Ariew, Robert Cummins, Mark Perlman, Oxford University Press, (2002) pp.157-173 
47       Ibid 
  
 
        136 
their presence in the organism is because of the effects and functions they have. In this kind of 
selectionist approach functional properties are considered in terms of etiological concepts, and 
Cummins foregrounds the designer and constructor roles in artefactual production.48 This theory 
acknowledges that the process that produces properties is not sensitive to function, because these 
properties are acquired after the production of function. However, the processes that maintain and 
reproduce them are sensitive to function.  
 
In this theory, adaptiveness concepts are used for explaining function. In other words, properties are 
selected due to their function, only if the function is considered as an adaptive variation in the 
population. Adaptiveness can be used to evaluate the level of the vehicle’s success in survival and 
reproduction, which is the basis of selection, but adaptiveness should be distinguished from 
adaptive concepts and function. Sometimes an organ that has better adaptive qualities performs its 
function better, but it may function in the same way as a lower adapting item. Therefore, functional 
analysis occurs prior to and independent of adaptation, although there is a link between function 
and adaptation, because if the level of adaptation is higher, it may result in an increase in function.  
 
It could be argued that Cummins presents a 'weak' interpretation of theory in order to evade one 
basic problem of etiological theory, which is that properties do not develop because of their 
function. 49  In contrast to a strong account, in which traits are to be selected because of performing 
their function, neo-teleology account argues that natural selection do not pick up proper function 
but supplies the relationship between the existence of traits and function. This deals with the 
introduction of functional invention, and this idea provides for an interpretation of functional 
innovative vehicles after the act of selection. However, on the whole, this theory does not pay 
substantial attention to the field of artefactual design.  
 
4.5  Beth Preston 
 
Preston formulates a disjunctive theory' of function which is inspired by Millikan, and which tries 
to address the shortcomings of the theories of Cummins and Wright.50 For Preston, only a pluralistic 
theory that incorporates the distinct ideas of etiological and causal-role theory can work to provide a 
                                                
48 Selection can be natural selection or intellectual selection. 
49      Ibid 
50 Beth Preston The Functions of Things: A Philosophical Perspective on Material Culture (2000) pp.22-49 
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general theory for use in both the fields of biology and technology. In pluralistic theory, the basic 
theories of C and E play a complementary role. As mentioned previously, Wright considers two 
elements of functional ascription in order to distinguish operations that form a proper function, and 
those that result in additional or accidental function.51 Firstly, operations that create functions 
should be connected to reasons causally in order to establish why something is there. In this way, 
capacities and capabilities under certain conditions are created. Secondly, it is necessary to refer to 
the history of the discussed capacities that justify their existence. However, one of the problems 
with this interpretation is that the current capacity of an item is often unrelated, or might even be in 
contrast, to the reasons for its being; there are cases in which the current use of an item’s being has 
no relation to historical performance. For example, insect wings were used for the regulation of 
body temperature rather than for flying. Preston notes that referring to past performance or use in 
order to assign function ascription is criticised by Cummins.52 However, based on this theory, 
function is the capacity of an item to perform an especial role in the context of a system.53  
 
As mentioned in earlier sections of this thesis, referring to the natural selection history imports a 
normative element into the functional explanation, whereby proper function is distinguished from 
accidental function. Thus, wherever function lacks a selection history, accidental function is 
interpreted. For Cummins, the boundary between accidental and proper function is dependent on the 
containing system. He uses the example of a belt buckle, which is used to prevent a bullet entering 
the body.54 This is a system not usually imagined based on the traditional function of a belt buckle, 
thus in this alternative operation, an alternative function has been devised which might be 
'accidental'. When Preston evaluates Millikan’s functional theory in relation to Cummins and 
Wrights’ theories and put forward the following example to exemplify this problem, as follows:  
 
If someone is born blind then: 
 
1. Based on Cummins' theory, the eyes don’t have any capacity, and, subsequently, any function in 
the containing system. 
 
2. Based on Wright's theory, because it cannot be said that X is there because it does Y, then this 
                                                
51 Wright (1973) 
52      Cummins, Robert 'Functional Analysis' in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 20. (Nov. 20, 1975) 
53 Preston (2000) - These capacities are sub-functions of a system as a whole. 
54 Cummins (2002) 
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theory results in a similar outcome to 1.  
 
3. Based on Millikan's theory the eyes have function, but they have malfunction in a sensory 
system. 55 
 
In 3 Preston presents a pluralistic theory of function that refers to Millikan's idea of directed proper 
function. In 1 and 2 Preston shows that different concepts of function are two different aspects of 
functional explanation, and are complementary. However, the point, which needs consideration, is 
how function can be achieved dynamically? In other words, can items obtain or lose proper function 
in their dynamic process? Using an evolutionary approach, artefacts achieve their proper function, 
and if an innovative artefact or the innovative use of an existing artefact is successful, it is produced 
based on this capacity, and the proper function of the artefact is achieved. Capacities that do not 
obtain productive success are still referred to as system functions. In cases where an item is 
produced for a system function gradually, it would be the proper function of its own generation. 
The function of a first example of a certain type must be considered as a system function, and then, 
when it is reproduced based on successful performance for that purpose, it achieves proper function.  
 
For Preston, system function is similar to Millikan's derived proper function.56 This kind of function 
refers to artefacts and innovative items that lack a selection history. What derives proper function 
out of system function is production history, which provides function with normative elements. For 
Millikan, proper function is normative and this means that an assumed item has a function even if it 
is a malfunction.57 Even if a vast majority of items of a generation have malfunction, then proper 
function can still be ascribed to them. In other words, normativity of proper function is irreducible 
to the statistical average.  
                                                
55 Beth Preston (May 1998) pp.215-25455 Preston agrees with Cummins in that capacities and selection history 
do not necessarily follow each other. Wright also agrees with this. Preston (1998) suggests that selection 
history can be likened to the function of prototype (in the case of artefacts) and ancestors (in the case of 
organisms). Indeed, what items have been in the past contributes to the selection history that accounts for the 
existence of the item. 
56 Preston (2000) Proper function comes from system function. 
57 Ruth Garrett Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism 
MIT Press, 1984 - Psychology 
  
 
        139 
4.6 'Weak' interpretation of functional etiological theory, based on the role of design and 
adaptability in modern theory 
 
In a 1993 article, Kitcher attempts to create unification between function ascription and design 
thought.58 This theory serves to inspire a new interpretation of etiological theory by theorists, 
including Griffiths in 199359 and later in 1998 by Buller60 who design theories that are thought of as 
a 'weak' version of etiological theory. Kitcher establishes a connection between function and design. 
In the biological world an organism's function is chosen based on the organism's response to 
selection pressures, and the main components’ function are determined based on their contribution 
in overall performance. Thus, for Kitcher, the selection pressures that determine the function of 
complex organisms can be defined based on a mechanistic analysis of the complex organisms, 
which shows how components participate in the overall performance.  
 
In this argument, entities have a function when they are designed to do something, and design is 
rooted in intelligent agent intentions (technology) or in selection (design source in biology). The 
link between function and design source may be direct, for example in instances where agents 
expect an artefact to perform an especial task, or it may be indirect, for example when the agent 
desires a complex system to perform an especial task and the components create a causal 
contribution in the overall operation. A 'strong' etiological concept of function is based on a direct 
link between function and the related source of design (which takes place in selection biology), and 
thus an evolutionary explanation can be assigned to the presence of an item.61 In a 'weak' etiological 
interpretation, the selection role in function ascription is not clear, and selection for the presence of 
an entity is not a necessary condition.  
 
Kitcher's attempt to unite functional accounts (E-theory and C-theory) (whenever functional 
analysis in terms of C-theory is considered, then the resources of design would be available) has 
been criticised by theorists such as Godfrey-Smith.62 The analyses of Cummins and Wright cite 
                                                
58       Philip Kitcher (1993) pp.379–397 
59 Paul E. Griffiths, 'Functional Analysis and Proper Functions' Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 44 (1993) pp.409- 422 
60 David J. Buller 'Etiological Theories of Function: A Geographical Survey' in Biology and Philosophy 13 
(1998) pp.505-527 
61 Kitcher (1993) this theory may apply in both technology and biology. In technology Kitcher considers 
intentional elements (intention is a source of design) to establish his pluralistic disjunctive IC-theory.  
62 Peter Godfrey-Smith 'Functions: Consensus Without Unity' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1993) 
pp.196-208 
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functional ascription to distinct explanatory states, and argue that uniting a single interpretation is 
not appropriate.63 Godfrey-Smith proposes a theory of function (conjunctive EC-theory), which 
refers to etiological concepts based on (current) modern history. He argues that functions are states 
or forces that describe the current presence of a property in the selecting context, based on its 
related past. Godfrey-Smith attempts to express a final formula of function using an adaptive 
concept, as follows: 
   
The function of M is to F if: 
 
(i) M is a member of T family. 
(ii) Members of T family are components of biologically real systems of type S. 
(ii ) Among the properties copied between members of T is property cluster C, which can do F. 
(iv) One reason members of T such as M exist now is due to the fact that past members of T were 
successful under selection in the recent past, by positively contributing to the fitness of S. 
(v) Members of T were selected because they did F, through having C. 64 
 
This formulation attempts to solve the inability of etiological theories to establish a distinction 
between functional and evolutionary explanations.65 Natural selection picks up proper function by 
showing which operations are used for survival and reproduction. In other words, variations that 
have the most survival value and the most productivity are maintained by natural selection.66 
However, in complex systems, each component makes a different contribution in adaptation. In 
contrast to Millikan’s and Smith’s (strong) etiological theory which places emphasis on natural 
selection, Buller suggests a (weak) version of etiological theory which undermines reliance on 
natural selection as the decisive criterion for achieving proper function.67 A 'strong' theory asserts 
that a property must be inheritable, and that variations and adaptation can happen in a similar 
environment. In contrast, 'weak' theory only insists that a property in the current containing 
adaptation makes a contribution, and based on this contribution, it has survival value.  
                                                
63 This view is historical – this is why ascribing function refers to related history (the current past). 
64 Peter Godfrey-Smith 'A Modern History Theory of Functions' Nous 28 (1994) pp.344-362 
65 Referring to ancient history, the function of flight cannot be ascribed to wings of insect and is for regulating 
temperature body of insect.   
66 This 'strong view' considers selected traits in terms of their contribution to the fitness of the containing 
system. 
67 Buller (1998) p.507 
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For Buller, a 'weak' etiological theory is interpreted as follows:  
 
'A current token of a trait T in an organism O has the function of production of an effect of type E, 
just in case past tokens of T contributed producing an effect of type E, just in case past tokens of T 
contributed to the fitness of O’s ancestors by producing E, and there by causally contributing to the 
reproduction of T’s in O’s lineage'.68 
 
However, focusing on fitness in a weak version of etiological theory shows that weak theory has 
some advantages over the 'strong' one, in that it shows why the selection process may not have a 
strong and necessary role in achieving functional properties (and thus it cannot have a significant 
role in an interpretation of a functional theory). Traits that are produced by genetic drift may 
account for functional analysis; this theory considers the function of all functional components in an 
overall system, where components contribute to fitness, even if they were left unchangeable in 
evolutionary history.  
 
Following on from 'weak' etiological theory, Griffiths presents a conjunctive combing theory (EC-
theory) by referring to the historical time period for evolution.69 This theory considers that proper 
function is determined based on the causal-role traits of the past (contribution in fitness), as 
involved in the selection process. Griffiths interprets this theory (a new etiological theory) as 
follows:  
 
'Where I is a trait of system of type S, a proper function of I in IN S’s is F if a selective explanation 
of the current non-zero proportion of S’s with I must cite F as a component in the fitness conferred 
by i'70 
 
Theories about proper function must be able to distinguish functional properties from vestigial 
properties. Vestigial properties are functional properties that may change or lose their function (like 
the appendix in the human body).71 In industrial systems, some components in artefacts may not 
have a proper function, because they do not make an intelligible contribution in the whole system. 
                                                
68 Ibid 
69 Griffiths (1993) 
70 Ibid 
71 It is important to note that vestigial traits can be distinguished from malfunctioning traits. This is why 
vestigial traits do not contribute to the fitness of organisms in their evolutionary history.  
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In artefacts that are constructed as part of a process of trial and fail, the contribution of functional 
components may be unknowledgeable for makers. However, the function of each part is its intended 
contribution in overall use. This understanding of function in biology can be used for artefacts, 
because conscious selection almost plays the same role as natural selection. Fitness in artefacts can 
be described as their tendency for production, and not their efficiency in performing the demanded 
function. 
 
In technology, some ancient artefacts have not only lost their main function, but are now used for 
another function (for example, for ornamental decoration) at present. In this regard, the artefact's 
function is its intended use, because its ability for performing an intended use gives it the tendency 
for being produced. The overall capacity in which the proper functions of an artefact contribute is 
the capacity for being produced. For example, a broken tool with malfunction still has a functional 
explanation, even though proper function is not ascribed to the properties of an artefact that 
contributes an intended use accidentally.  
 
Griffith's theory still struggles with function ascription to innovative artefacts that have 
malfunction. Utility and the positive contribution of survival value are tied to biological concepts of 
adaptation, and saying that an item has adapted with the environment means that natural selection 
has undergone selection of this item for performing a function. The concept of utility and benefits in 
adaptation is the result of fitness, and a property is beneficial for an item if it contributes towards 
fitness positively. Historical functional theories place emphasis on properties that have grown under 
natural selection in the past. However, utility may change over time according to environment. 
Adaptation is not an innate property; it is a scaled and relative property (which takes into account 
environmental factors). When considering the distinction between proper and accidental function, 
function and malfunction shows that function is not an innate property, but it is a relational property 
that is determined due to the contribution that a property makes in the adaptation process, and in 
relation to the environment.  
 
In contrast, Walsh attempts to design a relational functional theory by incorporating historical and 
non-historical approaches to function in biology, and by using the concept of adaptation.72 Walsh 
discusses that the function a property contributes in adaptation and adaptation is only determined in 
                                                
72 D. M. Walsh 'Fitness and Function' in The Brit. J. Phil. Sci., Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec. 1996) pp.553-574 
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a selective regime (the function is relative to the selective regime). Walsh interprets biological 
relational function as follows:  
 
'(RF): The/a function of a token of type X with respect to selective regime R is to M if X’s doing M 
positively (and significantly) contributes to the average fitness of individuals possessing X with 
respect to R.'73 
 
Relational function is the contribution an item makes to the average fitness in the selective 
regime.74 However, the contribution an item makes in adaptation is not equivalent in different 
environments. Thus, a normal environment must be distinguished for determining the level of 
adaptation. In other words, the positive contribution of an item to fitness in a specific context, and 
the method which the item contributes to fitness on average (in a specific regime), provides the 
conditions for which the distinction between proper and accidental function, and function and 
malfunction, can be determined.75 Therefore, any function ascribed in etiological theory has 
function in relational theory. 
 
Walsh attempts to provide conditions for a combining theory based on functional explanation; the 
proper function is cited (in the field of biology), but the question remains as to whether it is possible 
to use these concepts in the field of technology.76 As noted, natural selection needs different 
(variation) fitness, and this fitness indicates ability difference in survival and reproduction. In 
technological design, prototypes are refined in the mind of the designer, and then some are removed 
in the process of preliminary testing. These preliminary variations are subject to conscious 
selection, but there are other criteria for selection, such as aesthetic, economical, civil, or political 
elements, all of which can affect productive success and artefact adaptation. Thus, the variations 
that are produced in artefacts and prototypes can activate the selection process in a similar way to 
the process that occurs in biology. However, the criterion that determines adaptation in artefacts 
may be different to what it is seen in biology.  
 
Buller suggests that fitness includes the following components: viability, fertility, fecundity and the 
                                                
73 Ibid p.564 
74 The fitness of components can be separated, and not all have a role in entities.  
75 Here function means something that items can do in context. 
76      Ibid 
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ability to find mates.77 In other words, these four basic components provide the propensity for 
survival, and production in biology. Buller questions whether these concepts are usable in the field 
of technology or not, and he concludes that potential viability is an adaptive fundamental 
component in organisms, because they must reach puberty in order to potentially achieve viability, 
fertility, fecundity, and ability to find mates. For artefacts there is no such life producing cycle; 
artefacts are constructed to be used for a while, then they depreciate. However, some artefacts 
experience a kind of puberty (for example, a fermentation process), but this process is not exactly 
equivalent to sexual maturity because it is not related to production and reproduction. Instead it is 
related to the performance of other functions. Therefore, in technology, reproduction is not 
dependent for survival on an item's puberty, whilst in biology if organisms do not reach puberty, 
their lineage becomes extinct. Artefacts do not have the ability to find mates, but some prototypes 
are produced and others are released. However, some types do not achieve intended success due to 
social, economic and technical differences. On the other hand, there are different rates of production 
in artefacts. Due to differences, some artefacts may have more presence in society.78 Sometimes the 
greater efficiency and economy of an artefact leads to its extension. 
 
In technology the above concepts are indirectly related to the cycle of artefact production. In 
addition, in technology, the rate of an artefact's presence in a user's society might not necessarily be 
due to the above factors, because social and commercial reasons etc. affect adaptive properties. As 
noted, a 'weak' etiological theory ascribes function only in relation to the hereditary properties that 
contribute in fitness, while a 'strong' version of the theory seeks a selection date for items. The 
'weak' etiological theory only distinguishes the positive historical contribution of ancestors in the 
fitness, and is not sensitive to an item's proper function.  
 
Artefactual design, construction and distribution uses techniques and resources that may be 
insensitive to final product function during the long process of selection, development and use.79 
There is no exact equivalent to fitness in the technological world, and successful performance does 
not justify an artefact's proper function. It would seem that proper functions in artefacts are 
determined to the extent they effect reproduction. This method of selecting proper function does not 
                                                
77      Buller, David J 'Etiological Theories of Function: A Geographical Survey' in Biology and Philosophy 13 
(1998) 
78 The artefact has the same function in the competing design, but because of efficiency, it is spread out. 
79 Basic engineering technologies for producing artefacts usually grow independent of the design and 
manufacturing of the artefact. In modular systems, modules develop separately.  
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provide an explanation or description of novel prototype functions, which do not have a 
reproduction history. The criterion of ascribing proper function for innovative artefacts is not 
applied, because these kinds of artefacts are not ascribed a production or production history, even 
though they might be involved in system function.80  
 
Davies presents a conjunctive combing EC-theory by referring to natural norms.81 He attempts to 
answer the question of whether these two basic theories are in competition, or are complementary, 
or can be unified in a more general theory. Davies presents an alternative approach and suggests 
that E theory is an interpretation of C theory in different systems. For Wright, the question of why 
an item is there is equivalent to the question of function, and, thus, function ascription is equivalent 
to an item's existence.82 Based on C-theory, function ascription is explanatory. It describes the 
contribution of capacities in a certain system, based on a capacity analysis and the tasks of the 
components. These theories are different in terms of explanatory powers and explanatory strategies. 
As previously mentioned, the purpose of E-theory is to describe the presence of a property in a 
certain time, while C-theory describes how the capacity of an item in a containing system is 
applied. E-theory is described by referring to natural selection mechanism, whilst C-theory is 
described by referring to constructor components, the capacity of a system and the methods by 
which these components contribute in the containing system.83 
                                                
80 In 1996, Vermaas and Houkes and Houkes established the use plan approach in terms of the basic theories of 
C, I and E and later in (2010), they developed ICE theory. 
81 Paul Sheldon Davies 'The Natural Norms: Why Selected Functions Are Systemic Capacity Functions' Nous, 
Vol. 34, No. 1 (Mar. 2000) pp.85-107 
82      Larry Wright (1973) 
 
83     When Davies talks about C-theory, he expands the definition of the theory from a consideration of organisms 
to an analysis of population capacity. Davies suggests that a population might have capacities similar to a 
system (with a natural selection date) which allows change inside of itself. Thus, a population is a system 
that is formed from components, and it has a morphological function. However, the systematic properties of 
a population are different from those of organisms in that they capture different kinds of structural forms, 
which create differences in their C-functions. Davies notes that evolution in populations can occur under the 
influence of mechanisms such as drift, rather than selection. He believes that by distinguishing related 
systems in populations it is possible to construct an analysis of systematic capacity, and of genotype and 
phenotype redistribution as created by drift, and, thus, cites C-functions to components. Therefore, each E-
function is nothing more than an especial kind of C-function and C-function refers to all cases that determine 
E-function. The main points of Davies' theory are listed as follows: 1. C-functions are basic. From an 
ontological and epistemological point of view, E-function is nothing more than the C-function that is kept in 
the selection process, and is set in a larger system. In fact, selection operates on C-functions and, from an 
epistemological view, C-function cognition occurs prior to E-function cognition, and without this cognition, 
historical evidence is needed for item selection. In fact, E-function is only identifiable after C-function. 2 
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4.7   Overall Design in Krohs Thought 
 
Krohs proposes a concept of design that can be applied in two basic theories, whilst Davies omits 
one of these theories (E-theory) in favour of the other one.84 Alternatively, Krohs attempts to 
present a concept of design based on ontogenetics. This theory is a combining conjunctive IC-
theory, which argues that function can be determined without referring to the design history. In the 
field of technology, C-theory includes I elements, and designing the blueprint determines structural 
properties by referring to intentions. However, in the field of biology, non-intentional thought is 
classed as type fixation. Krohs aims to show that functional description in both fields can be united 
according to usage in technical-social systems.  
 
Krohs looks at design in the context of ontogeny rather than by examining evolutionary dates, and 
he does not connect the adaptive process to design. Krohs suggests that design separates a creature 
from the process from which the design is created, and this means that biological design can be seen 
as a kind of intentional design. Accordingly, intentional design comprises something more than 
mere intentionality. Design merely fixes the type of constructor components in an assembly. Thus, 
type fixation works alongside intentionality in intentional design. However, a physical-chemical 
system lacks type fixation, and type identities are determined based on component properties. In the 
process of intentional design, the designer fixes the types for the constructor components. Thus, 
Krohs proposes a concept of design that refers to function in which the functional norms do not 
refer to their evolutionary source.  
                                                                                                                                                            
Theoretical unification. Davies aims to achieve theoretical unification between two basic theories. Kitcher 
attempts to do this also, but for Kitcher, function is something that is designed: in technology by design 
resources and in natural selection by desire. Therefore, Kitcher is committed to the theory that evolution 
creates design by natural selection, and, therefore, this poses the question is it necessary to explain why 
something is designed in the domain of biology? In addition, why does such a process occur? In addition, 
Kitcher suggests that design concepts in the field of technology have no equivalent in biology. However, 
Davies believes that an analysis of natural system capacities may result the classification of C-function, 
which can be presented in a flowchart or diagram, but all system capacities do not belong to system design, 
and, therefore, an analysis of all capacities does not indicate systematic design. 3. The preservation of 
distinctions. Davies' theory preserves the distinction between evolutionary explanation (historical reasons) 
and functional explanation (systematic reasons), which is a difference in explanation strategy..  
           
84 Krohs Ulrich (2009) 'Functions as based on a concept of general design' Synthese 166, pp.69-89 
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For Krohs, the contribution of the functions of type-fixed components is designed according to 
system capacity, as follows: 
 
'To Φ is a function of a component X of a complex entity S with design D with respect to a capacity 
Ѱ of S if F to Φ is a contribution of X in S to Ѱ and X is type-fixed in D.'85 
 
This definition of function is applicable in both the fields of biology and technology. The possibility 
of part of a designed system having different functions, or similar functions which run differently 
by fixed types, is considered. Krohs emphasises the role of the designer’s desires in association with 
type fixing; the designer assumes that a selected type runs a function, and, thereby, the type is 
linked to examples in the structure design implementation. It should be noted that in this approach, 
function refers to the constructor components, parts and properties of a system. However, if we 
want to ascribe function to artefacts as a whole, they must be considered as a part of a designed 
system (like social-technical systems). 
 
4.8   Sperber and Teleo-function 
 
Sperber 86 poses ontological and epistemological questions in respect of artefactual design, in order 
to present a combining approach to function theory to explain the presence of intentionality in 
functions and in artificial selection. In relation to disjunctive IE-theory, Sperber considers functions 
as selected effects in biology, and as intended effects in technology. Teleo-functions are broader 
categories that include biological and social functions. Biological teleo-functions are phenotypical 
features of organisms that relate to the reproduction propensity of a property. Cultural teleo-
functions can comprise two types, as follows:  
 
1. Mental representations that are constructed among agents using mental processes. 
 
2. Public products, including behaviour (speech) and its sequences (like manuscripts) which can be 
received as mental processes input. 
  
                                                
85 Krohs Ulrich (2009) 'Functions as based on a concept of general design' Synthese 166, pp.69-89 
86 Dan Sperber 'Seedless Grapes: Nature and Culture in Margolis, Eric and Laurence, Stephen, (eds.) Creations 
of the Mind: Theories of Artefacts and their Representations (2007) pp.124-137 
  
 
        148 
Teleo-function is the effect that explains why an item is reproduced and propagated87. Mental 
representations trigger a desire for cultural production, and the effects that an item had in the past 
leads to expectations and demands for the reproduction of that item.88 Thus, Sperber links desires, 
and the mental presentations that stimulate these desires, to past effects. Sperber defines teleo-
functions as follows: 
 
'An effect of type F is a teleo-function of items of type A just in case the fact that items have 
produced F effects helps explain the fact that A items propagate.' 
 
4.9  Boorse and Goal-Directed Patterns 
 
Boorse argues that theories that are based on a designer’s intention do not shed light on the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of function.89 Boorse believes that structural components may 
have a function which is unknown to their designer, and that the intention of the function is 
independent of manufacturing it, and that if intention was enough to determine function then this 
means that the artefact could never malfunction.90 A describes his idea of function by what he refers 
to as an Operational Explanation, which determines function in terms of contribution in a system. 91  
The examination of aims provides a more appropriate explanatory method of function, although it 
should be noted that this analysis should not be limited to an especial goal, such as usefulness. 
Every goal, which is followed up by a purposeful system, can produce functional statements. 
Organisms are oriented towards purposes such as survival and reproduction, and, in contrast, 
artefacts can be goal-directed in automatic systems, or they can be used in a purposeful containing 
system. For example, the chair has a function because it contributes in a goal-oriented activity 
(sitting), but the weak point of this analysis is that function is viewed in terms of it being a 
contribution to a goal, and the contribution may not be fully understood. 
 
Dennet interprets organism design in evolutionary biology in the context of adaptation, and artefact 
function in the context of hermeneutics.92  In hermeneutics, a reader’s interpretation of a context 
                                                
87 Sperber uses words like re-production and propagation to show that produced items may not inherit all traits 
of their ancestors.  
88 Vermass & Houkes (2010) use E-theory to show cultural functions, and I-theory to show technical functions. 
89 Christopher Boorse 'Wright on Functions' in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 85, No. 1, (Jan. 1976) pp.70-86 
90     Makers of ancient artefacts may not have had knowledge about all physical-chemical properties. 
91      Ibid 
92 Daniel C. Dennett 'The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artefacts' in Philosophy and 
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may be independent from its author’s intention. Thus, the real interpretation of a context is not 
based on an author’s personal opinion. The artefactual hermeneutic is a hermeneutic which is used 
in a wider domain. In this context, artefacts are open to different interpretations (use), and the 
common use of an artefact may be different at any given time. The inventor and the designer act as 
one reference point for functional ascription by means of having privileged knowledge of the 
designer. Therefore, functional theories that consider the use pattern of artefacts can be inspired 
using this hermeneutic approach. For example ICE-theory as presented by Vermaas and Houkes 
looks at use pattern.93  
 
The arguments presented in this chapter can be expanded by reading the work of the following 
academics: Robert Cummins (1977), Robert N. Brandon94 (1981), Goslow Efal95 (1986), Ron 
Amundson96 (1994), Larry Wright (1972) and Philip Kitcher (1981). 
                                                                                                                                                            
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 50, Supplement (Autumn 1990) pp.177-194 
93 Vermaas and Houkes (1996) 
94 Brandon believes that an historical ascription of function is ambiguous and biology limits the application of 
the evolutionary concept. 
95 Efal uses C-theory to examine artefacts and accounts for the function of organisms without reference to 
selection. 
96 Amundson agrees that an etiological view of function applies to evolutionary biology and the function of an 
organ is its evolutionary goal. 
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Chapter Five 
Modularity and Modular Systems 
 
When trying to find an evolutionary theory for technology, a dynamic process is needed which can 
link the past to the future events. Modularity can perform this role as a conceptual tool, because it 
can be explored as an inheritable process. It is important to explore evolutionary mechanisms that 
act on the 'unit' of selection. Baldwin and Clark consider six modular operators within the 
evolutionary path of complex systems.1 Design Evolution occurs when designers make value-
seeking changes to a design. In this chapter I will examine a set of operations based on the theories 
of Baldwin and Clark. If a design is modular then six operators across modular architecture and 
two operators within modules work to create a system. This idea explores splitting a design and its 
tasks into modules, substituting one module design for another, augmenting and adding a new 
module into a system, inverting to create new design rules, porting a module to another system, 
modifying the components of modules, and combining modules. In this analysis, the mentifact 
(which can, in some sense, be thought of as the module) will be the unit of selection.!!
 
                                                
1 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark Design Rules: Vol. 1, the Power of Modularity (2000) 
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5.1  Emergence in Technical Systems 
 
The mechanism of natural selection used by evolution in biology requires variation, and changes of 
pattern in biology always relate to the degree of fitness of the selected variations. Although, there 
may be some uncertainties about the value of applying evolutionary models in technology, it is 
becoming increasingly important to consider change patterns for economical-political outcomes. 
Industrial development has been traditionally regarded as a process rooted in engineering 
procedures, standards, and social-economical constraints etc. In light of the rapid changes taking 
place in technological advancement, one question now frequently raised is how is the technological 
world is related to the biological one?2 With advances taking place in genetic engineering, in 
computer technologies, and in other technological fields, it is valuable to explore Darwinian 
patterns in biology with a view to explaining their relationship with the artificial world. 
 
Artefacts are designed to be used in a means-end context. In contrast, organisms are the result of the 
selection of genetic variations that occur in the inheritance process aimlessly. It could be argued that 
the theoretical differences between the artefactual and natural worlds is very extensive and diverse, 
but that artificial processes such as genetic engineering are linked to both the world of nature and 
organisms, and the world of technology. It could be suggested that the idea of intentionality in 
artefactual theory automatically negates and destroys any viable link between the concepts of 
evolutionary theory in biology and technology. However, by referring to evolutionary design 
(especially in electronics) and evolutionary archaeology, it could be argued that concepts and 
models working in both fields are problem-driven and open-ended, and that there is no explicit 
boundary between selection theory and intention-oriented theory. 
 
By applying a methodology of evolutionary design, designers of electrical circuits and computer 
science have managed to discover procedures and algorithms that operate free from human 
interference. These procedures and algorithms are able to engage in evaluating and controlling a 
system, or take an action to search inside a design area in order to find optimum solutions, or to 
spread out the design area. Although, nature manages to find solutions for design problems far more 
efficiently and complexly than evolutionary algorithms do, the evolutionary algorithm uses similar 
                                                
2 Houkes believes that if we want to develop evolutionary concepts and models for the artefactual world, we 
must show (prove) that there is an interaction between the intentionalist description of artefacts and the 
selectionist view based on principles of evolutionary theory. Wybo Houkes 'The Open Border: Two Cases of 
Concept Transfer from Organism to Artefacts' in Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds:Comparative 
Philosophical Perspectives, edited by: Ulrich Krohs and Peter Kroes (2009) 
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mechanisms in order to solve problems. Artificial design (phenotypes) have been used to change 
configurations using genetic codes (genotypes), and this process is an imitation of the methods used 
naturally by organisms when they interact with other living things in the environment.  
 
From a selectionist point of view, technological innovations may satisfy environmental needs and 
reinforce a well-adapted system. By considering the criteria and necessities in design requirements, 
designers are often able to create different variations in the design space. In the selection process of 
the first phase, they eliminate ideas that they believe to be inappropriate.3 Using evolutionary theory 
to examine innovations in technology merely gives greater explanatory value to an expanded range 
of selection and variation factors.4 For variation, these factors can include: know-how, technical 
quality, the nature of a suitable design procedure, and the material sources that create the artefact, 
and all of these determine what alternatives are available for selection. For selection, these factors 
include: examining the competitive environment, which contains a technology, and the user’s 
requirements of the artefact. However, since these requirements take many various forms, this has 
resulted in the inability of academics to decide on a comprehensive theory, and an inability to 
determine the factors of an artefact’s success.  
 
We cannot always expect that it is the best, the cheapest and the most useful artefact that survives. 
The survival of existing artefacts is dependent on market demands, and these demands do not 
always refer back to the common properties of token artefacts. Therefore, the presence or lack of 
presence of an artefact is important.  
 
Technical artefacts differ from social artefacts (such as money etc.) in that fulfillment of a function 
depends on physical structure. Therefore, an appropriate interpretation of 'generation' is crucial for 
understanding the nature of artefacts. Artefacts are physically produced in an engineering 
environment, which is an environment in which physical objects are designed and made. Many 
artefacts are produced in relation to a concept or an idea that possesses humanistic intentionality, 
and, in this environment, physical objects acquire directionality and become artefacts. Therefore, it 
could be said that artefacts are produced as a physical concept and as an intentional concept. 
                                                
3 Manufacturers and designers take out the elements that do not meet the design criteria because this might 
make the cost of production uneconomic. Users also may ignore goods because of price or quality etc. 
4 Lewens believes that we must not expect too much from trying to apply evolutionary theory to the world of 
designing artefacts. 
           Tim Lewens 'Innovation and Population' in Functions in the Biological and Artificial Worlds: Comparative 
Philosophical Perspectives Edited by: Ulrich Krohs and Peter Kroes  (2009) 
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Some artefacts and complex technical systems may comprise emergent properties, behaviours or 
qualities that are not created within an intentional context. These emergent properties or behaviours 
emerge suddenly and unexpectedly as by-products of complexity, and they go beyond the properties 
and qualities of the components of the system. Emergence shows us many examples both in biology 
and in technology, such as consciousness in the brain, turbulence in hydrodynamic systems, and 
resistance in the electrical circuits of complex technical systems. Emergent properties may produce 
destructive effects, such as the emergence of resistance in a power transmission network, or they 
can produce beneficial effects, such as adaptable systems. Kroes suggests that emergence should be 
considered with reference to the following points:    
 
1. The causal power of emergent properties. This causal power is often called epiphenomena. 
Emergent properties without this causal power cannot prepare new opportunities to influence 
(causatively) in the physical environment. 
 
2. Emergence and functional decomposition. In order to solve design problems, engineers apply 
functional decomposition strategy, whereby the function of the whole system is divided into sub 
functions run by the components of the system. This strategy cannot be used for systems containing 
emergent properties, because emergent properties cannot be understood in terms of component 
properties.  
 
3. The unpredictability or unexpectedness of emergence. The nature of unpredictability means that 
design can be meaningless, and trying to control emergent properties in an engineering system 
would be challenging.5 
  
Emergence is innovative and different from the other components of a system. Therefore, a system 
or a design cannot be reduced to its components, or the predictable or expected relationships that 
take place within this system. From an ontological perspective, and with regard to the physical 
structure of an artefact, it is valid to ask whether function is considered to be emergent property or 
not? Function supplies the first conditions of emergence, in that function cannot be reduced to the 
operation of a system's components. However, function does not fulfil the condition that stipulates 
that a system must demonstrate a new qualitative causal power beyond its components. 
Consequently, it could be argued that functions are not emergent properties from an ontological 
                                                
5 Peter Kroes 'Technical Artefacts, Engineering Practice and Emergence' in Functions in the Biological and 
Artificial Worlds: Comparative Philosophical Perspectives Edited by Ulrich Krohs and Peter Kroes  (2009) 
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perspective.  
 
From an epistemological viewpoint, we need two cognitive tools to explore the paradigm of 
engineering control: non-predictability and non-explainability.6 In a 'strong' interpretation of 
epistemic theory, emergence occurs when the quality of a system is neither predictable nor 
explainable in principle. Therefore, if we want to define an artefact's function as an epistemic 
emergence, we must distinguish between the artefact’s function, and its behaviour or capacity. 
Physical behaviour is not an emergent property because it is predictable and explainable based on 
physical-chemical properties and the arrangement of components.7 However, technical knowledge, 
and recognition of the intention and goals of the user, manufacturer, and designer etc. is required to 
discover artefact function. From an epistemic perspective, various functional theories can play a 
crucial role in determining emergent properties. Theories that consider use patterns can be used to 
explore function in relation to emergent properties, because the function can be ascribed according 
to the intention of the user (which may be unpredictable).  
 
Theories that look at the intention of the designer may facilitate an exploration of emergent 
properties in relation to the designer's technical knowledge of components. A 'weak' interpretation 
of emergence can be examined by exploring time-scales in relation to the design and creation of an 
artefact. Artefacts may be non-predictable and non-explainable at the time of analysis, and 
sometimes after the acquisition of required knowledge, an emergent quality may disappear. Hence, 
engineering history is usually understood in terms of a continued effort to change emergent 
phenomena into explainable ones. 
 
Emergent phenomena can play a role similar to the role played by 'drift' in evolutionary theory. 
Using the idea of drift, the emergence of semi-complex systems can be considered as having 
function. However, although emergent properties may be challenging to the engineering control 
process, they may be selected in some cases (such as for innovative use), and be placed in an 
                                                
6      Peter Kroes 'Technical Artefacts, Engineering Practice and Emergence' in Functions in the Biological and 
Artificial Worlds: Comparative Philosophical Perspectives Edited by Ulrich Krohs and Peter Kroes  (2009) 
7 It can be possible to divide a whole function into sub-functions based on a lack of energy, material, and signs 
noted in the system. For simple artefacts, emergence is not straight forward. This means that function is not a 
property can be ascribed to components. 
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adaptive system over a long period of time. Consequently, this results in the fitness of the artefact.8 
As mentioned in previous chapters, in biology drift usually occurs in small populations rather than 
in large ones. However, in technology, in rare cases emergent phenomena may occur in complex 
systems as a product of complexity in specific types of technical systems. 
  
5.2 Modularity and Modular Systems 
 
In order to present an evolutionary theory, a dynamic process is needed to connect the past to future 
events. Modularity exists in both biology and in technology, especially in complex systems, where 
the components of a system, or the modules, have limits relationally and interactively, and 
interaction is limited based on hierarchical structure.9  
 
In modular design, modules are independent (and possess their own design rules) but they work 
together under the general rules of the system’s design, so the options increase and the structure of 
design changes from an integrated structure into a hierarchical one. In modular systems, functional 
units are distinguishable, but these functional structures are compatible with the other structures in 
the system. Therefore, a modular system supplies a desired technical and specific solution. Modular 
systems are used when different functional variations are required in a product, and the modularity 
concept is frequently used in design, manufacturing and operation. It is expected that these designs 
have a positive impact on evolve-ability. Indeed, in order to perform adaptation mechanisms, 
complex systems must be evolve-able (whether in organisms or in artefacts). In other words, these 
systems must have the ability to make random variations that sometimes lead to improvement. In 
fact, in these systems the adaptation process only can proceed to the extent that desired mutation 
occurs. This depends on evolve-ability that is the manner of the writing of the genotype variation in 
the phenotype variation. 
 
Wagner and Altenberg separate modularity into two processes as follows: 
 
1. Parcellation: A process that generates modularity from an integrated whole. 
                                                
8 In memetics, fitness refers to technique, ideas or even artefacts, and it corresponds to growth rate in society. 
Lewens (2009) argues that the psychology of a population is one of the key factors for determining fitness.  
9 This section will proceed to outline an evolutionary theory of technology inspired by Baldwin and Clark's 
'Design Rules: The Power of Modularity' Baldwin and Clark 'Design Rules: The Power of Modularity' MIT 
Press , 2000 - Business & Economics (2000) 
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2. Integration: The result of the integration of separate functional units.10 
 
In technology, the modules in modular systems are designed and produced independently as 
functional structures, and are included in a system under the rules governing that system. However, 
individual modules have limited interaction, but can be consistent with other modules. In an 
evolutionary process, modules can evolve independently. Individual designers (who may not be the 
designers of the entire system) can make modules more efficient and effective. Therefore, by 
examining and categorising different types of modules and functional structures, it is possible to 
engage in the evolutionary procedures of technical systems, and to clarify the possible impact of 
evolution on modules in the evolutionary procedure of complex technical systems. Pahl et al. divide 
modules into function modules and production modules.11 Function modules that work 
independently or in combination together play a role in the performance of a system’s function, 
whereas production modules are designed independently of their function, and use based on 
production considerations.12 They categorise modules as follows: 
 
Distinguishing Features Classifying  Criteria 
− Function modules, Basic function modules,            
− Auxiliary function modules, Special function modules         
Adaptive function modules, Non-modules 
 
Types of module 
Essential/possible modules 
 
Importance of modules 
Large/small modules 
 
Complexity of modules 
Similar modules only, Different modules only 
Similar and different modules, Modules and non – modules 
 
Combination of modules 
Number of parts per modular 
Number of units and their possible combinations 
 
Resolution of modules 
Software/paper modules only, Mix of hardware and software 
modules, Hardware only 
 
Computerisation of modules 
Closed system with combinatorial plan 
Open system with specimen plan 
 
Appropriation of modules 
 
Table 5: Pahl et al. - Functional and Production Modules13 
                                                
10 Guenter P. Wagner and Lee Altenberg Complex Adaptations and the Evolution of Evolve-ability (1996) 
11 G. Pahl, W. Beitz and J. Feldhusen Engineering Design: A Systematic Approach (1996) p.498 
12 Function modules refer to equipment and spare parts etc. 
13      G. Pahl, W. Beitz and J. Feldhusen (1996) p.498 
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Basic functional structures are fundamental to a system. They can run the function of one system 
individually or in combination with other functional modules. Basic functional structures are 
identified as essential.  Special functional structures are complementary structures with special sub-
functions. They are special modules that are attached to basic modules, and can be named as 
possible modules. Adaptive functional structures are essential in order to adapt the system to other 
systems according to boundary conditions. They are run by adaptive modules, and since their 
dimensions are not pre-determined, they are suitable for unpredictable conditions. Customer-
specific functional structures are not used as part of a standard modular system. They are designed 
individually for special tasks, and their application is based on a combination of modular and non-
modular systems. It must be noted that a combination of different modules, and modules that are 
consistent with customer-specific modules, often results in the creation of complex systems that are 
designed to satisfy market demand. In fact, market demand and functional requirements often 
determine the different combinations of modules in modular systems, and the type of participating 
modules. However, there are limitations to the techniques and combinations available. 
 
Creating functional structures in modular systems involves dividing functions into sub-functions. 
This is important because identified sub-functions can be placed in order within modules. In other 
words, general functions can be divided to less complex sub-functions in order to be placed in the 
functional structures individually or together in consistent combinations. These functional structures 
in a modular system are of special importance. The process of evolution that can be traced in these 
systems derives from the running of evolutionary operators within these fixed structures. In 
technology, functional modules are adapted into structural units. This inconsistency between 
functional and structural decomposition in biology and in technology has led to the idea that, in 
biological systems only a structural approach can be considered when examining function.14  
 
Modularity is scaled both in biology and in technology, and contains dynamic dimension. However, 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
14  Krohs suggests that animal organs can be viewed as structures with strong interior interaction ability, but 
with weak outside interaction ability However, morphological criteria are not always applicable to the 
modules’ decomposition when a complex system is decomposed. Modules such as temperature and enzyme 
metabolism can be distributed between cells. However, these networks are divided into modules according to 
structural and functional criteria. Ulrich Krohs 'The Cost of Modularity' in Functions in Biological and 
Artificial Worlds: Comparative Philosophical Perspectives, edited by: Ulrich Krohs and Peter Kroes (2009) 
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modular systems can evolve from different onset spots and with changes in different directions.15 
Since modularity creates evolutionary plasticity, it makes selection more possible, and artefacts 
having a modular design can evolve through the substitution and reconstruction of modules. 
Therefore, modular systems that experience gradual revision and improvement evolve easier than 
integrated systems, since in integrated systems the whole design must be revised.  
 
In engineering, modular systems are able to complete rapid revisions in line with the general rules 
of design, but, in the long term, the evolvability of the system may decrease. In addition, a modular 
design that includes an integrated design may be less able to accept changes; modules may show 
different applications in different systems, and this might result in limitations in the acceptance of 
changes, since the changes must be consistent with the running of the different functions. Therefore, 
it could be argued that modularity does not increase evolve-ability. Hence, modules are functional 
structures in which interior structural elements are strongly interdependent and are independent of 
other functional structures. In addition, they are able to integrate functions. 
 
5.3  Design and Modular Operators 
 
The architects of modular systems must identify working principles in order to create a modular 
design. These principles identify the functional role of modules within the system, and are designed 
to take into account the most economical efficient arrangement of modules.16 Baldwin and Clark 
explain that for a modular design to function properly, design parameters must be distinguished 
according to their visible and hidden information.17 This information tells the designer which 
parameters interact outside their modules, and how potential interactions can occur between 
modules. Indeed, the system is modularised by hiding some information of systems. They present a 
hierarchical vision of modular design that shows the categories of information involved in the 
modular design as follows:  
                                                
15 Integration and parcellation mechanisms are able to bring about modularity separately or together.   
16 Interdependences leave room for creative design space, and innovative modules can bring about evolutionary 
effects in modular systems.  
17 Baldwin and Clark (2000) 
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Figure 12: Baldwin and Clark's Hierarchical Structure of Design18  
 
The design comprises four types of module, A, B, C, and D. The general rules of design are visible 
for modules B and C directly (and for modules A and D indirectly). This means that designers of 
modules C and B must be familiar with the general rules of the design, the A-B and C-D 
interfaces.19 In this hierarchical design, the designers of hidden modules act independently of the 
overall design rules.20 However, they must be aware of rules that are placed higher than their own in 
the hierarchy. Therefore, any change to visible information must be compatible with changes to the 
components of that level.  
 
Designers determine the architecture of a system in terms of design rules, working principles, 
dependent networks and the operation of modules. Designers consider the functional requirements, 
cost of production and create desired assemblies based on optimal solutions. Placing modules 
without considering interaction between modules would not result in a modular design. Modular 
layouts rely on the relationship and interaction between modules, and they are designed to optimize 
opportunities in order to access desired goals.  
 
Modularity might not be restricted only in an artefact's design. The production process can be 
divided into separate and independent processes. For example, different production units are created 
                                                
18 Baldwin and Clark (2000) p.75 
19       Interfaces are pieces of visible information in the hierarchy of modular design, and express interaction 
between modules. 
20  Hidden modules relate to when design decisions do not have an affect on decisions made for other modules. 
Visible means the design rules and the designers of hidden modules must follow these rules. 
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in a steel production factory all of which can produce a given product independently. Pelletizing 
units can prepare the required pellets for iron making, which is used in steel making plants. Then, 
steel can be used in cold rolling units, or used on galvanizing and colour coating production lines. 
Although these units use each other’s products sequentially, they are not interdependent. However, 
a steel making process in the plant can occur without the presence of pelletizing unit in the plant 
complex, or in some cases, plants just contain steel making and rolling lines. The products produced 
on each line can be used as raw materials for other plants. On the other hand, modularity may take 
place in use, when a part of a product (for example, part of a piece of furniture) is used. Then, the 
use can be a function of the modularity condition.  
 
Each design is made by determining functional requirements and essential issues through the design 
rules of functional structures and the mechanisms of a system’s function. The design space is 
achieved based on the layout (configuration) of the working structure. There is more flexibility in 
modular design in complex systems, and the number of sub-functions in the running phase 
decreases. When the revised modules are placed into a larger system, the system starts to change 
and evolve gradually. Therefore, it must be noted that changes made to modules in the containing 
system will be the result of the module operation actions. This process can be seen when changes in 
the modular design are the result of the operation of (one or a combination of several) modules. 
These conceptual tools can be defined as follows: 
 
1. Splitting: dividing one design or system (and its tasks) into modules. 
2. Substituting: substituting a module with another module. 
3. Augmenting: adding a new module to the system.  
4. Excluding: removing a module from the system. 
      5. Inverting: to create new design rules. 
6. Porting: the process of adapting a module in another system, and done using common 
modules.21  
 
In addition to six operators across modular architecture presented by Baldwin and Clark, I propose 
two operators within modules as follows: 
 
                                                
    21       Baldwin and Clark 'Design Rules: The Power of Modularity' MIT Press , 2000 - Business & Economics (2000). 
P123  
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1. Modifying the components of modules. Hidden modules can be revised and improved more 
economically and easily. The evolutionary paths of the hidden modules are attained by means of 
operator activity in the system, and invention surrounding these modules may subsequently affect 
the containing system. 
 
2. Combining modules. The design rules of hidden modules and the function of modules in the 
same level can be shared. 
 
The above operators articulate the dynamic process that can result in evolutionary changes within 
genetic modular systems.22 These operators affect technical functions and design layout directly, 
and production methods indirectly.23 However these operators act on available structures, and new 
architectures result from the new relationships these structures form. This forms part of 
evolutionary theory as it works in complex technical systems. Therefore, assessing the role and 
function of these operators is off crucial importance. An evaluation of these operators is outlined 
below: 
 
1. Splitting: This is the only operator used to create function structures and modules in a system, 
and to establish the initial mechanism of evolution. Therefore it is the first and the most 
fundamental operator used in integrated systems. This operator separates most of the modules that 
leads to the creation of a hierarchical design in a modular system. 
 
2. Substitution: This operator is used in both modular and integrated systems. The functions of the 
previous operators create opportunities to facilitate the function of this operator. The substitution of 
modules creates a basis for economic competition. After the separation of modules, the designer can 
substitute a module for another in the framework of the design rules. Thus, alternative designs can 
compete together. An evaluation of these designs depends on economic and social conditions.  
 
3. Augmenting and excluding: These operators are used only for modular systems. They add or 
remove modules from the system in order. A module is added to the system to provide a new 
function, and another is removed when there is no need for it any more. In expanded systems, the 
                                                
22 Two first and last two operators apply for integrated systems, and the others apply for modular systems only. 
23 In their appropriation of 'operators' Baldwin and Clark were inspired by Holland (1992). For Holland, the 
actions of these operators (or structural modifiers) can create new structures that are embedded and adapted 
to their environments. 
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user may exclude a group of modules that are not required. Systems that let the user select 
according to their needs are called configurable systems. Configuration is a form of modularity in 
designing. These systems can place the user in the designer’s role.24 The designers of a system may 
use operators to determine the design rules for a flexible system that contains a large collection of 
modules. In such a situation, designers may implement a basic minimum system and then add other 
modules to it gradually, depending on market conditions. This allows users to complete the system 
according to their economic situation. However, the adding and removing of modules may lead to 
some differences in the function of the system. 
 
4. Inversion: This operator improves modules in the higher layers of the hierarchy of modular 
design. Thus, a common carrier with widespread use is placed in an upper level of the modular 
system, and increases the number of layers in the hierarchy of modular design. 
  
5. Porting: This operator occurs as the last, when a hidden module is able to act upon a different 
collection of designing rules, and it can be used in more than one system. Like the previous 
operator, this module enables a hidden module to move upward in the design hierarchy. However, 
because that module is hidden, it means that the designers and architects of other modules may be 
unaware of the function of this operator. For a module to be transmittable, the designers should split 
their design into parts that are influenced by the environmental system, and those that are not. A 
shell cannot be created for the uninfluenced parts that are the interior parts affected by the 
environment nor have any influence on it. Thus, they can change without significantly changing the 
larger system, or they can emigrate to another system. Exterior parts should transmit information 
from the exterior system to the interior parts and vice versa. The design rules of an environmental 
system and portal module should be both equally clear for these translator modules.25 Additionally, 
if the above-mentioned actions - definition of shell, separation and the design of translator modules- 
occurs, then a module would be able to act in two or more inconsistent systems. 
                                                
24 The system may be modular in respect of use, but not be modular in relation to design and vice-versa.  
25 Translator modules are a kind of hidden module that transmit data and information from one system to 
another compatibly  
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Figure 13: The Internal-External Phase of Modularization26 
 
Thus, through the operation of these six elements, a modular system can adapt itself to 
environmental changes. As mentioned, the first two operations are not able to establish modularity 
alone; they cannot create new functions or connect to other systems. Modules can be used in a 
system individually or together. Further, the authors of these theories have relied mostly on the 
theory of descent rather than replication, because the performance of these operators in available 
systems has meaning. Therefore, the existence of previous generations has particular importance for 
current modular systems.  
                                                
26 Baldwin and Clark (2000) p.133-35 
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Figure 14: Activity of the Six Operators27 
 
Model A is separated into three sub-modules, and the various substitutions that occur in module B 
and module C are removed. The common elements of D and E are delivered into the sub-system 
design rules so that an architectural module can be developed for this delivery.28 Then, Module F is 
transformed.29 Accordingly, the final system has three levels, with two modular systems that 
perform the functions of A, D and E modules in the old system, together with a standard hidden 
module and three special modules (system integration & testing, architectural, and transformer 
modules). The evolution of technical systems participates in a value seeking process that achieves 
value or fitness for adaptation to the environment.  
 
                                                
27 Ibid p,140 
28 These modules integrate hidden modules in architecture of systems. 
29      It is separated, first and then the internal modules are placed in shell, and then the finally transformed 
modules will be developed. 
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To find an evolutionary pattern in technological development, we need to establish the unit of 
selection, the variation resources, mechanisms, and criteria for selection (theories about the 'unit' of 
selection are discussed in other chapters).30 In technology, the processes of production, and the 
purchase and use of artefacts, are considered as mechanisms working within the act of selection, 
and capital market value provides the criteria for such selection. However, in technology, the 
adaptation of a system is viewed as a whole. In fact, adaptation is assigned to a system, which is 
going to be adapted to the environment. Hence, it is possible that parts of a system are separately 
inefficient and lack technical-economical justifications, but they achieve the necessary value for 
survival in an efficient system. In biology, this is also so. For example, the appendix (in the human 
body) lacks necessary function, but its presence is still preserved within the body. However, 
functional structures may also be efficient and competent in an abandoned and failed system, but 
they vanish in the containing system. In biology, the quality of an organism is measured by the 
metric called 'fitness'. 
 
In economics, the concept most similar to adaptation is called IRR (the internal rate of return) or the 
ERR (economic rate of return). In engineering economy, one of the standard ways to evaluate 
economical proposals is called IRR. Investors measure profitability of their capital based on the rate 
of return. The IRR provides a criterion for technological evaluation. Thus, new forms of design, 
flow sheets and processes that can achieve the necessary value are adapted into the social-
economical environment, and as noted, novel examples in modular systems are the result of 
foregoing operational acts, and provide resources for variation in modular design upon which 
selection operates.   
 
The willingness and awareness of the designers and users of an artefact is derived from variation 
and selection. However, modularity is a conscious manner as part of the evolutionary dynamic in 
technology, which designers predict the value of the designed product using technical knowledge. 
However, issues of design are not completely predictable, and this process is often dominated by a 
degree of uncertainty. Moreover, the value of modularity links the different parts of a design, and 
the parts can be evaluated separately as independent units of selection31. This means that a system's 
                                                
30 Hidden modules, architect modules, and even whole systems can be considered as units of selection. 
31       In previous chapters, we have already discussed the memetic evolutionary process. By referring to this 
theory, Baldwin and Clark (2000, P 242) note two important differences between design evolution theory 
and memetic evolution theory, as outlined below: 1. In evolution, memes act as agents of removal for blind 
replicators. Therefore, their function as mental units in societies is a side effect of their success, which is 
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evolutionary process accelerates in relation to systems integration. Modules are not completely 
independent from others, and so designers must consider the visible information in a system, and 
obey the overall rules. Further, modularity includes a cost, and a pattern for investment is provided 
which is related to an evolutionary framework. Modular system architecture, and establishing 
design rules and testing needs investment, and the results must be tested and combined to obtain the 
final design. Therefore, investment is needed to perform testing at module level.  
A generation of modular systems begins with design rules, and tests are done at system level to 
highlight variation resources based on value-seeking behaviour in the evolutionary process. These 
tests enable designers to be more aware of the relationships between modules in a system, and they 
provide new opportunities for operators. The evolution pattern of system's overall configuration is 
independent from its modular evolution, and this evolutionary pattern appears as a co-evolution of 
the selection mechanism and the unit of selection. When the design of an artefact is modular, the 
system components are divided into hidden and visible modules. The evolutionary paths of the 
hidden modules are attained by means of operator activity in the system, and invention surrounding 
these modules may subsequently affect the containing system. The hidden modules may bring about 
unpredictable effects on system, which modular design can tolerance of uncertainty so far modules 
obey overall design rules. Therefore, modular designs can suggest alternatives which non-modular 
designs cannot.  
Finally, modularity provides options, which, when put under selection, an evolutionary path for the 
modular system will be created. Worthwhile options encourage investors in respect of following 
and implementing innovations. Based on this, invention would (in most cases) increase change in 
the hidden module design (but the changes are not sudden) in a way that produce technical and 
economical value. 
This chapter could be enriched by referring to the following work: 
                                                                                                                                                            
measured by the number of copies of a meme in society. In contrast, designers create designs for special 
goals, and so the success rate of a design is measured by how well the designed artefact runs its function, and 
how and what this function is important for. 
 
2. Design evolution is to destroy to memes. When human endeavour tries to improve designs, it destroys the 
previous pattern and replaces it (the available memes) with new and better designs.31However, although 
there are differences in these two approaches, they coexist in human society and fulfil each other, because 
one design may consciously produce memes that will replicate themselves (such as advertising slogans, etc.).  
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Gunter et al. (2001) attempt to present an explanation of modularity and an evaluation of modules 
and their roles from the perspective of different academics 
Deguet et al. (2005) discuss the idea of visibility and present five definitions of this concept. They 
claim that visibility is an idea that was first discussed in the field of philosophy and then was used 
in the field of complex technological systems as a key element. 
Also: Peter Kroes et al. Al (2006) and (1991), Parent and Spaccapictro (2009), Heylighen (1992), 
Blackmore (2001), Buchi and Santini (2005), Vincent and Mann (2002) and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) contribute to this debate. 
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Conclusion 
 
When the evolutionary biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky first published 'Nothing in Biology Makes 
Sense Except in the Light of Evolution' in 1973, he probably did not think that the application of the 
biological principles of evolutionary theory in the field of technology and engineering design would 
become so important in the 21st century. Now, it is apparent that evolutionary theory can be used for 
theoretical planning in relation to the growth and development of technical-social systems. The 
basic principles of Darwin’s theory of evolution notes that each system (which can), under a 
selective regime, achieves properties including variation, reproduction and heritability, in order that 
the system can evolve. Simondon is one of the first academics to use the conceptual tools of Darwin 
in order to consider a 'concretization' process for the evolutionary goal of technical complex 
systems.32 Other academics studying the growth and development of technology in the context of an 
evolutionary-historical process use the idea of genetic transfer for inspiration. Simondon also 
interprets this technical transfer from the level of basic elements (or the system’s constructional 
elements) to its phenotypic surface.  
 
The presence of intentionality in engineering design, and the conscious selection mechanism (in 
accordance with market demands and functional requirements) grants directionality to engineering 
procedures in technology in terms of non-linear developmental patterns. To understand non-linear 
evolutionary theory, an accurate cognition of the artificial environment, and the physical structure 
and functional nature of artefacts is crucial. Certain structures interacting in different milieu find 
different adaptive properties based on the actions of evolutionary operators. Although using 
evolutionary strategy is promising for shaping developmental patterns in technology, scientific 
progress and in economic theory, the distinctions between biological systems and technical-social 
systems highlights the importance of the preparation of a distinct conceptual framework for this 
kind of model. In this respect, the most important idea to consider is the presence of human desire 
and intention in the production of artefacts, and the idea that purposeful design is at the centre of 
such consciousness. Purposeful design is the intentional sensitivity of technological innovation 
toward human needs, social conditions and aesthetic aspects.  
 
Chapter One of this thesis explored the basic conceptual and theoretical elements of the artificial 
and evolutionary worlds. In this kind of exploration, it is important to consider the role of the 
                                                
32 Gilbert Simondon, 'On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects' Jérôme Millon (2005) 
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selection 'unit', and to examine the unit of selection in the context of its role as replicator and 
interactor. This approach helps to resolve ambiguity at the level of selection. In the past few 
decades, much debate has taken place among evolutionary biologists about the level and unit of 
selection. Selection is the result of replicator and interactor operation. An item is considered to be a 
replicator if it transfers its structure intact to the next generation following reproduction. Dawkins 
believes that longevity, fecundity and fidelity are the three properties of a replicator.33 In evolution, 
these properties are capable of participating in the process of reproduction, and can be transferred to 
next generations. The main principle of Darwin’s theory of evolution is the idea of natural selection 
and survival of the fittest, and this can be used to inform the contribution made by phenotypic 
effects in fitness. Using an historical-etiological approach it can be seen that adaptation occurs in 
the process of creating artefacts and systems that are used optimally in context (which have fitness). 
This adaptive process (in recursive practice) can be related to optimality in technical-social systems.  
 
Change and progress in technology is the result of different factors of operation. Technique and 
technical knowledge, engineering procedures, designing sets, aesthetic aspects, and commercial and 
economic aspects can have an effect on what is understood as the unit of selection, and some parts 
of technological culture could be referred to memetic. In this approach, a mentifact is considered to 
be a unit of selection. This idea views the cohesive whole as including the artefact and all activities 
involved in its production, use, maintenance, and developmental patterns (like design methodology, 
engineering procedures, etc.) which act to achieve the stable reproduction of the technical systems. 
Stable reproduction ability emerges when conditions and resources change in the context of the 
means-end process. Chapter 1 assessed the different units of selection, as identified and interpreted 
by different academics, and the different frameworks within which innovation and variation in 
technical-social systems occurs.  
 
An understanding of how evolutionary theory works in technology is crucial in order to discover 
how these two worlds (artefactual and natural) interact with each other. Chapter Two looked at 
whether it is possible to distinguish artefactual kinds from natural kinds, and whether the artefactual 
world is determinable ontologically and epistemologically. A theory of the artefact should be able 
to establish coherence of physical-chemical and intentional-tendency aspects. However, examining 
artefactual theory is not merely an analysis of structural properties. Intentionality plays a central 
role in human artefactual design, construction and use. Metaphysical studies show that an analysis 
                                                
33 Dawkins, Richard The Selfish Gene (1976) New York City: Oxford University Press. 
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of function cannot provide the necessary and sufficient conditions to determine artefactual 
membership. Identity criteria links to artefactual kinds and the theory of Fregean cardinality and 
relativism can contribute towards showing whether an artefact can be examined in a sortal context 
or not.  
 
Chapter Three discussed why technical systems are considered the product of a design process. An 
understanding of evolutionary mechanisms as they work in the design space is a pre-condition of an 
evolutionary theory of technology. Design methodology is involved with the improvement of the 
design process. John S. Gero talks about activities such as formulation, synthesis, analysis, 
evaluation, re-formulation and the production of a design description.34 According to how these 
procedures perform, function, structure and behaviour are bonded together. An exploration of state 
space initiates the spread of the design space, and new elements emerge based on additional or 
substitutional patterns, and as a result of relational knowledge. Design is a re-formulation process, 
based on the behaviour of structure, and function in different environments. This means that design 
activity can be thought of in terms of the idea of 'situatedness' as an evolutionary recursive. One 
important aspect of creative designing is the emergence effect. As a result of interactions among 
units and low-level elements, overall system behaviour emerges. An analysis of 'situatedness' in 
design attempts to examine the status of the environment as a determinative element in the 
evolutionary methodology of design. 
  
Chapter Four looked at different fundamental theories about function, such as intentional function 
theory, system function or causal-role theory, and etiological-evolutionary theory. By presenting 
existing theories of function, it is possible to consider whether the 'unit' theory of function can be 
used to answer all questions about how function works. The chapter considers the distinction 
between proper function, accidental function, and malfunction. In order to overcome theoretical 
obstacles, conjunction and disjunction combination theories are frequently used by academics in 
order to try to present a comprehensive interpretation of function. Some of these theories look at 
functional analysis from the perspective of the use plan or the action-oriented activities involved in 
production, design and use. In addition, this chapter presents a discussion about how an 
interpretation of function can be used in an evolutionary model of technology, and in evolutionary 
design methodology. 
                                                
34 John S. Gero 'Creativity, emergence and evolution in design' in Knowledge-Based Systems 9 (1996) pp.435-
448 
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Planning a dynamic evolutionary theory for technology means that a method is needed in order to 
link the past to the future. It could be argued that, in technology modularity plays the same role as 
heritability does in the world of nature. Additionally, evolutionary mechanisms that act on the unit 
of selection are a requirement for evolution. Baldwin and Clark look at the dynamic possibilities of 
modular operators in complex systems, such as splitting a design and its tasks into modules, 
substituting one module design for another, augmenting and adding a new module to the system, 
inverting to create new design rules, and porting a module to another system.35 Thus, the mentifact 
(which can also be thought of as the module) can be thought of as the unit of selection, and this idea 
of fitness encapsulates the idea of a selection criterion and emergent properties that are part of the 
source of variation, as well as the creativity of intellectual agents. 
                                                
35 Baldwin and Clark (2000) 
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